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Summary 
Macroeconomic aspects 
In terms of size, the Turkish economy is only about 4% of the EU-25 as a whole; however, Turkey is 
a major player, in economic terms as well, among its neighbours in South-East Europe and Asia. By 
regional standards, the Turkish economy is relatively developed. The country may well exert a 
greater influence over this part of the world further in the next few years.  
 
In the second quarter of 2004, Turkey achieved a real year-on-year GDP growth of 14.4%, re-
affirming its capability as a highly dynamic economy. This high growth-rate, one of the highest 
worldwide, raised concerns of overheating. Observers started asking whether once again, high 
growth would be short-lived and then brought to an abrupt stop by yet another crisis. The upsurge in 
the second-quarter growth was the outcome of kick-factors relating to private consumption: 
something that cannot be repeated. In the third and fourth quarters, the growth rate was only 5.3% 
and 6.3% respectively, and the growth rate for the year 2004 as a whole was 8,9%. In all likelihood, 
GDP growth has returned to a band between 5% and 10%. That is what can be expected from 2005 
and 2006, with rates not much above the lower limit. Quite possibly, growth will remain that strong 
for even longer. It seems that both the Turkish authorities and their advisors, the international 
financial institutions, have learnt their lesson from the crisis in 1999 – and more particularly 2001. 
The government is focused on achieving large primary surpluses, and the public debt-GDP ratio has 
already dropped close to 70%. The banking sector reform was an extremely costly, yet successful 
operation. GDP growth rates as high as 5% to 10% could well raise fears of a burgeoning current 
account deficit. The latter has increased, but hopefully not to an unsustainable extent, thanks to the 
strong dynamics in the export of both goods and services. As can be seen from the foreign trade-
GDP ratios, the Turkish economy used to be comparatively closed; it is now turning into a fairly open 
economy.  
 
Over the past few years, dynamics came into play in many different respects and directions. There 
were periods when the GDP grew very rapidly for several years, only to enter into an abrupt 
recession and even GDP decline. Not for long, however, as the economy repeatedly demonstrated 
its ability to revert swiftly to high growth. Turkey’s population had also grown accustomed to 
dynamics in a nominal sense – most of the time, inflation ran to two digits, and efforts were more 
directed towards preventing it from running to three digits. Since 2001, however, price dynamics 
have decelerated; the annual rate of inflation is close to single digits with a corresponding slowdown 
in currency depreciation. From the first half of 2003 onwards, there have been periods without any 
depreciation – and some even with slight appreciation. 
 
The risk of an economic setback, generated by internal factors has not disappeared completely. The 
country’s macroeconomic weak spot is still to be found in the public sector’s fiscal sphere. No matter 
which government rules the country over the next decade or so, it will have to service high debt. 
Other expenditures will have to be cut back correspondingly; otherwise the public debt-GDP ratio will 
remain high or rise even further. This is a difficult task; it runs counter to the urgent need for public 
investment in areas of significance for the country’s future socio-economic development. Over the 
next few years in particular, a significant increase in the debt-GDP ratio would undermine the 
growing confidence in Turkey’s future economic prosperity. The present government envisages 
important reforms. The short-term consequences of those reforms will scarcely meet with broad   ii
public acceptance. Privatization is likely to increase unemployment, at least in the short term, while 
the agricultural reform package entails not only a shift to a new subsidy system, but also a cut in total 
subsidies. In other words, it is not certain that for the next legislative period Turkey will again have a 
government that enjoys a comfortable parliamentary backing. Parliamentary elections are due in 
November 2007 at the latest. The next few years will surely prove to be a difficult transitional phase. 
For the present government, coming through this phase successfully will be easier if the international 
business climate remains favourable and international lending rates low.  
 
The risk of an economic setback also looms in the transition from the previous state of high inflation 
and permanent or repeated devaluation to one of low inflation and exchange rate stability. Once the 
risk of devaluation disappears nominal interest rates start attracting the attention of international 
financial investors. Capital inflows can become massive and lead to currency appreciation. Given 
Turkey’s export specialization (see below), the country is vulnerable to currency appreciation: 
exporters can easily lose their competitive edge. The current account could start yielding deficits 
which, at some point in time, could give financial investors the jitters.  
 
Macroeconomic considerations are only one aspect. The structural characteristics of the economy 
are no less important. The share of agriculture in the Turkish economy is still high – not only in terms 
of employment, but also with regard to its contribution to GDP. Trade including tourism creates 
almost as much value added as the manufacturing sector. Small enterprises, most of them under-
developed by EU standards, dominate the country’s manufacturing sector, as well as large parts of 
the services sector. At the same time, small and medium-sized enterprises were the seedbed for 
larger private companies. Most of them are now embedded in large holdings that have expanded 
their activities across the economy: in manufacturing, trade, tourism and finance. They have 
frequently entered into joint ventures with foreign companies, and extended their operations abroad, 
where they operate as traders – and frequently as direct investors as well. They have contributed to 
the change in the structure of Turkey’s corporate sector, especially in the structure of manufacturing. 
The production of machinery, transport equipment and durable consumer goods now accounts for 




The customs union with the EU, which entered into force on 1 January 1996, has contributed greatly 
to opening up Turkey’s economy, bringing about major increases in the volume of foreign trade. 
Turkish exports have more than doubled: up from USD 21.6 billion worldwide in 1995 to 47.2 billion 
in 2003. Imports have also increased: up from USD 35.7 billion to 66.7 billion over the same period. 
The EU share in Turkish trade flows has remained constant at about 50% of exports and 47% of 
imports. Owing to an asymmetric abolition of trade barriers (the EU abolished tariffs on most 
industrial goods from Turkey in the early 1970s whereas Turkey only lifted tariffs on entering the 
customs union),the customs union initially had a greater impact on the country’s imports than on its 
exports. Textiles account for the lion’s share of Turkey’s exports, whereas the main import items are 
transport equipment, chemicals and manufactured goods.  
 
The Turkish economy faces the challenging task of increasing the international renown of its brands 
and designs, thus strengthening the country’s position in the higher value-added segments of the 
European market. The focus on undifferentiated, low-technology and low-skill-intensive goods 
persists, despite Turkish export patterns having improved somewhat over time: the share of   iii
manufacturing in total exports increased from 25% in 1979 to 52% in 1989 and accounted for 54% in 
2003. Intra-industry trade has also gained in importance; however, it is often the result of vertical 
differentiation, with Turkey specializing in low-tech and low-skill-intensive activities. Following 
Turkey’s adoption in 2001 of the national programme for the adoption of the acquis, trade in services 
has increased noticeably in volume compared to the mid-1990s. The net contribution of services is 
positive and has risen to more than 5% of GDP. Travel services are the prominent feature of trade in 




With the entry into force of the customs union between the EU and Turkey, many of the features 
attributable to potential EU membership and the improved market access related thereto have 
already materialized (viz. customs controls, tariff and non-tariff barriers, competition law, industrial 
commercial and intellectual property rights, harmonization with EU technical standards, etc.), even 
though the customs union only covers industrial products. Turkey’s largest gains from further 
integration are expected to come about as a result of institutional reforms and reduced corruption 
stimulated by the prospects of EU membership. At present, Turkey continues to struggle with 
technical barriers to trade, while the EU still does not recognize the Turkish Accreditation Agency 




Over the past decade, the main features of the Turkish labour market have been: persistent 
migration from rural to urban regions; changes in the composition of the workforce; and a decline in 
employment and activity rates, particularly those of women. In contrast to the EU-15 where 
employment rates have increased over recent years, they have continued to drop in Turkey. Thus, 
on entry into the EU, Turkey would find itself at the lower end of the EU scale, even behind the 
latecomer Poland. The female employment rate in Turkey is extremely low, less than half the EU 
average. In Turkey, employment is still heavily concentrated on the agricultural sector (34%), 
particularly in the eastern parts of the country. This is indicative of an ongoing transition towards an 
industry and service economy. The share of services in total employment is much lower than in the 
EU, yet higher than in Romania and similar to Bulgaria; this is attributable to Turkey’s well-developed 
tourist sector. Employment in high-skill services, such as financial intermediation and business 
services, is still under-developed.  
 
Informal sector employment is reportedly on the increase; estimates as to its size vary from the 
figure of 13% cited by the Statistical Office and the OECD assumed figure of close on 50% of all 
persons employed. In 2003 nearly half of all employees were not registered in any social security 
institution. 
 
Unemployment has been on the rise over the past few years; it is currently higher than in the EU, 
especially in urban regions and among young educated people. The yawning gap between urban 
and rural unemployment is mainly due to the widespread practice of family members working as 
unpaid labour in agriculture. Interestingly, the proportion of long-term unemployed is very low: only 
24% in 2003, whereas it is close to 50% in Poland and 60% in Romania. Unemployment is 
particularly high among young educated people in urban areas: some 30% in 2003. As in the 
European Union, unemployment rates differ widely between regions. Southern Anatolia suffers most   iv
from high unemployment: a jobless rate of 21.6%, which is double the national average. By way of 
contrast, the Black Sea region and East Anatolia report the lowest jobless rates, while all other 
regions are close to the national average.  
 
As in other developing countries, child labour is very common in Turkey. The Accession Partnership 
(AP) has identified the strengthening of efforts to tackle the problem of child labour as one of the 
short-term priorities and objectives related to employment and social affairs. Initial steps towards 
reducing child labour were undertaken as far back as 1991 when Turkey joined the ILO International 
Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour. Since then child labour has decreased substantially; 
in 1999 it totalled some 500,000 6-14 year olds. Child labour is mostly to be found in agriculture, but 
it is also to be seen in the furniture and manufacturing industries, as well as in restaurants.  
 
The wave of internal migration dating back to the fifties is still underway. Most people migrate from 
the eastern to the western parts of Turkey; many of the migrants have only been to elementary 
school, if at all. Their job opportunities are limited to manual labour by virtue of their having worked 
previously in farming or some other low-skill activity. Lack of public security in the east and southeast 
of the country, the unequal distribution of job opportunities and regional income disparities are the 
main reasons for the massive scale of migration in Turkey. In the 1990s, the main targets for internal 
migrants from the agricultural areas in Anatolia were the Marmara region (an industrialized area) 
together with the Mediterranean region (a tourist area).  
 
Today some 3.2 million Turkish nationals live in the European Union, the bulk of whom (two thirds) 
are concentrated in Germany. Other important host countries are the Benelux countries, France and 
Austria. Many of these Turks were born and bred in EU countries. In most cases, the original 
immigrants came from rural areas and had little schooling. However, over the past few years 
migration has taken a new turn: an increased number of Turks with advanced professional 




Given the structure of industry, foreign trade and the labour market in Turkey, it is obvious that the 
country is lagging behind in comparison to the developed EU countries. However, except for the 
current state of the labour market, Turkey’s economy, including its macroeconomic performance, is 
by no means significantly or substantially inferior to other lesser-developed EU candidate countries, 
present and past. It has developed a remarkable dynamism in terms of economic growth and 
structural adjustment. The small size of its economy suggests that from an economic point of view, 
accepting Turkey as an EU member does not incur any major risk. The current fierce debate raging 
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Turkey: macroeconomic vulnerability, trade and competitiveness, 
and labour markets 
A Macroeconomic dynamics 
Population, size of the economy and income per capita compared to other countries  
Turkey has a population of around 71 million (estimate for mid-2004): less than Germany (82.6 
million), but more than the other EU member states. In recent years, the Turkish population has risen 
each year by about 1.1 million. However, its growth is expected to decelerate in the course of the next 
decades; in its medium variant, the UN Population Division (2004) has forecast a population of close 
to 89 million for 2025 and around 98 million for 2050. Whether these estimates prove accurate or not 
hinges on the country’s future economic development. In the case of strong long-term economic 
expansion encompassing most parts of the country, the population growth rate would probably be 
low. Turkish citizens with an income close or superior to the West European average tend towards 
low birth rates. Birth rates are high where people are relatively poor: in certain segments of urban 
agglomerations and less developed rural areas. As evidenced in various other countries, family-
related government policies also have an appreciable impact on population growth (Neyer 2003).  
 
With a surface area of some 780,000 square kilometres, Turkey is larger than France, the largest 
EU country (547,000 sq km).  
 
Compared to the extent of its territory and the size of its population, the country’s economy is small 
in terms of the volume of productive capacity and total annual output. Compared to the EU-25, 
Turkey’s gross domestic product (GDP) was only 4.4% in 2003. Each year, Turkey’s economy 
produces a GDP and/or gross national income (GNI) similar in size to that of Poland, measured in 
purchasing power parities (PPPs).
1 
 
In terms of size, Turkey’s economy is large in comparison to its close or more remote Balkan 
neighbours: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and 
Montenegro – and even Greece, a EU member state. Table 1 compares those countries’ GDP, GDP 
per capita and price levels. In 2002, Turkey’s GDP amounted to EUR 415 billion (in PPPs) 
compared to 187 billion for Greece and 139 billion for Romania. Only one country in Turkey’s 
immediate neighbourhood boasts an economy of similar size: Iran, whose GNI stood at 
EUR 476 billion in 2002 (DEİK, 2004a). Of Turkey’s more remote neighbours, only one economy is 
much larger: Russia with a GDP of EUR  1031 billion. Ukraine’s economy is about half that of 
Turkey’s, while Israel’s economy is about one third. In terms of its national economy, territory and 
                                                           
*   The authors would like to thank Ms Bengi Kibritçioğlu and Professor Aykut Kibritçioğlu, Turkish economists, for their 
tireless support in collecting data, search of literature and providing valuable background information. 
1   See Table 1 and for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe Gligorov, Pöschl and Richter (2004), where both the 
gross domestic product and GDP per capita can be found; the difference between GDP and gross national income 
(GNI) is negligible in the given context. If measured in exchange rates, Poland’s and Turkey’s GDP are once again 
similar in size. 2 
population, Turkey is undoubtedly the major player in the region. At the same time, economic links to 
its immediate and more remote neighbours are still under-developed. This stifles the Turkish 
economy, but may well lessen over the next few years.  
 
Table 1 
The size of the Turkish economy compared to neighbouring countries, 2002 
  Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), EUR bn 
Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita, EUR 
Population General  price 
level 
  at PPPs  at exchange 
rates 
at PPPs  at exchange 
rates 
in mn  EU-15=100 
Turkey  415.0 192.8  5950  2765  69.6  46 
Southeast Europe (SEE-8) 
Albania 11.1  5.1  3560  1645  3.1  46 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  22.4  6.0  5860  1556  3.8  27 
Bulgaria 50.0  16.5  6360  2101  7.9  33 
Greece 186.6  141.3  17040  12907  10.6  76 
Croatia 41.2  24.2  9270  5451  4.4  59 
Macedonia 12.3  4.0  6100  1981  2.0  32 
Romania 138.6  48.4  6360  2221  21.8  35 
Serbia and Montenegro  .  15.6  .  1874  8.3  . 
Eastern and South eastern neighbours: 
Armenia 10.9  2.7  3230  790  3.1  24 
Azerbaijan 26.8  6.3  3010  710  8.2  24 
Georgia 12.8  3.7  2270  650  5.2  29 
Iraq .  .  .  .  24.2   
Iran 475.8  122.3  6690  1720  65.5  26 
Israel 136.2  114.8  19000  16020  6.6  84 
Syria 64.1  20.9  3470  1130  17.0  33 
Northern neighbours: 
Russia 1030.7  365.4  7160  2540  143.9  35 
Ukraine 220.2  44.9  4570  931  48.2  20 
Note:  1) Gross National Income (GNI) instead of GDP. Rates used for recalculation from USD into EUR terms: 
USD 0.9449 USD per EUR for the exchange rate, USD 0.9209 per EUR for the PPP. 
Source: wiiw, EU-AMECO, World Development Indicators 2004. 
 
Within the regional setting, Turkey’s population is certainly not the poorest in terms of GDP per 
capita; measured in PPPs, it stood at EUR 6,000 in 2002. Only two countries in the broader 
neighbourhood have much higher per capita incomes: Israel (EUR 19,000) and Greece (EUR 
17,000). With EUR 9,300, Croatia is also clearly more advanced. Russia, Bulgaria, Iran, Macedonia 
and Romania are more or less in the same league; all the other neighbours are much poorer 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Syria and Ukraine). A comparison with 
neighbours based on exchange rates is even more favourable for Turkey: only Israel, Greece and 
Croatia are superior to Turkey.  
 3 
Table 1 also allows us to compare the general price levels in the different countries
2. Turkey’s 
general price level is 46% compared to the EU-15, which is rather high for the neighbourhood. Once 
again, Israel, Greece and Croatia record higher ratios (84%, 76% and 59%, respectively). In all other 
countries listed in Table 1, price levels are lower than in Turkey – and in some cases even much 
lower, viz. the Ukraine with a ratio of 20%. The lower both GDP per capita and overall price levels 
tend to be, the less developed a country is. In other words, seen from a regional perspective, Turkey 
is relatively developed.  
 
 
Turkey’s macro-development: dynamic instability? 
Turkey has acquired a reputation as an unstable, yet dynamic country
3. Both terms mean essentially 
the same; the one has negative connotations, the other positive ones. ‘Dynamic’ is associated with 
processes taking place in the real sector; variables such as real GDP growth or growth of industrial 
output spring to mind. In fact, after World War II, Turkey experienced several phases of high growth 
interrupted time and again by major setbacks – periods of low growth or even pronounced GDP 
decline. Oscillations along some long-term trend are characteristic of the development path taken by 
market economies; in the case of Turkey, however, the oscillations were not smooth, but rather 
extreme and abrupt. All in all, the country experienced a strong and positive development, as 
becomes clear on reviewing such development yardsticks as the UNDP development index and its 
changes over time. 
 
In the case of Turkey, the UNDP human development index points to a reduction in poverty and 
unbearable living conditions over the past decades. For example, life expectancy at birth, one of the 
components of the index, rose from 53 years in 1965 to 69.3 years in 1998; GDP per capita more 
than doubled over the same period
4. The figures also reveal a pronounced disparity between the 
incomes of the richest and of the poorest segments of society. In Turkey, the ratio between the 
income of the richest and the poorest 20% of the population is about 8, rather similar to the USA (9). 
In Western Europe the ratio is significantly lower: mostly between 3 and 7. In Austria the ratio is 5.5 
and in Germany 4.7 (UNDP, 2002). 
 
In the post-war period, GDP growth in Turkey was appreciable. However, since it was matched by 
high population growth, real per capita income growth lagged way behind GDP growth.  
 
As Figure 1 shows, Turkey enjoyed a protracted period of high growth in the 1980s; it lasted from 
1981 to 1987. In the four-year period 1990-1993, developments took a comparatively positive turn 
once again before contracting sharply for the first time in 1994. By then the era of liberalized capital 
flows, which had begun in 1989, had already set in
5. Over the period 1995-1997 growth was 
                                                           
2   Dividing a country’s GDP in euro at PPP by the GDP in euro at exchange rate provides the ratio between the country’s 
overall price level and the EU-15 price level. 
3    Turkey’s economy is under close scrutiny by researchers and institutions in Turkey itself as well as by academic 
research outside Turkey, international business-financed research (e.g. FitchRatings, 2005; Deutsche Bank Research: 
Boettcher, 2004; Jaeger, 2004, 2005; Bank Austria Creditanstalt: Quichano-Evans, 2004), the European Commission 
(EU Commission, 2004), OECD (OECD, 2004a) and the international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank). 
4   If measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollar terms, in 1998 the GDP per capita was 6,635 compared to 
2,504 in 1965. Source: Economics Web Institute, http://www.economicswebinstitute.org/ecdata.htm).  
5   For risks related to financial liberalization in developing countries see Wyplosz (2001).  4 
satisfactory once more, whereas in both 1999 and 2001 GDP suffered another steep decline
6. The 
interim year (2000) was marked by pronounced growth. 2002 and 2003 also yielded good results, 
while results in 2004 proved to be even better.  
 
Over the past decades, the real sector development has been clearly dynamic (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 








































Source: State Office for Statistics. 
 
There was not much stability, however. This is especially true if we associate stability with price 
stability or exchange rate stability. The economic history of Turkey over the past decades has been 
characterized by high inflation. On occasion it threatened to degenerate into hyperinflation, although 
this in fact never happened. That notwithstanding, for a short period the annual rate of inflation shot 
up to three digits: 105% in 1994. Another peak value, albeit less dramatic, was reached in 1997: 
86%. Thereafter inflation has decelerated continuously.  
 
Nominal wages and nominal exchange rates as well as discount rates – all moved in the same 
direction, as did consumer price inflation (Figure 2). The depreciation of the Turkish lira took a 
massive leap in 2001 in the wake of that year’s financial crisis.
7 Whereas the discount rate had been 
                                                           
6   Many authors deal with Turkey’s instability, as for example Boratav and Erinç (2002), Dibooğlu and Kibritçioğlu (2004) 
or Ekinci and Ertürk (2004). 
7   The exchange rate-related line was above zero throughout; this indicates that the Turkish lira depreciated against the 
euro (or the basket of currencies corresponding to the euro) each year.  5 
much lower than inflation in the mid-1990s, it was much higher after 2000. In other words, over the 
period 2001-2003, nominal interest rates went down and real interest rates went up.  
 
Turkey’s persistent and pronounced tendency towards high inflation has caught the attention of 
many analysts (e.g. Dibooğlu and Kibritçioğlu, 2004; Kibritçioğlu, 2004; Kibritçioğlu, Rittenberg and 
Selçuk, 2002). Of course, no single generally accepted interpretation of the causes has been found. 
One possible reason is the mutually reinforcing correlation between inflation and nominal 
depreciation. Depreciation increased the YTL price of imports which, in turn, bore inflationary 
consequences – either directly via the import of consumer goods or indirectly via the import of 
manufacturing inputs, thus nudging production costs upwards. Possibly, this correlation had little 
effect prior to the 1980s, as foreign trade was still minor in relation to the GDP. In 1990, ten years 
after the introduction of an export-led development strategy, exports of goods had still only reached 
a level of less than 9% of GDP, while the import-GDP ratio stood at 14%. By 2003 these ratios had 
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Source: wiiw calculations based on national statistics. 
 
Inflation inertia is possibly rooted in prior experience which, in turn, generates expectations. Wage 
bargaining could have anticipated inflation. It is debatable, however, whether trade unions had the 
power to push through wage increases that offset inflation. That having been said, in general, 
anticipation of inflation should have played a role in a society that had become accustomed to high 
inflation rates.  6 
Up to 1996, the first year of the customs union with the EU, protection against foreign competition 
played an important, even if diminishing role. Together with GDP growth, protectionism may have 
created internal bottlenecks in certain segments of the economy, thus fuelling inflation. 
 
In all likelihood, the state played an important role where inflation was concerned. For many 
countries, economists have tried to find evidence of a close link between government deficits and 
inflation. The relationship between these two variables may not be that simple, however. Kibritçioğlu 
(2004) argues that periods of deteriorating public governance are more likely to be accompanied by 
increasing inflation. In a country where the production of public utilities and key segments of 
manufacturing are dominated by public enterprises, state-regulated prices play an important role. 
Pushing prices upwards has a positive effect on public sector revenues. In Turkey, where inflation 
was endemic, permitting regulated prices to rise was by far the easiest way of supplementing 
government revenues – especially for weak governments. 
 
 
Strong governments more the exception than the rule 
The state sector plays an important socio-economic role in Turkey. This fact may have deep 
historical roots. In a manner of speaking, the Ottoman Empire was an extension of the Byzantine 
Empire; it was engaged in ruling over a vast territory with a most diverse population. Its main pillars 
had always been the administration and the army.  
 
The more regulations there are, the more often civil servants have to be approached. If a person or 
company requires a service of a government body, the most practical first step is to seek direct 
support or intervention or mediated support from somebody who works in administration, ideally at a 
senior level. This strategy is common to many societies; in Turkey, however, it is extremely 
widespread. Once a senior civil servant has made a suggestion, however informal, to an official 
lower down on the scale, the latter is left with little choice. Without that backing, most Turks do not 
expect civil servants to treat them amicably – at least at no cost. There is little public confidence in 
complaints being treated equitably. In this respect, as in many others, Turkey is full of contrasts; in 
certain sectors of the civil service employees are efficient, skilful and incorruptible.  
 
Maintaining control over the public administration with all its subdivisions is a difficult enough task for 
governments across the globe. In Turkey public governance has been especially difficult over the 
past few decades. Governments with a comfortable majority in the parliament, similar to the current 
government, have been more the exception than the rule. However, even governments with strong 
parliamentary backing have had to be aware that they could be removed from office at any time – as 
soon as the military leaders determined that they had violated the fundamental principles of the 
state: the two most important tenets being laicism and the undividable national state. Large parts of 
the population have never identified with these principles, but nevertheless the army has always 
been held in high respect by most Turks. The constitution accords the military a custodian role: an 
assignment that the military has taken seriously. On several occasions, it has intervened not only 
behind the scenes, but also quite openly and rigorously. 
 7 
In 1960 the military seized power, put the prime minister in gaol and started things anew – with a 
new constitution.
8 In 1971, after three years of eroding public security due to politically motivated 
violence from different angles, the military leaders forced a change in government but did not impose 
direct rule. In 1980, the military seized power and introduced martial law throughout country, 
appointing a national security council and entrusting an assembly with the task of drafting a new 
constitution. Some 30,000 people were gaoled, including several top politicians who were 
subsequently banned from all political functions for ten years. 1980 also marked a turning point in 
economic policy: liberalization and export-orientation were introduced. In 1997, the National Security 
Council ousted the Islamist prime minister, Erbakan.  
 
The National Security Council has always had an influence on Turkish politics on a regular basis. 
Each month senior government ministers are called in to report to the heads of the various branches 
of the armed forces, who then pronounce on a whole range of issues. It used to be risky to ignore 
the views so presented. Most of the time, the Council had a problem with political parties with 
religious leanings. On several occasions, the military leadership introduced a ban of such parties 
only to have them resurface under another name with ever-increasing support from the electorate. 
The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) currently in power, which 
won a large majority in the general election in November 2002, came from this camp. Prime Minister 
Erdoğan’s government has one aim in common with the military leadership: paving the way for 
Turkey’s accession to the EU. This entails strengthening democratic institutions and, at the same 
time, consolidating laicism as one of the fundamentals, hardly something to be expected from that 
party. It also entails making concessions in terms of federalization and minority
9 rights, hardly 
something that the military leadership can accept easily. Debate is raging in Turkey on whether the 
indivisible nation state will survive, should EU accession require that, at least in some districts, 
Kurdish be introduced as a second official language (Oran, 2004). In August 2004, President Ahmet 
Sezer confirmed the appointment of a civilian to head the National Security Council. Since the 
Council’s supremacy is not compatible with the European Union’s Copenhagen criteria, from mid-
2003 onwards legislation has accorded the council the status of an advisory body, the counts of 
which are subject to scrutiny by the audit court (Schäfer, 2004).  
 
Over the past decades, Turkish governments, possibly more than their developed country 
counterparts, have usually been exposed to pressure from different quarters such as the military, 
armed resistance, opposition parties, coalition squabbles, the electorate, or economic imbalances. 
Public governance has been especially poor in some periods. As a consequence, little has been 
done to combat corruption, which has a long tradition in the region, similar to many other less 
developed countries. In the more remote past, Turkish government revenues were very low in 
relation to the GDP, whereas in the meantime this ratio has increased (Figure 4). There may well 
have been a link between poor public governance and low tax revenues. For example, it is quite 
possible that the application of taxation laws has been only fragmentary. In the early 1990s, tax 
revenues made up about 15% of GDP. Only after 1997 did they climb to over 20%; in recent years 
they have come close to 30%. To some extent, this may reflect, inter alia, more efficient tax 
collection.  
 
                                                           
8   For a chronology of political events see, e.g., Ecoi.net (2004). 
9   For a discussion of minority issues (in Turkish language) see Baskın (2004). 8 
Box 1 
Tax issues 
Turkey’s most important tax rates are the following (YASED, 2004):  
•  Corporate income tax: 30%;  
•  Dividend withholding tax: 10%;  
•  Personal income tax rate for: salaries: 15 to 40%, other income: 20 to 45%;  
•  Value-added tax: 18% for most domestically produced and imported goods and services; 8% for basic 
foodstuffs, books, natural gas and medical products; 1% for journals, newspapers, certain agricultural 
goods and most leasing transactions.  
Exempt from VAT are e.g. exported goods and services, transhipment of goods through Turkey.  
A recent reform of the tax system provides for inflation accounting applicable in the event of future high-inflation 
periods. 
Turkey applies a two-tier corporate income tax system, this provides for both accelerated depreciation and 
investment allowances. As a result, the effective tax burden can be very low if a company’s purchases of new 
machinery and equipment exceed its profits in the same year. 
 
 
Public sector debt 
The reform programme elaborated in cooperation with the IMF in the late 1990s envisaged a stable 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor. As it transpired, this policy was not backed by sufficient 
currency reserves (Alper, 2001). For the reform policy to be successful, so Alper, an uninterrupted 
flow of good news was essential. The increase in the current account deficit and the troubles in the 
banking sector in late November 2000, however insignificant the bank that sparked everything off 
might have been, did not qualify as good news. By February 2001, the situation had got out of 
control, culminating in a major devaluation of the Turkish currency devaluated strongly and an 
inordinately high gross debt in the public sector. 
 
Figure 3 
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Source: SIS. 9 
At the end of 2000, the public sector net debt (Figure 3) amounted to 58% of GDP at the end of 
2000; however, by the end of 2001 it had risen to 91%. In the two years thereafter, it dropped down 
again to 78.5% (2002) and 70.5% (2003).  
 
At the end of 1990, the debt-GDP ratio had been as low as 29%. The reasons for the subsequent 
increase are manifold. During the first half of the past decade, the public sector generated a high 
primary deficit: on average 4.5% of GDP. Over the period 1995-2000 following on the crisis of 1994, 
the public sector’s primary budget was more or less balanced, whereas high interest rates provoked 
a strong growth in the debt stock (Özdemir 2004).  
 
Towards the end of 2000 and in the first months of 2001, it became obvious that one segment of the 
banking sector was overexposed to risk. Increasing awareness of the sector’s vulnerability led to a 
full-blooded financial and economic crisis, which had not been preceded by such obvious symptoms 
as an alarming increase in macroeconomic imbalances.
10 Some of the banks, public and private 
alike, found themselves in serious trouble. In the end, the treasury poured some USD 40-50 billion 
into the sector, thus increasing the government’s debt. The major devaluation of the Turkish lira 
(YTL) as a result of the crisis merely compounded the increase in the government’s debt-GDP ratio. 
At the end of 2001, loans from abroad made up 42% of the overall government debt, compared to 
34% at the end of 2000. In YTL terms, the government’s net foreign debt almost doubled in the 
biennium 2000-2002 and net domestic debt nearly trebled. In USD terms, external debt rose from 
USD 39 billion (in 2000) to USD 59 billion (in 2002) and declined slightly thereafter. Domestic debt 
climbed from USD 76 billion to USD 84 billion, only to be followed by a hike to USD 123 billion in 
2003. All in all, there was a shift away from USD debt. The main problem with the debt is not its size, 
but its maturity profile and composition. The average maturity in the treasury’s auction was about 13 
months in 2004 compared to less than seven months in 2001-2002 (Cevik 2005). The January 2005 
average was 16 months, reflecting investors’ increasing readiness to accept longer-term debt 
instruments. The shares of floating rate and foreign exchange instruments have somewhat declined 
in 2004, but should be diminished further (Yapı ve Kredi Bankası 2005). 
 
A policy of relatively high primary budget surplus was already on track in 2000; it has since remained 
one of the key elements of government policy. The primary budget surplus was 6.1% of GDP in 2000, 
7.0% in 2001, 4.6% in 2002 and 5.2% in 2003. If corrected for inflation using the GDP deflator, 
government revenues can be seen to have declined slightly in 2001, only to increase thereafter: by 
over 2% in 2002 and over 7% in 2003. Likewise corrected for inflation, expenditures grew by over 
11% in 2001, but declined slightly thereafter: by 0.3% in 2002 and 1.0% in 2003. The increase in real 
expenditures in 2001 was attributable to the hike in interest costs; non-interest expenditures fell by 
close to 3% in 2001, only to rise in the two years thereafter (by 12.3 and 4.5%, respectively). The 
backdrop to all this was a decline in domestic interest rates and the reduction of nominal currency 
depreciation which, from May 2003 onwards, became visible against both the US dollar and the euro.  
 
In 2001 in particular, extremely high debt servicing costs in the context of high interest rates pushed 
overall government expenditures upwards far in excess of revenues. From 1999 onwards, the 
budget deficit has always been over 10% of GDP, peaking at 16% in 2001. Public sector net debt, 
                                                           
10   For the role of banks in this context see Öniş and Alper (2002). Effenberger (2002) gives an overview on discussions 
concerning early warning indicators of currency crises. Hutchison and Neuberger (2002) analyse, based on experience 
from a number of countries, output effects of ‘twin’ banking and currency crises. 10 
YTL 72 billion at the end of 2000, stood at YTL 250 billion at end-2003. In 2004, it only increased to 
an insignificant degree; at end-June 2004, net debt amounted to 265 billion. Something similar holds 
true for the government’s net domestic debt in YTL terms; in June 2004, it was not much above the 
end-2003 level (YTL 186 billion compared to 179 billion).  
 
Figure 4 
Central government: expenditures including interest payments;  
expenditures, excluding interest payments; revenues, 1996 to 2003 
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Source: wiiw calculations based on national statistics. 
 
The 2003 figures were better than generally expected. For example, Nur Keyder (Keyder, 2003a 
and 2003b) calculated the debt-GDP ratios for 2003 under different assumptions such as a real 
GDP growth rate of 5% or 6%, nominal depreciation against a 1 to 1 EUR-USD basket of 15, 20 or 
25%, an inflation rate of 20 or 25%, a real interest rate on YTL-denominated debt of 15 or 20%, an 
average interest rate on foreign exchange borrowing and non-maturing debt of 9% and a primary 
surplus target of 6.5% of GDP.
11 The scenario with the lower growth rate (5%) and inflation rate 
(20%), the higher rate of depreciation (20%) and the highest real interest rate (20%) led to the most 
unfavourable result, a debt-GDP ratio of over 77%. By contrast, the scenario based on 20% 
devaluation, but 6% real GDP growth and 25% inflation in tandem with a lower real interest rate 
(15%) generated the most favourable result: a debt-GDP ratio of less than 73%. The rates assumed 
have proved ‘conservative’, given the debt-GDP ratio of 70.5% which Turkey achieved in 2003. GDP 
growth was 5.8% in 2003, and by December the real interest rate of the domestic debt stock was 
11.9%, as a weighted average of public and market interest rate (6.5 and 16.5%, respectively). A 
                                                           
11   An informative paper on this topic is also Seçuk and Ardıç (2004). 11 
comparison of the average exchange rates in 2002 and 2003 yields 0.8% nominal appreciation 
against the US dollar, but 17.9% depreciation against the euro. The average rate of inflation, year-
on-year, was 22.5%. The primary surplus achieved in 2003, 5.8% of GDP, remained somewhat 
below the target.  
 
In 2004, GDP growth was high (8,9%), given that it was 11,8% in the first and 14.4% in the second 
quarter. Depreciation against the euro was moderate (annual average 2004 over 2003). The real 
interest rate was also declining, and the primary budget balance was significantly positive again. In 
other words, in 2004 the debt-GDP ratio converged further towards the debt ceiling as defined in the 
Maastricht treaty. 
 
In all the years shown, government expenditures, excluding interest payments, were lower than 
revenues. From 2000 onwards, the primary surplus was very significant. At the same time, high 
debt-servicing requirements pushed the overall government deficit far above revenues.  
 
Figure 5 
Public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR), 1990 to 2003 
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Source: wiiw calculations based on national statistics. 
 
Within the government budget over the period 1999-2003, state expenditures, excluding debt 
servicing, did not change much in relation to GDP, whereas the debt-servicing requirements pushed 
the overall expenditures upwards: a point emphasized, for example, by Derviş, Gros, Öztrak, Bayar 
and Işık (2004a). 
 12 
Turkish statistics not only provide data about the budget of the central government, but the statistics 
on public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR) also show the size of the of the public sector deficit 
in a comprehensive sense. They also record deficit data for the various public sector subdivisions 
such as state-run enterprises (state economic enterprises, SEEs), those SEEs transferred to the 
privatization agency, as well as the social security system and extra-budgetary funds. In those 
statistics, a positive sign indicates a borrowing requirement: it thus points to a deficit.  
 
The results derived from the PSBR statistics do not differ substantially from those shown in the 
central government statistics. The PSBR has been most positive in recent years: up to 16% of GDP 
in 2001. This indicates a very high deficit for the public sector as a whole. If debt servicing is left 
aside, the PSBR takes a markedly negative turn: down to –8% of GDP (see Figure 5). These 
negative figures reflect primary surpluses in the public sector as a whole.  
 
 
Economic policy: challenges facing the fiscal and monetary authorities 
Combating high public indebtedness is a primordial objective of the government’s fiscal policy. It is 
important that it achieve a high primary budget surplus over the next few years. By pursuing such a 
policy, the government risks losing popularity. Thus, it will probably relax budgetary discipline 
somewhat when approaching the next elections. The government also runs the risk of dwindling 
popularity, at least among the less affluent electorate, if it relies mainly on cuts in expenditures to 
meet its budgetary goals. The arguments calling for this particular route to come from many 
directions: for many experts, cutting expenditures is always more popular than striving for higher 
revenues, being as it is quite in line with the ideal of a ‘slim’ state. If it economizes on transfers in the 
context of pensions and the health system, farming subsidies or job-seekers, the government may 
disappoint many of those who constitute their electoral base. In principle, in a democracy it should 
not matter too much if a ruling party loses popularity and is replaced by opposition parties. However, 
Turkey is now at a critical stage; it needs firm and professional political governance in the interest of 
economic consolidation.  
 
The constraints on the expenditure side are severe: the army is large and absorbs a significant part 
of the budget, the social security system is unbalanced, massive investment in infrastructure, 
education and research are required. The population has had to pay into a mandatory savings 
system from the late 1980s onwards; a court decision has committed the government to start 
repayments. In the case of Turkey, it would be important to improve tax collection, whence the public 
sector could gain much without increasing tax rates. However, it is difficult to achieve that aim, as it 
is also a question of combating corruption: an extremely difficult undertaking, especially in the short 
run. The main tax burden will continue to be borne by consumers and employees.  
 
The declared goal of monetary policy is achieving and maintaining almost stable prices. The recent 
achievements in this respect are impressive. Within a matter of months, the annual rate of inflation 
has dropped to below 10% (December 2004); it seems likely that this trend will continue. The 
exchange rate has stopped depreciating. The situation, however, is not without its dangers. 
Confidence in future exchange rate stability or gradual nominal appreciation could spread, in which 
case Turkey may prove very attractive for international financial investors. The key variable for them, 
in such circumstances, is nominal interest rates, which are still high. In other words, capital inflows 
could boost appreciation tendencies. They could place undue strain on the Turkish business sector, 13 
whose international competitiveness would suffer.
12 It will be difficult to chart the right course, given 
that the room for manoeuvre is in fact limited.  
 
 
The structure of the current account 
Up to 1989, so one view (e.g. in Alper, 2001), Turkey’s crises were linked to current account 
problems. Thereafter, they stemmed from processes registered in the financial account. 1989 was 
the year in which financial account flows were liberalized. Balance of payments data create the 
impression of there also having been a link between current account deterioration and crisis post-
1989. Current account developments are variables that affect financial flows; the crisis-producing 
mechanism may well have changed after 1989. 
 
Table 2 
Current account flows and balances, 1990 to 2004 
(% of GDP) 
    1990 1991 1992    1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001    2002    2003    2004
CURRENT  ACCOUNT -1.7 0.2  -0.6 -3.6 2.0  -1.4 -1.3 -1.4 1.0  -0.7 -4.9 2.3  -0.8 -3.3 -5.2 
Balance  on  goods  -6.4 -4.9 -5.2 -7.9 -3.3 -7.8 -5.9 -8.1 -7.1 -5.7 -11.2 -3.1 -4.5 -5.8 -7.9 
  Exports  f.o.b.  8.6  9.0  9.3  8.6  14.0 12.8 17.7 17.0 15.4 15.7 15.4 23.7 21.8 21.3 22.1 
  Imports  f.o.b.  -15.0 -13.9 -14.4 -16.5 -17.2 -20.6 -23.6 -25.1 -22.5 -21.4 -26.7 -26.8 -26.4 -27.1 30.0 
Balance  of  services  3.3 3.4 3.7 3.8 5.4 5.7 3.7 5.8 6.8 4.1 5.7 6.3 4.3 4.4 4.2 
  Services:  credit  5.4 5.6 6.0 6.1 8.5 8.8 7.4 10.4  11.9  9.1 10.2  11.0  8.0 7.9 . 
 Services:  debit  -2.1 -2.2 -2.4 -2.3 -3.1 -3.1 -3.7 -4.7 -5.1 -5.1 -4.5 -4.8 -3.8 -3.5 . 
Balance  of  income  -1.7 -1.8 -1.7 -1.5 -2.5 -1.9 -1.6 -1.6 -1.5 -1.9 -2.0 -3.4 -2.5 -2.3 -1.8 
  Income:  credit  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.4 0.9 . 
 Income:  debit  -2.3 -2.4 -2.3 -2.2 -3.2 -2.8 -2.5 -2.6 -2.7 -3.2 -3.4 -5.3 -3.8 -3.2 . 
Current  transfers  3.0 3.4 2.6 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 0.4 0.4 
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, Ankara; 7 March 2005 update. 
 
As Table 2 shows, starting from 1990 onwards the current account deficit in most years was not 
alarmingly high. The major exceptions were 1993 with 3.6% of GDP and 2000 with a 4.9% deficit. In 
both cases, a major crisis occurred the following year, with declines in GDP of 5.5% (1994) and 
7.5% (2001). Therefore, even under conditions of liberalized financial flows, it seems advisable to 
keep current account developments under close scrutiny. The current account deficit was highest in 
2004: EUR 12.5 billion, more than 5% of GDP. Given that the GDP growth was around 8% and 
possibly even more, this fact is not surprising – but in any case it is not comfortable. A forthcoming 
revision of GDP calculation in the context of an adoption of the EU methodology is likely to shift GDP 
figures significantly upwards. This will shift GDP-related indicators downwards. 
 
Within the current account, the trade balance has always been negative, with the deficit-GDP ratio 
fluctuating considerably in a band between -11% in 2000 and -3% a mere year later. The balance of 
services has always been positive and has tended to improve still moreover time, whereas the 
balance of incomes was always negative and deteriorating over time. A clear trend is also visible 
                                                           
12   International comparisons of competitiveness in a very broad sense can be found in Porter (2004). 14 
with regard to transfer figures: the balance has always been positive. However, whereas it reached 
over 3% of GDP in the early 1990s, it was down to less than 1% in 2003 and 2004; the significance 
of remittances from Turks living abroad is declining.  
 
The changes in the trade in goods have been remarkable. Exports and imports have grown much 
more than GDP – from less than 10% of GDP in the early 1990s to over 20% of GDP after 2000. 
The ratio is likely to climb much higher in the future. Turkey’s exports in 2004 amounted to 
EUR  53.6  billion, whereas Poland’s exports were EUR 64.6 billion; in terms of the size of the 
economy, Poland is similar to Turkey, and Poland too has a relatively low export-GDP ratio (33% in 
2004). The Czech economy is small compared to Turkey, but its exports in 2004 were EUR 53.6 
billion, and the export-GDP ratio was 62%.  
 
Not only has the export-GDP ratio improved over time, but the proportion of imports covered by 
export revenues has also gone up. It was between one half and two thirds in the early 1990s (and 
between 30% and 40% in the mid-1970s), but between 91% (2001) and 74% (2004) after 2000.  
 
Revenues from services as well as inflows of income have grown in relation to GDP; however, the 
same holds true for service expenditures and income outflows. Both aspects are but another hint of 
the country’s increasing integration in international structures.  
 
 
Exchange rates and real appreciation 
One of the factors influencing the competitiveness of Turkey’s producers of tradable goods and 
services – and therefore current account developments as well – is real appreciation. Figure 6 





Inflation-adjusted currency appreciation, 1995 to 2004  
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Source: Appendix Tables A1 and A5. 
                                                           
13   It is not exactly real appreciation, which would also take into account inflation in the euro area. 15 
In 2001, the current account was in surplus for two reasons: (a) the size of the real GDP was smaller 
than in the previous year and imports were correspondingly low; (b) devaluation meant that Turkish 
products were cheap on international markets – including Turkish tourism services – and at the 
same time imported products were expensive in Turkey. After 2001, the Turkish currency 




Exchange rate regime 
Over the past ten years, Turkey has changed its exchange rate regime several times. The policy adopted in 
November 1995 linked the devaluation of the Turkish Lira systematically to the development of the Wholesale 
Price Index (against a basket consisting of 1 USD and 1.5 DEM or, later, 0.77 Euro). In 2000 a crawling peg 
regime was introduced. In 2001 already, after the crisis in February of that year, the country switched to a 
floating regime and starting learning to live with the float (Selçuk and Ardıç, 2004). The central bank now only 
intervenes to avoid extreme fluctuations, but does not try to exert an immediate impact on the trend. 
Full convertibility has been established. Transfers of profits, fees and royalties are free. Banks are allowed to 
open foreign exchange deposit accounts for residents as well as for non-residents. Non-residents can buy and 
sell without any restrictions on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Residents, if intending to export foreign currency 
capital in an amount of over USD 5 million, have to seek permission of the General Directorate of Banking and 
Foreign Exchange.  
Exporters have to transfer their proceeds to Turkey within 180 days after delivery and convert them into YTL. 
Gains stemming from a failure to observe this time limit have to be transferred to the Support and Price Stability 
Fund. If exporters bring in 70% of the proceeds already within 90 days, the remaining amount can be left 
abroad.  
Source: YASED (2004). 
 
As shown in the chapter on foreign trade, by their very nature most Turkish tradables are competitive 
as long as they can be produced at low prices. Real appreciation definitely bears the potential of 
threatening the economy’s development. In the past, the main source of real appreciation was 
inflation rates in excess of nominal depreciation. Inflationary pressure has weakened. This may well 
become the basis for pressure in favour of nominal appreciation of the Turkish currency, given that 
interest rates are declining, but could remain high enough to attract the inflow of ‘hot money’ at some 
point in time. 
 
At least with regard to labour costs (Figure 7), the crisis in 2001 increased the Turkish firms’ 
competitiveness
14, and subsequent years have witnessed only a minor reversal of this gain. As 
Figure 7 shows, after the crisis in February 2001, unit labour costs in private manufacturing, 
measured in foreign currency, fell drastically. Within a year, they dropped to 75% of the level in 
1997. By the end of 2003, they had climbed back to 85% of the 1997 level. 
 
                                                           
14   In an empirical study dealing with dynamics of competition and FDI, Özler  (2004) does not find evidence that foreign 
ownership would matter for the companies’ survival and growth. 16 
Figure 7 
Unit labour costs exchange-rate adjusted (43% EUR 56% USD basket),  
seasonally adjusted, private manufacturing companies 






















































































































In state-owned manufacturing, developments may have been different. Wages differ greatly 
between SEEs and private manufacturers (Table 3).  
 
The analysis of wage developments is limited for want of adequate data. Wage data are either 
derived from specific sectors such as manufacturing or are based on indirect methods of calculation, 
e.g. the share of employee income in GDP (ETF, 2004). Data obtained from the Employment and 
Earnings Survey only cover industry – mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water and the 
manufacturing sectors with ten and more employees. Monthly gross wages include overtime 
payments, while only the hourly wage is given, excluding overtime payment. These data also allow 
for a geographical breakdown (regions and selected provinces).  
 
Differences also exist between average monthly gross wages for workers employed in public and 
private enterprises covered by collective bargaining agreements (CBA) on the one hand and those 
not unionized on the other. In the first half of 2003 industrial employees in private enterprises (with 
collective bargaining) earned about 83% of monthly gross wages in the public sector. In general, 
industrial sector wages covered by CBA were more than double those not covered by CBAs: both in 
the private and public sectors. For wage disparities across regions see chapter C. 17 
Table 3 
Average weekly actual working hours and average monthly gross wages in industry 
by economic activity, state versus private sector status and periods 
    Average weekly actual 
working hours including 
overtime hours 
Per capita average monthly 
gross wages in YTL 
Per capita average monthly 
gross wages in EUR (ER) 
    Jan-Jun 2002  Jan-Jun 2003 Jan-Jun 2002 Jan-Jun 2003 Jan-Jun 2002  Jan-Jun 2003
Total 44.3  44.1 667.88 847.64 537  485
 Mining and quarrying  42.9  42.6 881.10 1,136.88 709  651
 Manufacturing
1)  44.5 44.2 627.21 800.58 504  458
 Electricity, gas, water  42.7  43.3 1,029.47 1,333.35 828  763
State sector  42.1  42.2 1,059.93 1,318.47 852  755
 Mining and quarrying  42.1  41.1 1,087.54 1,472.89 875  843
 Manufacturing1
) 41.7  41.6 1,075.14 1,264.53 865  724
 Electricity, gas, water  42.7  43.3 1,027.11 1,326.01 826  759
Private sector  44.8  44.5 579.33 752.71 466  431
 Mining and quarrying  44.6  44.9 481.51 591.08 387  338
 Manufacturing
1) 44.8  44.5 580.43 754.48 467  432
 Electricity, gas, water  42.7  ... 1,134.28 ... 912  …




Average monthly gross wages in manufacturing, January to June 2003 
in EUR at exchange rates 
YTL EUR (ER)  Total=100
Manufacturing total  800.6 458  100
Food products; beverages and tobacco  836.8 479  105
Textiles and textiles   547.2 313  68
Wearing apparel; dyeing of fur and leather and footwear  497.4 285  62
Wood products and cork excl. furniture  546.7 313  68
Paper & paper products; publishing & printing  934.7 535  117
Coke, refined petroleum products chemical products,   
Chemical products and rubber and plastics products  1,220.4 699  152
Other non-metallic mineral products  833.7 477  104
Basic metals  122.3 70  15
Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment,   
Office, accounting and computing machinery  778.3 446  97
Electrical machinery, radio, TV communication equipment   
Medical precision and optical equipment  1,194.9 684  149
Motor vehicles, trailers and other transport equipment  1,233.3 706  154
Furniture; manufacturing not elsewhere classified   607.8 348  76
Source: State Institute of Statistics of Turkey. 
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Substantial wage differentials exist between the individual manufacturing branches. Wages are 
highest in the manufacturing of transport equipment, basic metals, coke & refined petroleum 
products and electrical machinery and apparatus; they are particularly low in the manufacturing of 
wearing apparel and dyeing of fur and leather and footwear, as well as in textiles and the 
manufacture of furniture (Table 4). 
 
The wage level in the first half of 2003, expressed as average monthly gross wages in 
manufacturing converted at current exchange rates, amounted to EUR 458 and was higher than in 
Poland and Romania, and probably only slightly lower than in Hungary.  
 
Table 5 
Average monthly gross wages in industry, selected countries, 2003 
in EUR at exchange rates 
Croatia Hungary Poland Romania  Turkey
2002   
C - Mining and quarrying  837.2 559.9 863.3  300.0  651
D - Manufacturing  666.8 472.2 448.1  152.4  458
15 - Food products and beverages  748.3 444.3 402.3  134.1  -
16 - Tobacco products  1059.2 1028.8 953.2  418.4  -
17 - Textiles  440.5 326.6 349.5  119.5  313
18 - Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  383.4 270.7 257.2  102.3  -
19 - Tanning and dressing of leather; mfr. of related articles  358.2 286.3 283.5  109.4  -
20 - Wood and products of wood and cork  426.7 301.4 323.2  91.4  313
21 - Paper and paper products  594.7 599.2 553.6  149.2  -
22 - Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  912.2 453.4 630.6  215.3  -
23 - Coke and refined petroleum products  942.7 1033.5 918.7  361.2  -
24 - Chemicals and chemical products 977.5 742.7 698.2  235.1  -
25 - Rubber and plastic products  542.9 492.1 455.2  154.2  -
26 - Other non-metallic mineral products  715.9 512.0 453.7  174.6  477
27 - Basic metals  520.7 610.5 557.6  225.5  700
28 - Fabricated metal products, excl. mach. & equip.  578.3 396.6 425.2  159.1  -
29 - Machinery and equipment  621.5 481.4 499.6  183.1  -
30 - Office, accounting and computing machinery  1038.4 507.6 693.5  123.7  -
31 - Electrical machinery and apparatus  907.4 503.8 500.1  166.8  -
32 - Radio, TV & communication equip. & apparatus  1176.3 522.9 632.8  287.3  -
33 - Medical, precision & optical instruments, watches & clocks  709.7 447.2 508.8  177.3  -
34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 657.6 635.8 534.1  190.2  -
35 - Other transport equipment  793.7 563.0 516.6  225.8  -
36 - Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  462.2 324.2 342.4  114.5  348
37 - Recycling  729.0 438.2 454.8  127.8  -
E - Electricity, gas and water supply  804.7 644.9 686.7  266.6  763
Notes: Hungary: Enterprises with more than 5 employees. 
Poland: Including mandatory premium for social security. 
Turkey: Enterprises with more than 10 employees; including overtime payment 
Source: wiiw Industrial Database, State Institute of Statistics of Turkey. 
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From a comparative perspective
15 wages paid in Turkey in the manufacture of textiles were 
2.6  times higher than in Romania and somewhat lower than in Hungary and Poland. Whereas 
Turkish enterprises pay lower wages in the sector manufacturing wood and wood and cork products 
than the three comparative countries, its wages are significantly higher in the sectors manufacturing 
basic metals (e.g. about EUR 560 in Poland versus EUR 700 in Turkey) and furniture.  
 
Overall, Turkey’s wage structure may be said to bear a number of similarities to Hungary and Poland 
(Table 5), while it is completely different from Romania (Turkish wage levels in manufacturing are 
two to three times higher than those in Romania). 
 
 
Turkey’s international financial position 
At the end of t 2003, Turkey’s external liabilities totalled USD 186 billion (Table 6), while its assets 
amounted to USD 75 billion. Consequently, Turkey’s net position was USD -111 billion. Whereas 
Turkey had accumulated inward investment of USD 32 billion and an accumulated outflow was USD 
6 billion, Poland, with an economy similar in size to Turkey, had accumulated roughly twice as much 
at the end of 2003: USD 61 billion. 
 
Table 6 
External assets and liabilities, at end-2003 
(USD million) 
 Assets Liabilities Net assets
Direct investment  6,138 32,334 -26,196
Portfolio investment  1,956 33,609 -31,653
Equity securities  61 8,954 -8,893
Debt securities  1,895 24,655 -22,760
Other investment  31,217 119,797 -88,580
Trade credits  5,158 10,695 -5,537
Loans 2,816 87,649 -84,833
Currency and deposits  21,209 21,453 -244
Other assets  2,034 0 2,034
Reserve assets  35,204 0 35,204
Monetary gold  1,558 0 1,558
SDR 30 0 30
Reserve pos in IMF  168 0 168
Foreign exchange  33,448 0 33,448
TOTAL  74,515 185,740 -111,225
Source: Treasury, SIS, ISE, CBRT, Banks, BIS, IMF. 
 
                                                           
15   Statistics as published by the Statistical Institute of Turkey only allow wage comparisons with selected new member 
states only for a few manufacturing branches, such as textiles, wood and products of wood and cork, other non-metallic 
mineral products, basic metals and furniture and manufacturing n.e.c. 20 
Taken together, the countries of South-east Europe (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro) had accumulated about as much inward 
FDI as Turkey: USD 35 billion.  
 
With regard to the stock of outward FDI, Turkey’s figure, USD 6 billion, was much higher than that of 
Poland (USD 1.8 billion); of the new EU member states, Hungary was the only country with a 
comparable figure; USD 7 billion. Business leaders in Turkey were more eager than their 
counterparts in the new member states to have a second string to their bow. Foreigners held Turkish 
government bonds amounting USD 25 billion and held USD 88 billion claims on loans predominantly 
granted to the government and non-bank sectors. Reserve assets, mainly in the form of foreign 




In countries with a long history of economic volatility and political turmoil, more affluent people – and 
companies – tend to increase their economic standing by spending parts of their savings on 
purchases of foreign assets. Such capital outflow can be official or hidden, registered or 
unregistered. Derviş, Emerson, Gros and Ülgen (2004) have taken the period 1963-2002 and 
compared the size of Turkey’s net external debt at end-2002 (somewhat over USD 100 billion) to the 
accumulated current account deficit for the whole period (close to USD 42 billion). The difference 
(USD 59 billion) is interpreted as a proxy for capital flight. The last phase of this period (the years 
1997 to 2002) was mainly responsible for the overall result: net foreign debt rose by USD 40.8 billion 
(from less than USD 60 billion to more than USD 100 billion), whereas the accumulated current 
account deficit was USD  7.3  billion. The difference (USD  33.5 billion) was capital flight. Duman, 
Erkin and Ünal (2005) chose a similar approach, but in a more sophisticated version which allowed 
them to filter out exchange rate fluctuations and trade misinvoicing. In order to secure comparability 
of estimates across periods, they deflated them on the basis of the producer price index. The 
authors focused not on the size of capital flight, but on its determinants: their findings support the 
hypothesis that economic imbalances and political turmoil stimulate capital flight. Once again, the 
finding was that the 1990s had been a period of extreme capital flight. Should Turkey now enter a 
longer period of economic prosperity, confidence will grow and capital flight will stop after a while. 
The process may even have started already, considering the pronounced growth in gross fixed 
investment. In recent years some Turkish companies or holdings have been eager to invest abroad; 




For the banking sector, the crisis of 2001 was a turn for the better in the sense of improved 
regulation, enhanced surveillance and greater economic soundness for the survivors.
16 In fact, most 
of the reforms had been on track since 2000, based on legislation introduced in 1999.
17 However, 
they would hardly have been imposed as strictly, had it not been for the very severe crisis of 2001. 
                                                           
16   Thompson, Totan and Scott (2002) stress that the reform implemented up to 2001 was too little and came too late. 
17   Experience collected from a number of countries suggests, so İyigün and Rodrik (2004), that policy-makers have a 
choice between a new draw from a pre-existing policy regime, and institutional reform imposing an adjustment cost on 
incumbent firms. Institutional reforms work best, so the authors, in settings where entrepreneurial activity is weak. 21 
The latter crisis was final proof of the need for such reforms. The crisis also made it possible to push 
through the independence of the central bank: a step taken in May 2001. The Banking Regulatory 
and Supervisory Agency had started operations in autumn 2000 and within a few months it was 
already having to play a decisive role.  
 
The treasury took over USD 21.9 billion restructuring costs for public banks and 21.8 billion for 
private banks which were placed under the custody of the Savings and Deposits Insurance Fund. 
The burden assumed by the treasury was equivalent to about 30% of the GDP (Steinherr, Tukel and 
Ucer, 2004). The restructuring of the public banks was both comprehensive and swift.
18 The strategy 
drawn up for the troubled private banks was to restructure first, and sell thereafter; the concept has 
not been actively promoted since.  
 
In mid-2004, seven large commercial banks, three of them public (Ziraat
19, Halk and Vakıflar) and 
four of them private (Akbank, Is Bank, Garanti and Yapı ve Kredi), controlled about three quarters of 
the entire sector. This is ‘normal’ by European standards; concentration is somewhat lower than that 
in the EU-15, but higher than that in the new member states in Central Europe. Rather exceptional is 
the limited volume of loans granted to non-financial enterprises, amounting to merely 18% of GDP at 
end-2002.
20 Prior to the crisis in 2001 it had fluctuated between 80 and 100%, a ratio comparable to 
Western Europe. In October 2004, the total number of domestically owned commercial banks was 
21, excluding: (a) non-restructured banks under the custody of the Savings and Deposits Insurance 
Fund; and (b) non-depository banks. The number of foreign-owned banks was 15, of which 8 were 
branches of foreign banks and 3 were non-depository. Of the Turkish non-depository banks, three 
were public and eight were privately owned
21. The market share of foreign banks is low: a feature 
that Turkey has in common with West European countries such as France, Germany, Italy or Spain.  
 
Public commercial banks account for about one third in the sector’s total assets, but hold over 40% 
of total deposits. Their strength is attracting YTL deposits, rather than foreign exchange deposits. In 
the past, the public banks were busy financing the governments’ deficits of the governments, and not 
so much granting loans to non-financial enterprises. At the end of 2002, government securities made 
up 60% of their assets compared to 15% used for enterprise loans. In the case of private banks, 
securities amounted to 36% of their assets and loans to 33%. Large enterprises with a high credit 
rating never experienced problems of access to fresh loans, unlike small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Lending to SMEs was originally the prime business of the state-owned Halk bank. But 
non-performing loans turned out to be a problem for public banks; they thus felt it advisable to 
allocate more assets to government securities as being a safer business. 
 
Figure 8 shows a banking sector fragility indicator developed by Kibritçioğlu (Kibritçioğlu, 2003). In 
one version, BSF3, it measures month-on-month changes in three variables: bank claims on the 
domestic private sector, foreign liabilities of banks; and bank deposits. They are taken as indicators 
                                                           
18   Pınar and Sak (2003) emphasize that the problem with publicly owned banks in Turkey has not been solved yet, 
stressing that ‘the improvement in bank balance sheets and income statements looks to be illusory’. 
19   Ziraaat Bank’s original task is financing agriculture.  
20   The companies’ access to external finance is discussed in Bougheas, Mizen and Yalçın (2004). 
21    Banks are listed, e.g., in http://www.turkishbanks.com; Swiss Export Risk Guarantee http://www.swiss-erg.com;, 
Türkiye Bankalar Birligi, http://www.tbb.org; The Banker – The International Islamic Finance Forum, Top 1000 World 
Banks, 2 July 2004, http://www.thebanker.com. 22 
of credit risk, exchange rate risk and liquidity risk. The BSF2 version excludes changes in bank 
deposits. The difference between these two versions shows the effect of bank withdrawals, which is 
small if deposit insurance exists.  
 
Applied to Turkey, the figure shows excessive risk-taking behaviour prior to each of the crises, 
visible as a peak value of the curve. 
 
Should the government continue to succeed with its programme of financial consolidation, the 
securities market will become tight. Banks have to learn to operate in a low-inflation environment; 
they have just begun reorienting their activities towards the loan business. Household loans are on 
the rise, starting from a very low level by international standards.  
 
Figure 8 
Banking sector fragility indicator for Turkey 
















































































































































































































High Fragility BSF3 BSF2
 
Data Source: CBRT, SIS & IMF; calculations by A. Kibritçioğlu. 
Methodology: A. Kibritçioğlu (2003), ‘Monitoring Banking Sector Fragility’, Arab Bank Review, 5/2, pp. 51-66. 
 
In August 2004, Standard & Poor's raised its long-term counterparty credit ratings on Turkey, basing 
Ziraat Bank, Is Bank and Koçbank to 'BB-' from 'B+', arguing that ‘Improvements in the banks' asset 
quality, profitability, and capitalization have been strong over the past two years (Standard and 
Poor's 2004). They now operate in a sounder competitive environment with lower systemic risk as 
the nonviable banks have disappeared. As nonrecurring trading gains on government securities are 
shrinking, banks are moving their business model toward deeper customer intermediation.’ 
 
 
The macroeconomic situation after 2001 
The crisis in 2001 was not only a severe setback for the government finances; it also delivered a 
swingeing blow to the economy as a whole. Both the GDP and industrial output declined by 7.5%. 23 
The rate of unemployment leapt to an annual average of 8.5% only to rise still further, up to a 10.5% 
average in 2004.  
 
As is often the case, the crisis also laid the foundations for a new upswing. The devalued exchange 
rate increased the Turkish manufacturers’ competitiveness vis-à-vis their foreign competitors. 
Exports rose by 15% in 2001: from EUR 33.4 billion in 2000 to 38.5 billion. At the same time, imports 
shrank by 24% from EUR 55.7 to 42.5 billion. The latter was also due to the drop in real GDP. After 
the crisis in February 2001, confidence in a future positive development started recovering. Part of 
this change in mood was attributable to Kemal Derviş, a former IMF official who became minister of 
economic affairs in the aftermath of the crisis. He negotiated a USD 16 billion IMF credit deal for 
Turkey. He promoted the independence of the central bank and a reform of the banking system. He 
was also skilful in convincing the public of the need for painful reforms. The key programme was not 
particularly original: macroeconomic stabilization combined with privatization and, of course, 
liberalization in many respects as well. The parliamentary elections of November 2002 gave a strong 
majority to a strong leader, who left no doubt about his intent to improve public governance, set the 
public sector’s finances straight and pave the way for Turkey’s EU accession. Determination of this 
kind underpinned economic recovery.  
 
Currently, certain important features of the macroeconomic situation are highly satisfactory, as the 
State Institute for Statistics’ 2004 figures indicate: 
–  GDP growth (real), year-on-year, was 8.9% for the whole year 2004, resulting from 11.8% 
growth in the first, 14.4% in the second, but merely 5.3% and 6.3% in the third and fourth 
quarters. As for the individual sectors the main engines of high growth in 2004 were trade with a 
growth of 12.8% and industry with 9.4%. On the expenditure side, thanks to booming private 
investment gross fixed capital formation grew by 32,4% and private consumption by 10.1%. The 
growth rate for exports of goods and services was 12,5%, thus much less than that for imports 
(24,7%); hence, overall trade in goods and services had a negative impact on GDP growth. 
With government consumption nearly stagnating (+0.5%) and public gross fixed investment 
declining, the government’s GDP contribution was also strongly negative. 
–  Industrial output was up 9.8% in 2004.  
–  Inflation has come very close to single digits in 2004. The average rate of inflation was 10.6%, 
the December-on-December rate 9.3%.  
 
Other figures are rather alarming:  
–  The current account deficit is on the rise (Table 6). Whereas it amounted to USD 8 billion or 
3.3% of GDP in 2003, it was up to USD 15.6 billion or 5.2% of GDP in 2004. 
–  The rate of unemployment is high. Both in 2003 and 2004 it was 10.5% in average. 
 
Turkey is experiencing what is sometimes called ‘jobless growth’. It has attained a very high GDP 
growth rate without any indication of significant growth in employment. Hopes for a significant rise in 
employment in 2004 (Ercan, 2004) did not materialize. This spells doom for Turkey’s jobless; it is 
also something that cannot be so easily sold on the political trading floor. Economically, it points to a 
marked rise in labour productivity; this has to be seen in the context of strong investment growth. 
Serhan Cevik (2004) terms current developments in Turkey ‘productivity-led growth’. At least in 
some segments of the economy, a technological catching-up process may be underway.  24 
The rise in the current account deficit is what one would expect to follow from an increase in GDP 
growth. Given that GDP grew 8.9% in 2004, the rise in the current account deficit up to EUR 12.5 
billion was not stunning. However, the current account is a sensitive issue. It is something carefully 
followed by international financial investors, and they would prefer to see FDI inflows of 
approximately the same size as the deficit. This is not the case. Should the deficit climb high, 
nervousness is likely to spread among international financial investors. 
 
 
Outlook: critical years ahead  
Turkey has demonstrated time and again that it is capable of expanding economic activities on a 
rapid and massive scale, provided the conditions are right. However, its economic system was 
invariably susceptible to crisis; some setbacks have been dramatic.  
 
In the first half of 2004, real GDP growth was exceptionally high by international standards; growth 
even accelerated from the first to the second quarter (from year-on-year 11.8% to 14.4%). This 
raised justified concerns whether such growth would be sustainable or overheated, possibly followed 
by sudden deterioration. In fact, growth did not remain that high for a longer period; it came down to 
5.3% in the third and 6.3% in the fourth quarter. In the first half of 2004, the main reason for the high 
growth was a transitory boom in private consumption. For example, announcements of regulatory 
changes encouraged consumers to purchase motor vehicles; it was demand for consumer durables 
that has boosted private consumption growth. Moreover, the banking sector was looking for clients in 
the private sector, as household indebtedness is still low by international standards. Household 
credits are thus on the rise. The increase in private consumption took place despite stagnating real 
wage incomes – real wages dropped appreciably over the period 2001-2003, while employment 
declined in 2003 and increased only marginally (by about 2%) in 2004. 
 
It is likely that growth will revert to a band between 5 and 10%, oscillating around rates of 6 to 7%. 
The economy is in better shape than it was in the nineties. The situation in the banking sector is 
much improved; the exchange rate float offers the central bank an opportunity to influence the 
exchange rate as well as corporate sector competitiveness through its setting of interest rates.  
 
However, there are some traps. Let us assume that high growth continues for some time, inflation 
drops and remains below 10% and privatization gains momentum. In that case, FDI will increase 
quite significantly; while most administrative barriers fade away. It is likely that in such a scenario, the 
Turkish lira will come under pressure to appreciate. Capital account flows could start dominating 
exchange rate developments in a way that may harm the real sector. The competitiveness of Turkish 
manufacturers and tourist facilities could well suffer.  
 
This scenario is not unlikely. Nominal depreciation vis-à-vis the euro has slowed down already; 
periods of nominal appreciation occurred in both 2003 and 2004. Nominal interest rates are still high 
by international standards, so that short-term investment in Turkey could offer foreign financial 
investors promising prospects. Possibly, Turkey has started to become attractive for investors of 
Middle East profits from oil business (Michael Rubin, 2005). FitchRatings (2005) qualifies the 
external financing mix as unstable: the use of external financing, amounting to 22% of GDP in 2004, 
was almost entirely covered by borrowing (21% of GDP), most of it being of a short-term nature 
(13%). 2005 will not bring a substantial change in these ratios. 
 25 
Another question is whether Turkey will have strong governments over a longer period of time. If not, 
budgetary discipline could go by the board. Currency depreciation could start all over again or 
intensify, and public debt could skyrocket once more. In such a scenario, currency depreciation and 
rising inflation – all that might well return
22. For some years to come, the debt accumulated by the 
public sector will require a permanent high primary budget surplus, otherwise the debt-to-GDP ratio 
will start rising once more and the net result will be a loss of public confidence on financial markets.  
 
Politically, it is difficult to keep the primary surplus at the high level essential to stabilizing or reducing 
the debt problem. Turkey could gain a lot from more expenditure on infrastructure, education, 
research and development, regional and rural development, support for SMEs and the like. Hence, it 
is difficult for any government to act ‘greedily’ all the time.  
 
Some of the ongoing reforms will be prone to undermining the present government’s popularity. If 
this happened, the Turkish electorate would be unlikely to vote in another strong government in the 
near future. Let us start with privatization. If carried out, as it should, it will lead to higher labour 
productivity among the privatized companies. This will happen either through greater efficiency in 
existing plants or through the introduction of new technologies, which are usually labour saving
23. If 
the new owners are transnational corporations, restructuring is usually quite rigorous. It is thus likely 
that massive privatization will increase unemployment. Even today the unemployment rate is as high 
as over 10%. 
 
Under certain conditions, the rise in unemployment could be kept within certain limits: A pronounced 
increase in output thanks to a booming demand for products and services ‘made in Turkey’ could 
keep employment high. Very limited real appreciation of the currency and favourable developments 
in the main trading partner countries could bring about this positive outcome, and the government’s 
popularity might remain intact. 
 
The government’s popularity could suffer, however, from the reform of the agricultural sector. 
Turkish agriculture is a mix of comparatively highly developed farms in favoured regions and archaic 
forms of farming in others. For a long time, Turkey has maintained a system of low input prices for 
farmers. To give an example, the government has regulated prices of fertilizers and other agro-
chemicals and covered, if necessary, the losses made by the producers, usually SEEs. The 
government also set guaranteed prices for the farmers’ output. The whole system is currently 
undergoing reform
24, the two aims being to: 
–  eliminate price distortions and 
–  reduce the amount of money the government pours into agriculture and related industries.  
 
In future, the government will rely more on direct payments to farmers and other schemes inspired 
by the EU common agricultural policy. Of course, during this reform process, the government will 
have to define: (a) the support farmers receive: and (b) the purpose and scope of those subsidies. 
Inevitably, this will lead to a fight behind the scenes for a share in ever-scarcer resources. In the end, 
many farmers and farming families may end up completely dismayed. About one third of the labour 
                                                           
22   A rather sceptical view is taken by Yeldan (2004).  
23   For an empirical study of privatization effects see Cağla and Peren (2003). 
24   For a trade unions’ view on this topic see Oral (2004). 26 
force works in agriculture, with many more working on the land informally; hence, the government’s 
popularity could well suffer if this reform package goes through. 
 
Hitherto, the Turkish government has tried to have it both ways: pushing through comprehensive 
economic reforms and running programmes supportive of poorer segments of the population.  
 
 
The Turkish economy in the context of the country’s candidature for accession 
From an economic point of view, Turkey is not fundamentally different from certain other countries 
that have joined the EU or are currently on track for accession.  
 
Turkey bears certain similarities to the new EU member states and the candidate countries Bulgaria 
and Romania, as is discussed e.g. in a document prepared by the Economic Policy Committee 
(2004). Resemblance to current conditions in those countries is one aspect, the other one being 



















Source: wiiw Database. 
 
In none of the aspects shown in Table 7 does Turkey differ fundamentally from the New Member 
States and EU candidate countries listed. Industrial structure is moving in the same direction as in 
these countries.
26 The production of finished goods is taking on an increasingly important role; and 
machinery and transport equipment are enlarging their shares in value-added. Turkey is very active 
in trading, and over the past few decades private individuals and companies have accumulated 
capital which is now at their disposal for investment in the context of privatization (unless they opt to 
invest abroad)
27. The more advanced Turkish companies have engaged in direct investment 
projects in a wide range of countries, particularly in the former transition countries.  
                                                           
25   The same is true for the EU-South, the Mediterranean countries Greece, Portugal and Spain. Yilmaz (2002) discusses 
Turkey's competitiveness in the European Union comparing it with Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
26   A study by Gaygısız and Köksal (2003) analyses the determinants of entry and exit rates in industries. 
27   For a comparison of Mexican and Turkish privatization experience see Bakan, Eraslan and Sarac (2002). 27 
In common with most of the new EU member states, Turkey is a low-wage country compared to the 
EU average, irrespective of the fact that wage levels are significantly higher than those in Bulgaria 
and Romania (Figure 9).  
 
Table 7 
Economic situation prior to the announcement of negotiations: 
Turkey compared to selected other/former accession countries 
Czech 
Republic
Hungary Poland Bulgaria Romania  Turkey
Reference year (1)  1996   1996   1996   1998   1998   2003  
1. Criteria addressed by the Maastricht Treaty              
Inflation 8.8   23.6   19.9   18.7    59.1    25.3  
Rate of interest (discount rate)  10.5   23.0   22.0   5.2   35.0   43.0  
Budget deficit (% of GDP)  -1.9   .   -2.7   0.4 
a  .   -8.7  




a  18.0   87.4  
Exchange rate variation (2)  0.9   -14.9   -7.2   -3.9   -19.0   -15.2  
2. Competitiveness-related criteria              
GDP (PPP) p.c. in % of EU average in  




c  24.0 
c  28.0
d 
GDP growth, constant prices  4.3   1.3   6.0   4.0   -4.8   5.8  
GDP growth, last 5 years' average  2.4   0.4   4.9   -1.4   0.7   1.6  
GDP (EUR, PPP)/Employed  24929   23749   18443   12732   10132   20822  
Growth of labour productivity (manufacturing),  
last 3 years' average  8.0   11.7   10.2   -2.5   -1.9   5.3  
Exports in % of imports (goods)  79.4   90.5   79.1   91.9   76.0   78.5  
Exports in % of imports (services)  130.7   147.4   153.7   128.3   67.0   223.3  
Current account in % of GDP  -7.1   -3.9   -2.1   -0.3   -7.0   -2.8  
General Price Level, EU-15=100  37.2   42.1   44.3   20.4   23.8   47.9  
3. Criteria related to economic structure              
Exports in % of GDP  38.0   35.3   17.9   33.0   19.8   21.3  
Imports in % of GDP  47.9   39.0   22.7   35.8   26.1   27.1  
Share of EU in total exports  58.6   62.7   66.2   49.6   64.5   51.9  
Share of EU in total imports  62.4   59.8   63.9   44.9   57.7   46.5  
FDI stock in % of GDP  15.0   29.6   8.0   12.0   10.2   10.2
e 
Share of agriculture in GVA  4.7   6.6   6.0   18.8   15.8   12.2  
Share of industry in GVA  42.0   30.6   35.5   30.5   35.8   29.3  
Share of services in GVA  53.3   62.8   58.5   50.7   48.4   58.6  
Government expenditures in % of GDP  
(EU concept)  55.5   .   42.6   56.2 
a  .   38.9  
Rate of unemployment (LFS)  3.9   9.9   12.3   14.1   6.3   10.5  
Notes:  a) 1999; b) 1997; c) compared to EU-15; d) compared to EU-25; e) 2002 data. - (1) Year prior to the 
announcement of accession negotiations. - (2) Exchange rate defined as ECU/EUR per national currency unit,   
% change over the rate registered two year before; a positive sign indicates nominal appreciation. 
 
Turkey can thus be seen to be active in labour-intensive production, yet weak in terms of well-known 
international brands. One of Turkey’s specializations is textiles and clothing: a branch facing fierce 28 
international competition. If real appreciation of the Turkish currency becomes excessive, that sector 
may lose its competitiveness
28. 
 
The Turkish economy has undergone major fluctuations; in the future temporary setbacks are also 
quite conceivable. However, all of the countries that have recently joined the EU or will join in the 
near future have gone through similar crisis periods over the past ten years.  
 
Compared to the EU-25 as a whole, the Turkish economy is small. It is most unlikely that a 
temporary economic crisis could spill over to the EU as a whole. Perhaps this does not hold fully true 
for a financial crisis, where sensitivities are much higher. However, the 2001 crisis in Turkey, which 
started as a liquidity crisis in the banking sector, did not inflict much damage on international 
financial markets. Even the Argentine crisis, which was of a different dimension, had a limited impact 
internationally. Only a protracted crisis with the Turkey eventually re-emerging as the sick man of the 
EU would have a negative impact on the community as a whole. There is, however, no reason to 
expect a long-lasting future crisis of this kind – even less so from Turkey.  
 
With regard to Turkey’s accession to the EU, economic considerations provide no cause for alarm. A 
pre-accession period of ten or fifteen years, the duration most frequently mentioned, is likely to lead 
to a massive shift towards modernization in the Turkish economy.  
 




                                                           
28    For a discussion of imbalances in the real exchange rate in the period from 1987 to 2003 see Kibritçioğlu and 
Kibritçioğlu (2004). 
29   See, e.g., Apap, Carrera and Kirişci (2004), Aydın and Keyman (2004), Bekmez and Genç (2002), Emerson and Tocci 
(2004), Hughes (2004), Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), Krieger (2004), Kubicek  (2004), Liberale 
Türkisch-Deutsche Vereinigung (2004), Quaisser and Wood (2004) or Vietor and Thompson (2004). 
30   This study does not deal with consequences Turkey’s EU accession could possibly have in terms of a re-allocation of 
funds from the EU budget. It is difficult to foresee what the EU member states’ budgetary preferences will be in the 
years after 2010. For a discussion of possible budgetary consequences see Derviş, Gros, Öztrak and Işık (2004c); the 
topic also plays a role in Quaisser and Reppegather (2004). 29 
B Major regional disparities within Turkey 
Regional income distribution 
At least in one respect, if not in more, Turkey resembles Italy; Turkey also has its mezzogiorno 
problem, featuring a contrast between a more developed region at the one end of the country and a 
less developed region at the other. In Turkey’s case, however, it is not a north-south, but an east-
west contrast; in Turkey, the eastern and especially the south-eastern regions are underdeveloped 
compared to the relatively advanced western areas of Turkey (the Marmara and Aegean regions). 
As in Italy, the capital lies between the two extremes. Internal migration is rife. People leave the no-
future regions and try to find jobs in the urban agglomerates
31. The Marmara region to the northwest 
would have a comparatively high per capita income, were it not one of the main target regions for the 




Gross national product per capita in 2001 
    Population (000) YTL  EUR  Turkey = 100
TR Turkey    68,618 2,600 2,372 
 Level 1 Regions   
TR1 Istanbul    10,243 3,711 3,385  143
TR2 Western  Marmara  2,917 2,907 2,651  112
TR3 Aegean  9,039 3,082 2,812  119
TR4 Eastern  Marmara  5,782 3,959 3,611  152
TR5 Western  Anatolia  6,557 2,802 2,556  108
TR6 Mediterranean  8,835 2,472 2,255  95
TR7 Eastern  Anatolia  4,210 1,917 1,748  74
TR8  Western Black Sea  4,877 2,068 1,886  80
TR9  Eastern Black Sea  3,151 1,730 1,578  67
TRA  North eastern Anatolia  2,520 1,114 1,016  43
TRB Middle-east  Anatolia  3,770 1,297 1,183  50
TRC  South eastern Anatolia  6,717 1,437 1,311  55
Source: Treasury 
 
For many years, the Turkish army and other security forces tried to quell what has escalated into 
violent Kurdish separatism, together with its support background. This internal war has reduced the 
region’s chances of developing further; it has created a very insecure situation for the people living 
there, thus fuelling emigration. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), annual military expenditures in Turkey from 1999 onwards have been equivalent to 
approximately 5% of GDP (see Appendix Table A19, Military expenditures of Turkey compared to 
Austria, Greece and USA). This is excessive compared to countries such as Greece and Austria – 
                                                           
31   For a more detailed discussion of urban-rural relationship in Turkey see Gür, Cagdas and Demir (2003). For a broader 
discussion based on experience in many countries see Spoor (2004). 
32   To address regional development inequalities, Ögüt and Barbaros (2003) choose a different approach: UNDP human 
development indices on a provincial basis. For regional specialization in Turkey’s manufacturing see Akgöngür (2003). 30 
and even the USA. It is also quite sizeable given that the government’s tax collection efforts amount 
to less than 30% of GDP
33.  
 
Government programmes have been aimed at supporting underdeveloped regions in several 
ways.
34 State economic enterprises build affiliates in those regions; people working there receive a 
premium in addition to their regular salary. At one point in the past, an investment support scheme 
was devised to promote investment in less favoured regions. A recent study (Ögüt and Barbaros, 
2003) came to the conclusion that the scheme, however, mainly bolsters investment in the more 
developed parts of the country.  
 
The economic future of the eastern part of the country will hinge on whether people are confident 
that the future will bring peace and security to the region; it will also hinge on developments in the 
Middle East as a whole.  
 
 
Regional features of the labour market 
Available data do not permit a comparison of regional employment structures over time, because the 
labour force surveys only started including the regional component in 2000. In 2003 the highest 
employment rate (see Figure 10) was reported for the Black Sea region (59%), far exceeding the 
national average (43%). However, the main reason for this favourable figure is not the region’s high 
level of development, but its huge agricultural sector which absorbs more than 60% of the region’s 
labour. It is followed by East Anatolia and the Marmara region with rates similar to the country 
average, while the remaining regions range below the national average, particularly Southern 
Anatolia.  
 
As in the European Union, unemployment rates vary greatly across regions. Southern Anatolia 
suffers most from high unemployment. It reports a jobless rate of 21.6%, double the national 
average. By contrast, the Black Sea region and East Anatolia report the lowest jobless rates (with 
agriculture as an employer of last resort), while all other regions are close to the national average. 
Young educated people face gloomy prospects throughout the country. In 2003, unemployment 
rates for this group were once again highest in Southern Anatolia (45.2%), and ranged between 
25% and 29% in all other regions.  
 
In terms of sectoral employment patterns, Turkish regions differ substantially from each other (Figure 
11). The shares of agricultural employment vary between 61% in the Black Sea region and 14% in 
the Marmara region. The latter employs the highest share in industry (over 36%), while industrial 
employment is almost negligible in East Anatolia (7.5%). Apart from the Marmara region, above-
average employment shares in industry are also reported for the Aegean region and Central 
Anatolia (with the capital city Ankara). The services centres of Turkey are Central Anatolia – where 
55% of the employed are engaged in services sector activities – as well as the Marmara and 
                                                           
33   For a discussion on debt consequences of Turkey’s defence expenditures see Erdal and Sezgin (2003) or Yıldırım and 
Sezgin (2002). 
34    In an effort to narrow regional disparities the Turkish government has launched a comprehensive development 
programme for South-Eastern Anatolia in 2000, the so-called GAP (Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi). For the most part, the 
programme envisages the construction of irrigation schemes and domestic water supply projects and hydro-electric 
power plants. 31 
Mediterranean regions (about 50% each). The lowest share of employment in services is to be 
found in the Black Sea region, which absorbs only 28% of total employment. Ankara is very similar 
to other EU capitals, employing more than three quarters of the population in the services sector. 
 
Box 3 
Regional inequality: rural-urban relations 
The State Planning Institution defines ‘urban’ cities as settlements with 20,000 and more inhabitants (Gur, 
Çağdaş and Demir, 2003). Back in 1927, the first census registered a population of 13.6 million persons, over 
75% of them (10.3 million) living in rural areas. By 1980, the rural population had grown to 25 million, but 
declined slightly thereafter, to 23.7 million in 2000. The urban population increased continuously, to 44.1 million 
in 2000; it now accounts for two thirds of the total population. The 2000 census registered a quarter of the 
population living in Turkey’s three largest cities: Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. As of 2004, the population in these 
three urban agglomerates amounted to about 18.6 million, with about two thirds of them living in the Istanbul 
region. Three other cities, Bursa, Adana and Gaziantep, also have populations of over 1 million. Between 1990 
and 2004, millions of people migrated from the rural areas to these major cities; the population grew by about 
50% in that period, triggering enormous problems with respect to accommodation, public utilities, pollution, 
education and employment. The large cities are the centres of economic development, nevertheless job creation 
is not enough to cope with the incoming flow of migration; many of the immigrants are a least fortunate enough 
to earn money in the informal sector
35. ‘Urban immigrants prefer city poorness to country destitution’ (Gur, 
Cagdas and Demir, 2003). The number of shanty houses rose from 50,000 in 1955 to 2 million in 1995, and the 
number of people living there rose from 250,000 to 10 million.  
Developments in agriculture stimulate migration to the cities. The share of agriculture in total employment is 
22%, whereas its share in the Gross National Product is only 12% (2003). Land is unequally distributed and split 
into small plots. That process continues owing to the inheritance law of succession. In 2000 the number of 
tractors was 900,000– one for about every third farm. The health system is worse in rural areas. For example, 
about 700 village clinics, 12% of the total, lack a doctor. The conditions for higher education are also bad in rural 
areas: primary schools are there, but not much else. The main reason for emigration from rural areas is, 
however, the large gap between the more affluent and poorer regions. Non-economic motives for migration are 
security aspects, especially in the case of special ethnic (e.g. Kurdish), political or religious affiliation (e.g. 
Alevi
36).  
Starting from the early 1960s, different approaches to lending support to rural areas were discussed and also 
applied in part by the government. One was the creation of centric villages. In the meantime, with the adoption of 
the CAP rules, rural development in the EU sense has become a topic for Turkey. It will be a key issue in the 
years to come. Rural development in the sense of rural areas remaining and increasingly becoming a productive 
location for a variety of sectors will be one of the decisive factors for Turkey’s economic and social future.  
 
In Turkey’s north and north-west, wages in private manufacturing are about twice as high as those in 
the south-eastern region. This is but one indication of the marked regional disparities. 
                                                           
35   For a discussion of the size and function of the informal sector see Saraçoğlu (2003). 
36   According to Zeidan (1995), about 25% of the total population are Alevi. Most Alevis are ethnic and linguistic Turks, 
whereas some 20% are Kurds. Minorities have become a topic in Turkey, as becomes visible for example from a study 
authored by Mahcupyan Etyen (2004), which deals with non-islamic minorities (in Turkish language).  32 
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Source: State Institute of Statistics. 33 
Regional wage disparities 
In the first half of 2003 out of eleven reporting regions and provinces, six recorded above-average 
monthly gross wages in the private industrial sector, most notably in the Black Sea and Marmara 
regions, Ankara and Adana (Table 9). The high wage level in the Black Sea region is quite surprising 
given its small industrial sector. As is to be expected, South Anatolia are to be found at the lower end 
of the scale with monthly gross wages less than two thirds of the country average. Average monthly 
gross wages in the public sector industries were substantially higher than those in the private sector. 
In the first half of 2003 they amounted to some EUR 744 as against EUR 425 in the private sector. 
From a regional point of view above-average public sector wages were paid in Izmir, the 
Mediterranean and Aegean regions. South-east Anatolia, the Marmara region, East Anatolia and 
Adana showed values similar to the national average, while all other regions and provinces 
remained below the national average. Overall, wage disparities across regions were less 
pronounced in the public industrial sector than in private industry.  
 
Table 9 
Monthly gross wages in the private industrial sector: January-June 2003 
by geographical regions and selected provinces 
YTL EUR (ER)  Total=100
Total (private sector)  752.71 431  100
Marmara (excl. Istanbul)  842.74 482  112
Istanbul 760.12 435  101
Aegean (excl. Izmir)  555.65 318  74
Izmir 717.41 411  95
Mediterranean (excl. Adana)  798.72 457  106
Adana 813.60 466  108
Central Anatolia (excl. Ankara)  624.07 357  83
Ankara 841.09 481  112
Black Sea  855.35 490  114
Eastern Anatolia  486.74 279  65
South eastern Anatolia  455.64 261  61
Source: State Institution for Statistics, Central Bank. 
 
Measuring economic success by macroeconomic indicators alone means ignoring the very 
important aspect of regional development. In many countries in the world a relatively satisfactory 
GDP growth rate mainly reflects development in one dynamic segment of the economy, whereas 
other large segments enjoy little prosperity and large parts of the population are being 
impoverished
37. This has also been the case in Turkey over the past decades; it was a main reason 
for political unrest. It is to the merit of the EU that the Union has started directing attention and funds 





                                                           
37   For contributions to this topic see Spoor (2004). 34 
Box 4 
Promotion of investment, research and development 
In December 2001, the government opted to establish measures aimed at the amelioration of the investment 
climate. A coordination council identified investment barriers and made proposals for their removal. As a result, a 
law was introduced in August 2004 facilitating company registration procedures, removing the screening and 
pre-approval requirements for domestic and foreign investors and making it easier for foreign investment 
companies to employ key personnel from abroad. In the context of privatization, these companies will now have 
the same access to tenders as domestic companies. The law also opened up the land market to foreign natural 
persons according to the principle of reciprocity. 
In order to obtain access to investment incentives, investors have to go for an Incentive Certificate. Conditions 
vary depending on the region envisaged by the investment plan. Conditions are most favourable for the priority 
development regions. They are located towards the east. Incentives are less pronounced for medium developed 
regions. Not eligible for incentives are investments in the most developed regions. These are the regions around 
the Marmara Sea (Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir, Kocaeli), Antalya and Adana.  
However, within the developed regions investments in certain areas, the so-called industrial and technology 
belts, also have access to incentives. Furthermore, some special sectors count as especially important, and 
investment in these fields qualify for incentives regardless of the location of the investment. These sectors are 
mining, ship and yacht building, shipyard, information technology, software development, infrastructure including 
energy, environmental protection, aircraft and helicopter production, electronics industry, education, health, 
tourism, research and development, rehabilitation centres, and priority technological investments.  
Research and development promotion relies on a number of instruments such as corporate tax deferral or 
techno parks located near universities and other research institutions. They are open to both advanced 
technology firms and firms applying technological inventions to the development of new products. Earnings from 
such activities are exempt from income tax for several years (corporate profits for five years, salaries for ten 
years).  
Source: YASED (2004). 
 
 35 
C The changing structure of the Turkish economy 
The structure of the Turkish GDP has changed markedly over the past number of years. This is clear 
from GDP figures, sectoral figures (see Figure 12) and, of course, employment figures as well.  
 
The most obvious shift has been a decline in the contribution of agriculture to the GDP. It dropped 
from 26% in 1980 to less than 18% in 1990 – and then to less than 12% in 2003. Over the same 
period the share of industry climbed up from 19% to over 25% and then dropped back to below 
25%. Thus, it was never really high. The contribution of services is by far the largest; the trading 
sector alone produces nearly as much value-added as does manufacturing (for a table with all sector 
shares in GDP see Appendix Table A3 Sector shares in GDP).  
 
Figure 12 
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Source: SIS, own calculations. 
 
Overall employment did not grow much in the economy as a whole, from 19.9 million in 1990 to 21.3 
million in 2003, as against a growth in population of almost 15 million in the same period. The 
expansion of production was modest in agriculture (around 10%) and much more pronounced in 
industry (65% in 2003 compared to 1990). The share of agriculture in total employment dropped 
from 47% in 1990 to 35% in 2003; this means that the rise in labour productivity was also marked in 
agriculture. It also points to creeping erosion in traditional forms of production and rural life styles. 
 
In manufacturing, even in the 1960s, the production of ‘food’ (food, beverages and tobacco) accounted 
for almost one third of total manufacturing value-added (see Figure 13). The second largest generator 
of value-added was the textiles and leather group (textiles, clothing and footwear) with a share of 
approximately 20%. The third largest sector, reaching about one sixth of the total, was chemistry in a 
very broad sense, including refining of mineral oil, petrol and coal products as well as rubber and 
plastic products. The next largest generator was metallurgy (iron and steel, non-ferrous metal products 36 
and fabricated metals). ‘Wood’ (wood, wood products, furniture, printing and publishing), ‘minerals’ 
(pottery, glass and other non-metallic products) and ‘finished goods’ (electrical and non-electrical 
machinery, transport equipment and other manufactured goods) had shares of less than 10%.  
 
1996-2000 averages provide a different picture. ‘Chemicals’ now created close to 30% of the whole 
manufacturing value-added. The second position was occupied by ‘finished goods’ (18%), whereas 
‘textiles’ (17%) ranked third. ‘Food’ was down to 13%.  
 
Figure 13 
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Source: UNIDO data base. 
 
Within ‘textiles’ a major reshuffling took place: textiles lost 7 percentage points, whereas clothing 
gained five. Within ‘chemicals’ half of the large overall increase (by 12 percentage points) stemmed 
from expanding refining activities. With regard to ‘metals’, an increase of the share of iron and steel 
production stood in contrast to a decline in the other metal branches. All product groups represented 
in ‘finished goods’ increased significantly their shares in manufacturing value-added – the production 
of transport equipment even by 4 percentage points. The increased contribution of finished goods to 
overall value-added is a sign of the Turkish manufacturing sector’s improved competitiveness. It has 
to be recalled that in the period 1996-2002 Turkey had just entered the customs union with the EU
38; 
Turkish manufacturers thus found themselves exposed to competition from the EU without enjoying 
any form of protection. 
 
                                                           
38   For a discussion of the Costums Union’s opportunity costs see Sözen and Ulusoy (2003). 37 
The automotive industry is a good example of the changes triggered by the introduction of the 
customs union (Türkiye Vakıflar Bankası, 2003). In 2000 for the first time ever the Turks bought 
more imported cars than domestically produced vehicles. However, thanks to the removal of trade 
barriers, Turkish car exports also started to expand, albeit a few years later compared to imports. 
The number of exported vehicles leapt from 37,000 in 1995 to 262,000 in 2002. Changes also took 
place with regard to inputs for the automotive industry. Exports measured in USD at current 
exchange rates surged; in 2002 exports covered about 85% of the import expenditures.  
 
 
A predominance of small enterprises – at least in numerical terms 
In 2001, in the manufacturing sector as a whole, a total of 11,299 enterprises employed 10 or more 
persons (OECD, 2004b). The other 199,739 manufacturers were employers of up to 9 persons; on 
average, they employed 2.5 persons (see Table 10A and 10B). In this segment of manufacturing, the 
value-added per person was approximately EUR 8,600, roughly one tenth of the value added that a 
person employed in companies with 250 and more workforce generated. In 2001, in this category of 
enterprises (up to 9 persons employed) the value-added per capita in EUR at current exchange rates 
was significantly lower compared to 1992; this was not the case for persons employed in somewhat 
larger and large companies (with 10 to 49 and 250 and more persons employed).  
 
Table 10 
Manufacturing enterprises in Turkey, by category of size and persons employed 
A) Number of enterprises, workforce and value-added: 1992 and 2001. 
Persons employed  Number of enterprises  Total workforce  Value added, EUR mn
1) 
  1992 2001 1992 2001 1992 2001 
1 to 9 persons employed  186,900  199,737  523,117  500,738  2,185  1,828 
10 to 49 persons employed   7,970  7,260  175,646  183,694  1,906  2,181 
50 to 249 persons employed  2,434  3,127  225,650  343,023  5,077  6,932 
250 and more persons employed  795  912  553,626  570,083  20,489  21,274 
Total 198,097  211,036  1,478,039  1,597,538  29,656  32,215 
Share of SMEs in the total
2)  99.6% 99.6% 62.5% 64.3% 30.9% 34.0% 
Notes: 1) The original table shows exchange rate based USD figures (1 USD = YTL 0.00688 in 1992 and 1.22837 in 
2001). - 2) SMEs defined as enterprises with up to 249 persons employed.  
B) Workforce per enterprise; and value-added per worker (EUR at current exchange rates) 
  Workforce per enterprise  Value added per worker 
Enterprise categories  1992  2001  1992  2001 
1 to 9 persons employed  2.8  2.5  4,177  3,651 
10 to 49 persons employed   22.0  25.3  10,849  11,876 
50 to 249 persons employed  92.7  109.7  22,497  20,208 
250 and more persons employed  696.7  625.1  37,009  37,317 
All enterprises  7.5  7.6  20,065  20,166 
Source: OECD (2004b), p. 29, using data from the State Institute of Statistics. 
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If we define small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as companies with up to 249 employed 
people, in 2001 99.6% of all manufacturers were SMEs.
39 This ratio was the same as it had been in 
1992. SMEs employed roughly two thirds of the total labour force in manufacturing, but merely 
produced about one third of total manufacturing value-added.  
 
In 2001, the 210,000 SMEs were operating predominantly in three subdivisions: metallic goods 
26.1%, textiles and clothing 25.6%, wood products 24.3%. Around one eighth were in food and 
beverages (12.7%).  
 
 
A contrast to the host of SMEs: three major international players  
Table 11 lists Turkish companies ranked by Forbes Global 2000 among the 2000 largest companies 
worldwide, 12 entries in all. In terms of revenues, two oil and gas operating companies clearly lead 
the field: Tüpraş and Petrol Ofisi. The companies listed are a mix of state-owned, expansive private 
corporations and former state-owned companies.  
 
Table 11 
Turkish companies ranked by Forbes Global 2000  
among the 2000 largest companies worldwide 
measured by a composite of sales, profits, assets and market value in 2002 
Rank Name  Category  Sales Profits Assets  Market  value
    USD bn USD bn USD bn  USD bn
566  İş Bankası
1)  Banking 4.23 0.31 23.73  6.68
666 Sabancı Group
1)  Diversified financials  5.22 0.23 18.59  4.86
746 Yapı ve Kredi Bankası Banking  4.48 0.9 19.83  1.86
883 Koç  Group
1)  Diversified financials  11.1 0.04 10.04  4.80
1.133 Türkiye  Garanti  Bankası Banking  3.87 0.03 21.81  3.03
1143 Turkcell  Telecommunication  services  3.17 0.14 4.16  5.81
1299  Petrol Ofisi  Oil and gas operations  6.36 0.23 3.23  1.19
1304 Tüpraş
1) 2)  Oil and gas operations  7.76 0.17 3.01  2.26
1312 Doğan Holding  Capital goods  5.64 0.10 7.77  1.35
1557 Finans  Bank  Banking  1.34 0.16 8.34  0.46
1813 Enka  Construction  1.44 0.21 2.71  2.64
1943 Arçelik  Consumer  Durables  1.92 0.19 1.46  2.43
Notes: 1) These companies are also ranked in Forbes International 500, a list of the 500 largest companies outside the 
USA: Rank 420 Koç, 461 Tüpraş, 489 İş Bankası, 492 Sabancı Group; 2002 results based on revenues. -   
2) Listed in Forbes The World's Best Big Companies 
Source: Forbes (2004), The World's 2000 Leading Companies. 
 
İş Bankası was a state-owned bank. Today the majority of shares are held by its employees and the 
Republican People’s Party: for the time being the largest opposition party and the only one with a 
larger number of seats in parliament. Tüpraş and Telekom are prominent examples of corporations 
                                                           
39   This proportion of SMEs is not exceptional for market economies – it is quite similar to that observed in Austria (Der 
Standard, 2004). 39 
that have long been on the list of companies designated for privatization. With the government now 
increasing its efforts, this could finally come about in the not too distant future.  
 
Arçelik, the producer of consumer durables, also features on the Forbes list; it is part of the Koç 
empire. The latter evolved from a small workshop in the early 1930s and now controls some 
hundred enterprises, employing over 50,000 persons (Die Zeit, 22 January 2004). The group as a 
whole generates value-added estimated at over 3.5% of GDP. Export activities are its forte: about 
one third of the group’s revenues originate from exports. BEKO Electronics, a member of the group, 
ranks third in terms of its share in the European market.  
 
In 2002, Arçelik bought up two affiliates of a bankrupt maker of appliances in France (the Brandt 
group), acquired two United Kingdom cooker brands (Leisure and Flavel), a German manufacturer 
of washing machines and dryers (Blomberg) and an Austrian producer of cookers, stoves, and 
vacuum cleaners (Elektra Bregenz). In September 2002, Arçelik bought a majority stake in a 
Romanian refrigerator maker (Arctic). Arçelik has also announced plans to establish a washing 
machine factory in the Russian Federation and two refrigerator factories in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
 
Koç Holding has outward FDI in the services sector. In May 2001, Koçbank Nederland NV opened 
its first branch in Frankfurt, Germany. In March 2002, it established Koç Asset Management (Suisse) 
SA in Geneva in order to enhance its private banking activities. Since 1996, Koç Holding has been 
extremely active in the retail services sector. Drawing on its 48 years of experience with its joint 
venture with Swiss Migros in Turkey, it has opened up since 1996 a series of supermarkets, 
hypermarkets, and shopping centres (Ramstores) in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan and the 
Russian Federation. It now runs three Ramstores in Baku (Azerbaijan), five Ramstore shopping 
centres and 20 Ramstores in Moscow, one Ramstore shopping centre and two Ramstores in 
Kazakhstan; and two Ramstores in Sofia (Bulgaria). Koç also has several distribution, servicing and 
trading affiliates in the United States, Europe and Asia.  
 
Koç Holding is one of three large Turkish holdings massively engaged in outward foreign 
investment. The other two are Sabancı Holding and Anadolu Group (Erkilek, 2003). Sabancı 
Holding, Turkey’s second largest industrial and financial conglomerate, has operations in Europe, 
the United States, West Asia, and North Africa. It plans to expand into other countries in Asia, 
including China. In 1999, DuPont and Sabancı merged their polyester fibre, resin and intermediates 
into DuPont SA (DuPont Sabancı Polyester Europe) B.V., based in the Netherlands, the largest 
polyester company in Europe. DuPont and Sabancı are equal partners in this joint venture which has 
annual sales of about USD 1 billion and some 4500 employees. Dusa International LLC, another 
50/50 joint venture between DuPont and Sabancı Holding, headquartered in Wilmington, Delaware, 
USA, is the world’s largest producer of industrial nylon yarn and cord fabric.  
 
The third large Turkish conglomerate is the Anadolu Group with total net sales of over USD 1 billion 
(excluding financial services) in 2001 (Erkilek, 2003). One of its specializations is soft drinks, where it 
cooperates with Coca Cola. The Anadolu Group holds the sales, marketing and distribution rights for 
Kia and Lada vehicles in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and sells them 
in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkmenistan and the Ukraine. 
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The Anadolu Group started brewing Efes Pilsen, Turkey’s leading beer, in the 1960s; it now runs 
production facilities in Kazakhstan, Romania, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. The Efes 
Beverage Group has an extensive regional relationship with Coca-Cola that began with bottling 
franchises in CIS countries and the Russian Federation. Since 1993, it has invested in the 
production and distribution of Coca-Cola products in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the 
Southern part of the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan.  
 
Investing abroad is not limited to large Turkish companies. Smaller firms, especially in the textiles 
and clothing sector, have invested in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic and Romania, thus dispelling the myth about Turkish companies not being able to export to 
foreign countries, let alone invest there. However, given the nature of their activities, other large 
companies are more inward-oriented, if not completely so. In August 2004, the Istanbul Chamber of 




Sales revenues of the 25 largest companies in Turkey, 2003 
 Company  Type  of  activity  Revenues 
EUR mn*
1 TÜPRAŞ-TÜRKİYE PETROL RAFİNERİLERİ A.Ş.   Refined petrol products  4,862.9
2 FORD  OTOMOTİV SANAYİ A.Ş.   Motor vehicles  1,435.7
3 EÜAŞ ELEKTRİK ÜRETİM A.Ş. GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ   Electricity generation  1,282.7
4 OYAK-RENAULT  OTOMOBİL FABRİKALARI A.Ş.   Motor vehicles  1,214.6
5 ARÇELİK A.Ş.   Electrical equipment  1,186.5
6 EREĞLİ DEMİR VE ÇELİK FABRİKALARI T.A.Ş.   Iron and Steel  1,152.8
7 TOFAŞ TÜRK OTOMOBİL FABRİKASI A.Ş.   Motor vehicles  1,075.5
8 TÜRKİYE ŞEKER FABRİKALARI A.Ş.   Sugar production  1,058.6
9 VESTEL  ELEKTRONİK SAN. VE TİC. A.Ş.   Electronics prod. and trade  998.2
10 AYGAZ  A.Ş.   Gas  951.8
11 TOYOTA  OTOMOTİV SANAYİ TÜRKİYE A.Ş.   Motor vehicles  781.5
12 BEKO  ELEKTRONİK A.Ş.   Electronics  680.5
13 PETKİM PETROKİMYA HOLDİNG A.Ş. GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ   Petrochemicals  628.5
14  TEKEL TÜTÜN, TÜTÜN MAMULLERİ,TUZ VE ALKOL  Tobacco, Alcohol  605.9
15 TÜRKİYE KÖMÜR İŞLETMELERİ KURUMU GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ Coal  513.8
16  İPRAGAZ A.Ş.   Gas  508.5
17  MERCEDES-BENZ TÜRK A.Ş.   Motor vehicles  493.6
18 ÇOLAKOĞLU METALURJİ A.Ş.   Meltas  474.2
19 HABAŞ SINAİ VE TIBBİ GAZLAR İSTİHSAL ENDÜSTRİSİ A.Ş.   Gas  471.4
20  İSKENDERUN DEMİR VE ÇELİK A.Ş.   Iron and Steel  435.1
21  İÇDAŞ ÇELİK ENERJİ TERSANE VE ULAŞIM SAN. A.Ş.   Energy  406.5
22  PHILSA PHILIP MORRIS SABANCI SİGARA VE TÜTÜNCÜLÜK  Tobacco  388.9
23 BSH  PROFİLO ELEKTRİKLİ GEREÇLER SANAYİİ A.Ş.   Electrical equipment  344.2
24 MİLANGAZ LPG DAĞITIM TİCARET VE SANAYİ A.Ş.   Gas  338.3
25  BOSCH SAN VE TİC A.Ş.   Electrical equipment  335.8
Note: * Recalculated in euro using the 2003 average exchange rate. 
Source: Istanbul Chamber of Industry (2004). 41 
Two branches seem to dominate the raft of large companies: motor car manufacture (all of them 
foreign investment companies) and production of basic materials and energy in a broad sense, 




Mixed degree of concentration in manufacturing 
Given that the corporate sector is a mix comprising a huge number of enterprises employing less 
than ten people on the one hand, and a select group of global players of the likes of Koç, Sabancı 
and Anadolu on the other, it comes as no surprise that the degree of concentration varies greatly 
between the individual industries. In a recently published table, the State Office of Statistics focused 
on concentration in Turkish manufacturing in 2001. To measure concentration, the table uses the 
joint market shares held by the four or, alternatively, eight leading enterprises in a given industry. 
Another measuring yardstick it applies is the Herfindahl Index. This is obtained by squaring the 
market share of each member in the branch and then summing those squares. In branches where 
no participant has a larger market share, the index produces a value close to zero, but a value of 1 in 
the case of monopoly (see Table 13). 
 
In sectors where a large number of SMEs operate, the degree of concentration is relatively low – 
something that would not necessarily have to be the case. For example, in the production of metallic 
goods, concentration is relatively low. Some 1,270 companies employing more than 9 persons 
operate in this sector (ISIC 2710 to 2899), and only in a few sub-sectors do the eight largest 
companies have a joint market share of over 80% (casting of non-ferrous metals and manufacture of 
steam generators). In the manufacturing of other fabricated metal products n.e.c. and in the 
manufacturing of structural metal products, the joint share of the eight largest companies is less than 
40%. In basic iron and steel, the branch with the highest revenues within this group (EUR 5.4 billion), 
the degree of concentration was moderate: of 184 market participants, the eight largest had a joint 
market share of 52%. 
 
In the textiles and clothing sector more than 3,500 companies are active. Two smaller sub-sectors 
are highly concentrated, whereas in most of the others concentration is low. This is especially true 
for the largest sub-industry, preparation and spinning of textile fibres and weaving of textiles as well 
as for manufacture of wearing apparel. In these two branches, the shares of the eight largest players 
were 21% and 12% respectively, whereas the branch revenues were EUR 7.7 billion and 6.4 billion, 
ranking them second and third 2 and 3 on the list of industries with the highest revenues.  
 
In the production of wood products, where 450 enterprises were operating in 2001, concentration 
ratios were not as low as in textiles. In the large sub-industries, the eight largest companies had 
market shares of around 60%.  
 
 
                                                           
40   This sector is also of importance given the number of oil and gas pipelines which either go to the Turkish harbour of 
Ceyhan or to the Black Sea, for onward transport through the Bosporus Straits (EIA 2004). 42 
Table 13 
Concentration in Turkish manufacturing industry, 2001 
































































































































Low concentration industries (Joint market share of the 4 largest companies below 50%): 
1810  Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel  1,485 7.88 11.68  0.00  6,427
1711  Preparation and spinning of textile fibres; weaving of textiles  825 13.89 21.05  0.01  7,674
2520  Manufacture of plastics products 487 14.76 25.61  0.01  2,016
1730  Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles  310 16.86 25.46  0.01  1,187
1531  Manufacture of grain mill products  264 18.07 27.53  0.02  1,008
1513  Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables  234 20.00 29.44  0.02  2,578
2899  Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c.  298 23.57 37.81  0.02  1,004
2694  Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster  82 30.44 46.34  0.04  1,626
2423  Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and 
botanical products  75 33.98 52.84  0.05  2,404
1511  Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat 
products 99 34.68 50.25  0.05  1,255
2710  Manufacture of basic iron and steel  184 34.97 51.49  0.05  5,426
1514  Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats  95 35.08 48.87  0.05  1,515
1542  Manufacture of sugar  39 35.88 53.35  0.05  1,523
2610  Manufacture of glass and glass products  103 40.05 63.96  0.06  1,091
3430  Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and 
their engines  171 44.97 57.76  0.10  1,113
High concentration industries (Joint market share of the 4 largest companies above 50%): 
2720  Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals  117 55.46 66.17  0.09  1,343
1543  Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery  85 61.42 82.14  0.11  1,013
2930  Manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c.  136 63.31 81.22  0.12  1,998
1600  Manufacture of tobacco products  25 66.69 88.53  0.15  3,361
2424  Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing 
preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations  71 66.78 84.05  0.15  1,313
3410  Manufacture of motor vehicles  26 71.11 90.08  0.15  3,907
2320  Manufacture of refined petroleum products  37 89.19 98.76  0.23  15,546
3220  Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus 
for line telephony and line telegraphy  16 92.50 99.58  0.23  1,042
3230  Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video 
recording or reproducing apparatus, and associated goods  30 98.64 99.27  0.40  1,395
2430  Manufacture of man-made fibres  5 99.85 100.00  0.57  1,394
2213  Publishing of recorded media  1 100.00 100.00  1.00  (*)
2230  Reproduction of recorded media  2 100.00 100.00  1.00  (*)
3313  Manufacture of industrial process control equipment  2 100.00 100.00  0.51  (*)
3330  Manufacture of watches and clocks 2 100.00 100.00  0.55  (*)
3599  Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c.  1 100.00 100.00  1.00  (*)
3693  Manufacture of sports goods  1 100.00 100.00  1.00  (*)
Notes: * Concentration ratios CR4, CR8 measure the share the 4 or 8 companies with the largest sales revenues have 
in the industry's total revenues. - ** for each industry the sum of the squares of the companies' market shares (defined 
as own revenues in relation to the industry's total revenues). - (*) Hidden due to code of Confidentiality 
Source: State Institution for Statistics, 27 August 2004. 
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In the food, beverages and tobacco sector, the picture was mixed. 25 companies participated in 
tobacco production, the branch with by far the highest revenues in the whole sector: close to EUR 
3.4 billion. The eight largest companies accounted for a joint market share of 89%. In the production 
of beverages with a total revenue of EUR 1.8 billion, concentration was also high. In all of them, the 
eight largest companies had market shares ranging between 80% and 100%. Among the larger sub-
sectors of the food industry, the manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery was 
highly concentrated, but less so the sugar industry where 39 companies were operating. The large 
food-processing branches with very low concentration ratios were processing and preserving of fruit 
and the vegetables and manufacture of grain mill products, each of them with a CR8 of somewhat 
less than 30%.  
 
With a branch revenue of EUR 15.5 billion, by far the most important activity among the highly 
concentrated industries was the manufacture of refined petroleum products. 37 companies were 
listed, but the largest four had a joint market share of close to 90%. Another important and highly 
concentrated branch was the manufacture of motor vehicles: the revenues of 26 participants totalled 
EUR 3.9 billion, but the joint market share was 71% for the four and 90% for the eight largest. Of the 
larger industries, other high levels of concentration were also to be observed in the manufacture of 
domestic appliances n.e.c., the manufacture of TV and radio receivers and video recorders, and the 
manufacture of man-made fibres.  
 
 
The discreet presence of the transnational corporations  
Hitherto, Turkey has been one of those countries that did not extend all that warm a welcome to 
foreign investors. Japan and Korea display a similar attitude, as did Slovenia, albeit at a different 
stage. In Turkey, the reasons for this vary. First, throughout their history the Turks have been 
distrustful of foreigners’ intent upon gaining a foothold in the country. In its long period of agony, the 
Ottoman Empire had to face centuries of edicts and interference from foreign powers. After World 
War I, Turkish territory was on the verge of being reduced to Central Anatolia. The victory of the 
hastily formed new Turkish army helped to avert that fate and marked the starting point of the new 
state. Another feasible explanation is to be found in the upper echelons of the state institutions, 
including the army, who do not wish to abrogate much of the power and influence they have wielded 
so far. It could also be that the state administration simply follows its traditional habit of tending to 
complicate things, a ruse many might resort to as a rent-seeking strategy. Moreover, up to mid-2003 
foreigners wishing to start an investment project had to seek the authorities’ permission. Thus, the 
low inflow of foreign direct investment may well be due to a lack of interest on the part of 
transnational companies. Finally, Turkey’s corporate sector is dominated by about 20 holdings (see 
above for a brief description of the largest three). The very existence of these holdings may 
contribute to the difficulty which large privatization projects face. While they may be interested in 
purchasing the more attractive companies listed for privatization, these holdings can hardly compete 
with foreign investors. They have thus been looking for opportunities to cooperate with transnational 
companies, both in Turkey and abroad. In sum, the involvement of transnationals in Turkey is strong: 







Privatization was put on the government’s agenda as far back as 1983, the legal basis being the privatization-
related laws of 1994 and August 2003. By 2004, some 150-200 firms had been privatized. The privatization of 
the following industries is complete: production of cement, animal feed, dairy products and forest products, 
catering services and petroleum distribution. In iron and steel, meat processing, sea freight and tourism, the 
share of the public sector has dropped to below 50%. In ports and petroleum refining that share is less than 
100%, but still above 50%. In the banking sector, several smaller banks have been privatized and, in May 1998, 
the largest Bank (Is Bank) went private.  
A number of important companies are next on the privatization agenda. They include the petrochemical giant 
PETKIM (at least 51%), the refinery TÜPRAŞ, the tobacco branch of TEKEL, Turkish Airlines (THY) and the 
National Lottery which in recent years has recorded annual revenues of over USD 1.1 billion. In mid-October 
2004, the government decided to sell en bloc a 55% stake in Turk Telekom, and the privatization agency has set 
the bid deadline for 31 May 2005. 13 companies and joint ventures have passed the pre-qualification stage: the 
Belgian telecom company Belgacom, the Turkish media conglomerate Doğan, a joint venture of Emirates 
Telecommunications Corporation, Çalık Enerji and Dubai Islamic Bank, Koç-Sabancı, Mapa İnşaat, Multi Global, 
Turkish Army Pension Fund (OYAK), Saudi Oger, SK Telecom Co., Telecom Italia, Spain's Telefonica and 
Turkish privatization investors led by Turktell Bilişim. However, analysts say few of them were likely to submit a 
bid; Belgacom withdraw from the process in February 2005. The legal basis for Telekom privatization is a law 
prescribing a sale of at least 51%, with a ceiling of 45% being put on foreign participation.  
Source: YASED (2004), Turkish Daily News, 9 February 2005. 
 
Transnational corporations have long been operating in Turkey, some of them dating back to the 
days of the Ottoman Empire. Examples of prominent investors are British Petroleum, British 
American Tobacco, Fiat (investor in the car producer TOFAS, truck producer Otoyol as well as Türk 
Traktör), the cement producer Lafarge (1500 employees), Nestlé with around 600 employees, Pirelli 
(tyres), Renault (Oyak-Renault, see Table 12), La Roche Pharmaceuticals with about 900 
employees, Shell, Siemens, Total, Carlsberg Beer, Unilever and Volvo (European Round Table of 
Industrialists, 2004).  
 
At the end of June 2003, 6,511 foreign investment companies were operating in Turkey. Nearly half 
their capital was allocated to services, close to 42% of which targeted manufacturing. About 3.5% 
was invested in agriculture, more precisely in services related to agriculture. The energy sector’s 
share was somewhat less than 5%; that of mining was 0.5%. Most foreign capital, over 10% of the 
total, went to banking, communications (9%), chemicals (8%), trade (7%), food (6%), investment 
financing (5%) and automotive industry (5%) – and another 4% to activities linked to the automotive 
industry.  
 
Until recently, most of the larger domestic companies were state-owned and known as ‘State 
Economic Enterprises’ (SEEs). This dates back to 1931, when a strategy frequently called etatism 
was officially proclaimed. Basically, private ownership was allowed to continue in those instances 
where it had already established itself; this meant that the strategy considered market forces a 
positive element. At the same time, five-year plans were institutionalized, the aim being to accelerate 
industrialization. In that context the state created new enterprises which remained part of the public 
sector. The legal position was similar to that long held e.g. in Austria or Germany in respect of the 
railway-operating state companies or the postal service. In Turkey, giving key enterprises such a 45 
position was supposed to be the better strategy – at least for a transitory period up until the economy 
reached a more developed stage. What followed was a massive industrialization drive in the 1930s, 
complemented by a system of highly protective tariffs. A long period of industrialization based on 
import substitution started, continuing well into the post-war period. In 1964 the government 
established the State Investment Bank; this aimed at providing long-term investment loans to SEEs. 
The latter had also access to other sources of financing, such as credit from the Central Bank of 
Turkey or transfers from the Treasury. There was, as Öniş and Alper (2002) show, a problem of soft 
budget constraint. 
 
The public sector’s economic activities were organized as follows: 
–  State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). They are fully state-owned and affiliated to a ministry in 
keeping with the inter-ministerial division of labour. They are split into 
• State Economic Establishments, which operate in line with regular commercial conditions in 
the manufacturing sector, and 
• State Economic Corporations, which usually are monopolies. 
–  Certain organizations equipped with a number of public functions. These enterprises and 
institutions are partners or affiliates of State Economic Enterprises, with the state’s share varying 
between 15% and 99%. 
 
Persons employed in this sector count as ‘workers’, not as civil servants. 
 
Enterprises with a state holding of at least 50% can be regarded as part of the SEE structures. Their 
boards reflect the company’s ownership structure, and government representatives play the lead 
role.  
 
SEEs continue to dominate two spheres: sectors that have always been regarded as sensitive; and 
sectors where private investors have hesitated to get involved, given the high capital requirements or 
their doubts about profitability. SEEs have been set up in transportation (air, sea and rail) and 
communications, as well as energy production and distribution. They also used to be the rule for 
banks with shares in non-financial companies, in particular branches such as textiles or refining, or 
with shares in multi-sector conglomerates.  
 
In 1980, it became clear that promoting development by means of an import-substitution strategy 
was doomed to failure. For all the endeavours to achieve import substitution, imports had expanded 
rapidly in the context of GDP growth. Furthermore, Turkish manufacturers had been predominantly 
inward-oriented and exports could thus not keep pace. In that year, the military stepped in for the 
second time
41; the military government launched a liberalization-cum-stabilization programme, but 
continued to rely on SEEs and development planning. After the military withdrew in 1983, 
privatization (at least of some of the SEEs) became a topic for discussion once more and major 
privatization steps were planned for 1987. In 1984, parliament passed a law that paved the way for 
the privatization of state-owned companies (amending it twice thereafter, in 1994 and again in 
August 2003). Most of the privatization planned for 1987 failed to materialize. In the mid-1990s, 
SEEs accounted for more than 40% of value-added in manufacturing and employed about 550,000 
workers (about 20% of the industrial workforce). 
                                                           
41   Contrary to 1960, the intervention in 1971 was an indirect one. 46 
One principle of Turkish etatism
42 was that SEEs should not set their prices independently. For 
larger parts of the economy, the reform package of 1980 abolished price regulation. It remained 
intact, however, in certain sectors such as energy and public transport, and especially in the 
production of staple foods and agricultural outputs/inputs. It was an integral part of agricultural policy 
that was being reformed at the time. In that context, SEEs also had to serve a social function. The 
farm-support programme stabilized farmers' incomes, while low consumer prices for food, energy 
and transport helped the urban poor. SEEs were pressed to employ more people than necessary 
from the standpoint of efficiency. In the context of regional development programmes, the SEEs had 
to set up some of their production sites in remote areas, regardless whether this increased their 
transport costs and infrastructural investment. For a time at least, a number of the SEEs ran at a 
loss, while the state covered their losses in one way or another. From 1989 onwards, SEEs were 
required by law to borrow at market rates; the latter were high, thus merely serving to exacerbate the 
debt problem. Some enterprises accumulated an ever-increasing debt burden, vis-à-vis the Treasury 
and the National Bank and, to a lesser degree, vis-à-vis commercial banks. As a result, debt-
servicing absorbed an ever greater share of those companies’ revenues.  
 
Over time, periodic crises in the economy as a whole led to a further erosion of confidence in SEEs. 
Finally, the situation worsened to such a degree that the government together with the military 
establishment had no choice but to yield to internal and, above all, external pressure to privatize. 
The privatization plans were comprehensive, yet up until early 2005 little has happened. 
 
Over the period 1986-2003, the state privatized 167 companies, many of which were parts of large 
SEEs. In 153 companies the state did not even retain a minority share. By end-2003, privatization 
revenues totalled USD 11.4 billion. In the first quarter of 2004, the state sold stakes worth USD 0.7 
billion and possibly close to USD 1.1 billion for the whole year – almost twice the average of past 
years.  
 
The state has completely withdrawn from the following industries: production of cement, animal feed, 
milk-dairy products, forest products, earth moving and catering services and petroleum distribution 
sectors. In the tourism, iron and steel, textiles, sea freight and meat processing sectors, the state 
has privatized more than 50% of its previous shares. In ports and the petroleum refinery sector, the 
government has sold its minority stakes.  
 
The state has also started privatizing shares in banks (Sümerbank, Etibank, Denizbank and Anadolu 
Bank). In 1998, the government offered domestic and foreign investors a 12.3% stake in İş Bankası. 
The government offered a tranche of the shares on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). In fact, more 
recently the public sector has started offering shares in many companies on the stock exchange in 
an attempt to strengthen that institution. 
 
The promotion of privatization deals ranks high on the Turkish government’s agenda. It is the sole 
means of ensuring a swift exit from fiscal structures due to high indebtedness: the IMF strongly 
recommends applying such a strategy. The list of tenders projected for 2004 was long; it included 
the sale of shares in large companies such as refineries (Tüpraş), the petrochemicals producer 
Petkim, Türk Telekom, electricity generation and distribution plants, Turkish Airlines, the national 
                                                           
42   More on etatism and Kemalism – and its impact on development strategies in other developing countries – can be 
found in Amin (1990).  47 
lottery, sugar factories and the former state monopoly producer of cigarettes, alcoholic beverages 
and a number of other products (TEKEL). The ultimate decision-making body is the Privatization 
High Council headed by the prime minister; administration of the privatization process is part of the 
prime minister’s remit.  
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D Turkey’s foreign trade relations  
Institutional framework 
Today’s EU shares a long history of economic integration with Turkey. In 1959, Turkey applied for 
associate membership; this led to the Association Agreement in 1963. Called the Ankara 
Agreement, it envisaged three stages in preparation for full membership. During the preliminary 
stage (1964-1973), the EEC was to give direct financial aid to Turkey and establish preferential trade 
conditions. During the transition stage, tariffs and other trade barriers were to be eliminated over a 
period of 22 years in order to establish a customs union between Turkey and the EEC. Depending 
on whether the requisite progress was observed, the Community would then examine the possibility 
of Turkey acquiring full membership in the final stage.  
 
For economic and political reasons, neither side was enthusiastic about implementing the 
Agreement over such an extended period of time. While Turkey was reluctant to eliminate tariffs, the 
EEC started setting political conditions for further integration. The timetable was also prone to 
change. In 1967, Turkey applied to negotiate entry into the second stage of the process. The 
Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement was thus signed in 1970, the aim being establish a 
customs union. After Greece joined the EU in 1981, Turkey was faced mounting political obstacles 
with respect to further integration
43. In 1987, Turkey surprisingly and prematurely applied for full 
membership to the EEC only to be politely rebuffed by the Commission. At the time, Turkey was 
confronted by two political problems: human rights and the Cyprus question. The major changes in 
the political landscape of Europe brought about by the end of the Cold War together with the 
transformation of the European Community from an economic to a political union also had an impact 
on EU-Turkish relations. Membership in the community took on increasing importance for Turkey. 
Moreover, pursuant to the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement the customs union should 
have been up and running by 1995. Turkey’s wish to become a full member intensified against a 
background of worsening political circumstances. For its part, Turkey had failed to implement the 
prior steps set out in the Ankara Agreement, further to which it now faced a Greek veto.
44 In this 
difficult situation, the Turkish government felt a fresh step towards integration should be taken. The 
customs union with the EU was thus concluded in 1995; it came into effect on 1 January 1996.  
 
It is important to note that the customs union only applied to industrial products: it did not extend to 
agricultural products and services. Owing to the legacy of the prior steps, with the Ankara 
Agreement unlike the Europe Agreement explicitly envisaging the formation of a customs union, 
both partners agreed on setting up a customs union instead of entering into a free-trade agreement 
as had been the case with the agreement between the EU and the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Moreover, in this specific instance, the customs union that was finally concluded went 
beyond basic requirements. Turkey was required to introduce a broad swathe of legislation covering 
all aspects of trade, competition law, industrial commercial and intellectual property rights and 
harmonization with EU technical standards. Thus, the customs union already bears many 
                                                           
43   For a discussion about winners and loser from the customs union see Dimitri and Moutos (2002). 
44   Greece laid down certain conditions that had to be met before it would lift its veto: Turkey should take the issue of its 
conflict with Greece over the Aegean to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Furthermore, the community should 
lend no financial aid until Turkey cleaned up its human rights record. Finally, Turkey should not oppose the opening of 
accession negotiations with the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus.  49 
consequences that would normally follow on from full membership. The fields of public procurement 
and trade in services were omitted, but negotiations on the same were envisaged. Apart from those 
issues, the customs union called for the establishment and maintenance of a common commercial 
policy vis-à-vis third countries; this has inevitably led to a pronounced degree of asymmetry given 
the major differences between the two partners in term of size.  
 
At the time the customs union was concluded, the conditions for Turkey were less favourable than 
had been envisaged in the Ankara Agreement. In economic terms, Turkey had to forgo any claim to 
financial aid as well as the right of free movement of workers, to both of which Turkey would have 
been entitled under the Association Agreement. Following a further deterioration, the cool political 
relations between Turkey and the EU froze solid in 1997, when Turkey was officially dropped from 
the list of candidate countries. However, at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey was officially 
declared a candidate country. Three years later at the Copenhagen Summit, it was agreed that, if 
the European Council were to decide in December 2004 that Turkey met the Copenhagen criteria, 
the European Union would open up accession negotiations with Turkey without further delay.  
 
The questions to be answered in this part of the report are: (i) how has the customs union affected 
both the Turkish and European economies? (ii) how is further integration going to work and/or what 
impact will it have on the competitiveness of both partners? Before answering those questions, we 
will present an overview of Turkey’s foreign trade in 2003 and compare the situation in that year to 
the early and mid-1990s in terms of the external sector: trade in goods and services and FDI. We will 
then summarize the abundant empirical literature on the effects of the customs union and present 
the outcome of simulations using current computable general equilibrium models for various 
integration scenarios. The latter models permit us to shed light on welfare issues, which cannot be 
assessed in a partial econometric analysis of the external sector alone. Finally, we will try to evaluate 
the future prospects for Turkey’s external sector based on the analysis of current competitiveness 
against a backdrop of institutional change. 
 
 
Evolution of foreign trade  
Turkey’s exports amounted to USD 11.6 billion in 1989; imports attained a level of USD 15.8 billion 
(see Figure 14 and Table A6 in the Appendix). Both exports and imports increased steadily over 
time, resulting in total trade volume doubling by 1995. The years immediately prior to the formation 
of the customs union were characterized by particularly high growth rates: close to 20% per annum. 
Greater volatility was observed on the import side: imports rose substantially in 1993, dropping by 
20% in 1994 and soaring by 50% in 1995. It seems that the creation of the customs union had 
already been anticipated; its impact materialized even before it went into effect on 1 January 1996. 
Trade growth remained high in the second half of the 1990s, in particular on the import side, apart 
from a slump due to deteriorating global conditions in 1998 and 1999. By 2003, Turkish exports had 
more than quadrupled since 1989 (and doubled compared to 1995), reaching USD  47  billion. 
Developments in import levels were similar; total imports amounted to USD 67 billion in 2003. 
 50 
Figure 14 










































Source: UN COMTRADE.  
 
Turkey’s global trade flows were mirrored by those with the EU-15, indicating the trade-creating 
effect of the customs union (see Figure 15 and again Table A6 in the Appendix). The EU’s share in 
Turkish foreign trade has remained fairly constant at roughly 50%. Consequently, the customs union 
has had no trade diversion effect. The sharp increase in trade volume, however, reveals substantial 
trade creation. The most recent data show that both exports and imports have more than doubled 
since 1995, with imports reaching a level of USD 31.1 billion in 2003 and exports amounting to USD 
24.5 billion. On the import side, the importance of the EU as a source of Turkish imports experienced 
a short-lived boost. This reflects an asymmetry in the customs union; Whereas Turkey only lifted 
tariffs with respect to industrial goods from the EU, the EU had already abolished nominal tariff rates 
on imports of industrial goods from Turkey as far back as 1971 (except for a few sensitive items 
such as certain oil products and particular textile products). Consequently, Turkish imports from the 
EU rose from a level of USD 16.9 billion in 1995 to 26.5 billion in 2000, while exports increased only 
moderately from USD 11.1 billion to 14.4 billion, with an immediate negative impact on the Turkish 
trade balance.  
 
Figures 14 and 15 illustrate the initial widening of the Turkish trade deficit following the establishment 
of the customs union. The preliminary peak was reached in 2000. The deficit was sharply reduced in 
2001, which – being an exceptionally bad year for worldwide trade – brought about a contraction in 
global trade and more or less stagnation for EU exports. In addition to the international setting, the 
Turkish economy faced specific difficulties in that year, experiencing a devaluation of its currency 
versus the euro by 47.5% compared to 2000 (versus the US dollar by 49%). The two factors 
combined to reduce Turkish imports, resulting in a positive impact on the trade balance. Despite 
constant devaluation ever since, imports have continued to outstrip exports, leading once more to a 
widening of the deficit. Consequently, the short-term improvement in the trade balance was clearly 
related to factors other than the customs union, while the customs union itself continues to have a 
greater impact on imports than on exports. 
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The widening trade deficit is often interpreted as a negative impact of integration with the EU and EU 
critics in Turkey advance it as an argument against further integration or full membership. In terms of 
welfare, however, most studies agree that the customs union has had a positive impact: lowering 
import prices, boosting productivity and contributing to a modernization of economic legislation, thus 
improving the business environment.  
 
Figure 15 










































Source: UN COMTRADE.  
 
 
Trade in goods: geographical structure 
Table 14 reports the geographical structure of Turkey’s foreign trade. As mentioned earlier, about 
half of Turkey’s foreign trade is conducted with members of the EU-15. Including the new member 
states increases this share only moderately, by 2.5 to 3 percentage points in 2003. In 1989 Turkey’s 
trade share with the EU amounted to 49% on the export side and 41% with respect to imports. 
Turkey’s single largest trading partner was Germany, accounting for 19% of Turkish exports and 
14% of Turkish imports. This picture remained fairly stable over time. The share of exports to the EU 
increased to 52%, while imports rose to 47% by 2003. Austria’s percentage share in Turkish exports 
decreased slightly, while imports from Austria rose to 1.2%. Furthermore, exports to Germany have 
declined in relative terms down to 16%, whereas Germany’s share of imports has remained constant 
at 14%. Starting from a low level, the share of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has 
increased substantially in terms of both exports and imports: nearly 3% in 2003.  
 
The importance of Turkey’s immediate neighbours to its foreign trade is diminishing. In 2003, Turkey 
shipped scarcely more than 7% of total exports to neighbouring countries compared to 11.5% in 
1989. Imports from those countries represented approximately 6% of Turkish imports in 2003, down 
from 13% in 1989. The most important trading partners among the neighbouring countries are 
Greece (with 2% of exports and 0.6% of imports in 2003), Iraq (1.8% exports, 0.2% imports) and 
Bulgaria (1.3% exports and 1% import share). Iran’s share in Turkish exports also surpassed 1%, 
while imports from Iran amounted to 2.8% in 2003.  52 
Table 14 
Turkey's trade structure, by partner 
 partner  in % of total exports  in % of total imports 
   1989 1995 1996 2003 1989 1995 1996 2003
EEC15  48.68 51.29 49.76 51.91 41.02 47.22 53.09 46.52
















CEEC9  0.83 2.87 2.35 2.85 1.18 1.05 0.92 2.61
        
GRC  1.07 0.97 1.02 1.95 0.64 0.56 0.66 0.64
BGR  0.23 0.85 0.66 1.32 0.02 1.13 0.84 1.03
ARM .  .  .  .    .  .  .  0.00
GEO  .  0.31 0.48 0.33 0.14 0.08 0.41
IRN  4.83 1.23 1.29 1.13 1.48 1.93 1.88 2.79
























SYR  1.52 1.25 1.34 0.87 0.11 0.72 0.73 0.62
        
ALB  0.03 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
BIH  .  0.04 0.10 0.13 .  0.00 0.01 0.01
HRV  .  0.12 0.12 0.18 .  0.03 0.07 0.03
MKD  .  0.35 0.32 0.26 .  0.14 0.07 0.04
ROM  0.45 1.40 1.36 1.85 1.51 1.03 1.02 1.43
YUG  0.73  . . .  2.38 . . . 
RUS  .  5.71 6.48 2.90 .  5.83 4.45 8.17
UKR  .  0.92 1.16 0.94 .  2.40 1.74 2.00

































ISR  0.26 1.11 1.10 2.30 0.38 0.47 0.45 0.68
Source: UN COMTRADE, own calculations. 
 
With an export share of 1.9% and an import share of 1.4%, Romania is one of the closer trading 
partners for Turkey. Considerably more trade is conducted with Russia, especially on the import 
side. While the export share to Russia dropped by half to 3% over the period 1989-2003, imports 
from Russia increased in relative terms and accounted for more than 8% of Turkish imports. This is 
clearly linked to the recent sharp rise in oil prices.  
 
Turkey focuses primarily on the EU market as the main destination for its products as well as the 
major source of imported consumer and investment goods. Thus, the EU may be called Turkey’s 
main trading partner. However, this trade relationship is highly asymmetrical owing to the major 
difference in size between the two partners. While the EU accounts for roughly half of Turkey’s 
trade, Turkey is a minor trading partner for the 15 incumbent EU countries. Table 15 shows the 
mirror image of trade integration with Turkey from the viewpoint of selected trading partners. Less 
than 1% of EU exports were destined for Turkey in 1995, the year before the customs union took 
effect. In 2003 this share rose to slightly more than 1%. EU imports from Turkey have increased 
from 0.6% in 1995 to 1.1% in 2003.  
 
In 2003, 1.3% of total German exports went to Turkey. Imports from Turkey also accounted for 1.3% 
in the same year. The data also reveal that despite political tensions, the laws of gravity hold at the 53 
margin, lending Turkey slightly greater importance in Greek foreign trade compared to the EU-15 on 
average.
45 Turkey features much more prominently as a trading partner for Romania and Bulgaria. 
The trade shares with Turkey amounted to 9% and 5% respectively of those countries’ exports and 
6% and 4% of their imports. The much lower share enjoyed by both countries in Turkish foreign 
trade can be explained by differences in economic size.  
 
Table 15 
Importance of Turkey to selected trade partners 
  Export share to Turkey in % of total exports  
  1989 1995 1996 2003
EEC15 0.52  0.86 1.07 1.13
DEU 0.71  1.25 1.45 1.31
GRC 1.13  2.02 2.98 3.36 *)
BGR 0.00  0.00 7.86 9.15
ROM 2.96  4.39 4.82 5.12
  Import share from Turkey in % of total imports  
  1989 1995 1996 2003
EEC15 0.52  0.63 0.64 1.06
DEU 0.93  1.26 1.23 1.34
GRC 0.75  0.81 0.81 1.91 *)
BGR 0.00  0.00 1.89 6.12
ROM 0.57  2.44 1.91 3.85
Note: *) 2002. 
Source: UN COMTRADE, own calculations. 
Table 16 
Trade shares with EU-15 of total trade 2002 
(in %) 
  Export share  Import share 
EU-15  61.07 58.62 
Czech Republic  68.63 60.99 
Hungary  75.16 55.47 
Poland  68.78 61.75 
Bulgaria  56.13 50.53 
Romania  67.32 58.65 
Turkey  51.51 45.50 
Source: IMF DOT Statistics (2002). 
 
                                                           
45   However, gravity estimation models suggest that the trade potential between Greece and Turkey is far from being 
exploited. In other words, actual trade between those two countries is below its potential given their proximity and 
economic similarity (Angelos and George, 2003). 54 
Although an EU share of 50% in Turkey’s foreign trade implies a pronounced orientation towards the 
West European market, it puts Turkey at the lower end compared with the new member countries 
and the EU candidate countries Bulgaria and Romania. Table 16 reports the EU’s share in exports 
and imports of selected countries in Eastern Europe. For three of the new member countries, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, exports to the EU-15 accounted for more than two thirds of 
their total exports in 2002, while the current candidate countries Bulgaria and Romania showed 
shares of 56% and 67%, respectively. Turkey ranks last here with 51.5%. Similarly, on the import 
side, Turkey recorded the lowest share of EU-15 imports despite the marked increases in import 
volume from the EU-15 following the establishment of the customs union. These differences arise 
from Turkey’s more diversified foreign markets and should certainly not be interpreted as a lack of 
orientation to the EU. As becomes apparent from the figures presented above, the volume of trade 
created since the establishment of the customs union reflects a strengthening of economic ties 
between the two partners.  
 
 
Trade in goods: commodity structure  
Turkey’s export structure is heavily dependent on two main product groups: textiles and food. Figure 
16 shows that the importance of food exports has declined since 1989 while that of exports of 
machinery and transport equipment has risen, reaching more than 26% in 2003 (see also Table A2 
in the Appendix). As a consequence, the importance of manufactures in total trade has risen from 
66% in 1989 to 84% in 2003. This suggests some upgrading in Turkish export patterns over time; it 
becomes even more apparent when viewed over a longer period of time. Other manufacturing 
exports (i.e. the product categories SITC 6+8) increased from a meagre share of 25% in 1979 to 
52% a decade later, accounting for 54% in 2003. Lohrmann (2000a) shows, however, that mainly 
low-tech and low-skill manufactures are exported, while sophisticated machinery and high-end 
products are imported.  
 
Turkey’s import structure is more balanced (see Figure 17). Machinery and transport equipment 
account for the highest share in imports with 32%. Thus, there is considerable intra-industry trade in 
this commodity group. In Turkey intra-industry trade (IIT) has on average increased from 20% in 
1989 to 33% in 1997. It has gained importance primarily in those sectors that are not among the 
traditional Turkish export sectors, such as inorganic chemicals, textile yarns, iron and steel, power 
generating, telecommunications, electrical machinery, transport equipment, sanitary/heating and 
travel goods. This can be interpreted as a sign of a shift towards catching-up in the country’s 
economic structure with its more advanced trading partners in the EU (Lohrmann, 2000b). Evidence 
of the actual extent of industrial re-structuring towards more advanced industry patterns is not 
overwhelming however. For instance, the marked increase in textile imports in the customs union 
resulted to a great extent from growing imports of high-quality and high-price clothing articles from 
Italy. Thus, the Turkish economy seems to be facing the challenge of establishing international 
brands and designs; if successful, it would secure Turkish products a strong market position in the 
higher value-added segments of the European market. The focus on undifferentiated, low-
technology and low-skill-intensive goods is symptomatic for the Turkish foreign trade structure. As 
Lohrmann (2000a and 2000b) shows, analysis of IIT between Turkey and the EU reveals that it is 
mostly vertical, with Turkey specializing in low-tech and low-skill-intensive activities. Apart from this, 
the majority of trade flows are between industries.  
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Figure 16 





















































































































































Source: UN COMTRADE, own calculations. 
 
Figure 17 



















































































































































Source: UN COMTRADE, own calculations. 56 
Trade in agriculture 
Agriculture contributes roughly one eighth to the country’s overall GDP, whereas its contribution is 
less than 2% in the EU. In contrast to the EU-15, where animal production has a weight of more than 
40%, about three quarters of the value generated by Turkey’s agriculture stems from plant 
production. Agricultural imports amount to about one eighth of domestic agricultural production in 
Turkey, but to one fifth in the EU. In 2001, 15% of agricultural revenues in Turkey stemmed from 
subsidies compared to 35% in the EU. In Turkey 70% of the subsidies took the form of price support, 
compared to 58% in the EU.
46  
 
Turkey is a net exporter of agricultural products (unprocessed agricultural products plus processed 
food; including beverages and tobacco products) and even has a positive agro-trade balance with 
the EU. In 2000/2001 agro-exports totalled EUR 4.3 billion, whereas imports amounted to a mere 
EUR 3 billion (Grethe, 2003). Almost half of those exports went to the EU, whereas somewhat over 
a quarter of Turkey’s agro-imports came from there. Throughout the 1990s, the EU share increased 
in Turkish agro-exports, but diminished in Turkish imports. 
 
Turkey’s most important export item is fruit: in 2000/2001 it had a share of close to 29% in Turkey’s 
overall agro-exports and a 45% share in exports to the EU. The second most important group within 
agro-exports is processed fruit with shares of 13% in the whole and 19% in exports to the EU. With a 
share of about one quarter ‘other products’ are the most important group within Turkish imports, both 
in general and with respect to the EU. Cotton ranks second in Turkey’s agro-imports.  
 
Agricultural products are exempt from the customs union between the EU and Turkey. To date, 
Turkey has granted very few preferential tariffs on agricultural imports from the EU. On the other 
hand, the EU has accorded imports from Turkey highly preferential treatment. An appreciable 
portion of the agricultural imports enters the EU duty-free. Import barriers exist mostly in the form of: 
(a) tariff-quota schemes, where imports within the quota are tariff-free; and (b) an entry price 
scheme, where specific duties are applied if the value of the consignment is below the entry price. It 
is estimated that about 70 per cent of the imports from Turkey enter the EU duty-free and without 
any other import barriers (Flam, 2004). However, high specific duties are applied to the core 
products of the CAP: cereals and processed cereals, sugar and sugar products, dairy products and 
meat. Olive oil is also highly protected. Turkish exports of vegetables and fruits receive export 
subsidies. From 1998 on, Turkey has also started granting preferential rates to an increasing 
number of EU agricultural products. In January 1998, Turkey introduced the trade quota system for 
39 agricultural products from EU.
47  
 
For a number of products, farm gate prices are higher in Turkey than in the EU: In 2001, the price for 
wheat was EUR 123 per ton in the EU, but EUR 143 per ton in Turkey. Sugar prices are 6% lower 
compared to the EU. Farm-gate prices in Turkey, calculated in euro, were much higher in the years 
prior to the crisis in 2001. Apart from the exchange rate development, which has had a decisive 
impact on the ratio between EU and Turkish farm gate prices, the fact that Turkey’s agricultural 
                                                           
46    The calculation of subsidies is based on OECD methodology and is not equivalent to support from the EU or 
government budget. To give an example, this methodology regards minimum import prices as a source of involuntary 
farm subsidies extracted from the consumer. 
47   As an example, 3000 tons of butter were allowed to enter Turkey tariff-free, but a total of close to 3400 tons per year 
were delivered over the period 1998-2001 – despite an above-quota tariff of 100%. 57 
policy has relied mainly on price support
48 also plays a role, whereas the EU has committed itself to 
replacing price support gradually through direct payments to farmers. Even after the major currency 
devaluation in 2001 the farm-gate prices of some Turkish agricultural products are still above EU 
levels. Under such conditions, an extension of the tariff union to agricultural trade would not 
necessarily flood the EU market with cheap Turkish agricultural products. However, things may 
change in the future. Turkey wants to reshape its agricultural policy along CAP guidelines, and the 
CAP itself will continue its evolutionary process. 
 
The present agricultural reforms in Turkey are a result of the Uruguay Round agreement on agricultural 
trade and Turkey’s own efforts to adjust to the CAP. To some extent the reforms have also been 
prompted by an agreement with the IMF in 1999 to reform agricultural policy, i.e. to reduce costs, as a 
prerequisite for IMF support. Under the reform programme, output price supports and input subsidies 
and grants in various forms will be phased out and replaced by direct payments to farmers based on 
land holding, while tariffs will gradually be reduced. Income support is capped at 20 hectares; it is 
estimated that the total support will cost more than EUR 2 billion. The reforms are currently being 
implemented; it is planned to complete them in two years. Privatization of state enterprises in the 
agricultural sector is also part of the programme. Implementing the programme calls for extensive 
administrative reform. For example, substantial investments are needed to improve land registration, 
collect agricultural data and raise the veterinary and phytosanitary standards (Flam, 2004). 
 
 
Trade specialization patterns 
Calculation of specialization indices sheds more light on Turkey’s competitive position in the global 
market. Export specialization is calculated as a country’s share of worldwide exports in a specific 
industry, corrected for relative country size. Indices are made symmetric around zero; a negative 
index thus points to below-average specialization in a certain commodity group and a positive index 
indicates a market share that lies above the world average. Figures 18 to 21 depict specialization 
patterns on the export side. Commodity groups are so arranged that specialization at the bottom and 
to the left in the diagram coincides with specialization in more technology- and skill-intensive and 
higher value-added products, while specialization at the top and to the right indicates specialization 
in more labour-intensive goods.  
 
Box 6 
Free-trade zones (FTZs) 
Depending on their field of activity, at least some of the companies with FTZ licences issued after February 2004 
will have to pay corporate income tax. Companies with licences dating further back will remain exempt from that 
tax – up to the expiry of the licence or, in the event of Turkey joining the EU, up to the date of accession. The 
salaries they pay will be exempt from income tax up to 2008. 
Turkey’s legislation treats FTZs as being outside the Turkish customs territory. Sales from FTZs to Turkey count 
as Turkish imports. They are not subject to restrictions, but subject to VAT as well as to customs duties, 
depending on the origin of the goods’ content.  
Source: YASED (2004). 
                                                           
48   Agricultural policy and its links to SEEs are discussed from the trade unions’ viewpoint in Oral Necdet (2004) 58 
Figure 18 












































Source: Own calculations. 
 
In 1989 in particular, Turkey displayed a marked focus on low-skill products such as food and 
textiles (Figure 18). While this held true for the whole period up until 2003, higher value-added 59 
commodities, such as the products subsumed under the heading ‘miscellaneous goods’ and very 
recently machinery and transport equipment as well recorded a clear gain in relative market shares.  
 
Developments in Greece
49 have been very similar (Figure 19). Initially, high market shares relative to 
the size of the country’s economy were limited to food and textiles. Over time, Greece also built up 
certain competitiveness in miscellaneous goods and machinery and transport equipment. These 
relatively high market shares were subsequently lost, and today the country’s comparative advantage 
– as revealed by export shares – lies only in food, textiles and ores and metals. Thus, at this level of 
disaggregation, the Turkish export pattern seems to be more advanced than that of Greece. 
 
Figure 20 























As a benchmark, the EU-15 taken together, as the largest single exporter in the world representing 
roughly 20% of global exports, show a much weaker degree of specialization than individual 
countries (Figure 20). This can be inferred from the lower absolute value of the specialization index, 
which only rages from –1 to 0.4. Turkey shows the highest degree of specialization in this group. A 
high degree of specialization on the world market is often a sign of the great significance attached to 
inter-industry trade and hence points to some degree of backwardness in terms of industrial 
structure. Compared to the EU, this is clearly the case in Turkey. A high percentage of its foreign 
trade still takes place between industries. The EU pattern is skewed to the left; this indicates a strong 
competitive position in goods such as machinery, transport equipment, and everything subsumed 
under ‘miscellaneous goods’.  
 
Figures 21 and 22 depict revealed comparative advantages (RCAs), calculated as the difference 
between the export and the import specialization index (the export and import components for 1995  
 
                                                           
49   For a discussion of Greek and Turkish industry and trade structures see Kotios and Petrakos (2003). 60 
Figure 21 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own calculations. 
 
Figure 22 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own calculations. 61 
and 2003 are listed in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix). The RCA is thus a net concept; it offers a 
more correct picture of competitiveness than export specialization alone. Figures 21 and 22 show 
the competitiveness in manufactures of EU-15 and Turkey in two different years: 1995 and 2003. 
Turkey’s strong position in textiles and wearing apparel is outstanding in both years. However, the 
degree of specialization in these two industries has declined considerably over time. Paper, coke 
and refineries, chemicals, machinery and other transport equipment were the weakest export 
sectors in Turkey in 1995. With one exception, other transport equipment, these sectors were still 
characterized by relatively high imports compared to low exports in 2003. The switch to revealed 
comparative advantage in the latter industry, however, is remarkable. Thus, the impression gained 
from this analysis confirms the view that some catching-up has taken place since the formation of 
the customs union, while the overall trade pattern has been subject to but a few qualitative changes.  
 
Turkey’s manufacturing trade structure with respect to selected trading partners does not vary 
greatly across partners (see Tables A5 to A8 in the Appendix). This is to be expected from the 
relatively strong specialization in just a few industries (i.e. textiles and wearing, and recently 
transport equipment as well).  
 
 
Trade in services 
Turkey implemented a national programme for the adoption of the acquis in 2001 which included 
economic aspects related to the acquis communautaire, thus paving the way to the common market 
with its ‘four freedoms’ (free movement of goods, persons, services, capital). This bore immediate 
implications for trade in services. Furthermore, although services were excluded from the customs 
union agreement in 1995, negotiations were started in 1999 on extending the customs union to the 
area of services (and public procurement as well).  
 
Turkey’s service exports account for more than 1% of globally traded services according to the 
balance of payments. Mainly thanks to the importance of tourism
50, Turkey’s share in worldwide 
service exports is thus twice as high as its share in global goods trade (0.5%). With respect to the 
Turkish economy, trade in services is less important than trade in goods. The USD 19 billion worth of 
service exports corresponded to approximately 8% of GDP in 2003, while commodity exports 
corresponded to close to 20%. Owing to the low level of service imports, the net contribution of 
service trade to GDP was positive: 4.4% of GDP; net exports in goods, however, were negative: –
5.8% of GDP in 2003
51.  
 
The Turkish current account thus traditionally shows a deficit despite the sizeable surplus in 
services.
52 Although the customs union does not yet include services, the volume of service trade 
has increased noticeably since the mid-1990s. During the 1990s both service exports and imports 
increased relatively to the GDP, with the net GDP contribution fluctuating roughly between 3 and 7% 
of GDP. In the period from 1997 to 2001 services experienced a boom: exports climbed as high as 9 
                                                           
50   The number of tourists in 2002 was 13.2 million; this meant a share of 1.8% in world tourism and rank 16. A quarter of 
the tourists were Germans. With regard to revenues from tourism, USD 9 billion, Turkey ranked twelfth and held a 
share in the world total of 1.9%. Within Turkey, the Antalya region accounts for close to one third of all beds (Türkiye 
Vakiflar Bankasi, 2004).  
51   For 2004, the corresponding ratios were 4.2% (balance of services) and –7.9% of GDP (balance of goods) 
52   Within a matter of years the current account showed a surplus, for instance in the crisis years 1994 and 2001.  62 
to 12% and net exports up to between 4 and 7% of GDP. Thereafter, these ratios stabilized at 
around 8% (exports) and 4% (net exports). Relative to the GDP service exports dropped to the latter 
stabilized at somewhat above 4%. Table 17 reports service trade flows for 1989, 1995 and 2003. 
The surplus of USD 4 billion in 1989 and nearly 10 billion in 1995 amounted to more than 60% of 
exports in services. In 2003, the value of service trade increased and the surplus of USD 10.5 billion 




Turkey's trade revenues in services 
(USD million) 
Exports Imports  Net 
1989 1995 2003 1989 1995 2003 1989 1995 2003
Total 6569  14939 19025 -2541 -5319 -8520 4028  9620  10505
Transportation 967  1712 2184 -668 -1410 -2707 299  302  -523
Travel 2557  4957 13203 -565 -911 -2113 1992  4046  11090
Construction Services  582  1857 682 0 0 0 582  1857  682
Financial Services  0  151 291 0 -425 -374 0  -274  -83
Other Business Services  2340  3829 1352 -1051 -648 -1377 1289  3181  -25
Government  Services  123  131 97 -257 -370 -812 -134 -239 -715
Other Services  0  2302 1216 0 -1555 -1137 0  747  79
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. 
 
For Turkey, travel services are by far the most important service category (Table 17). Since 1995, 
travel services have expanded considerably; exports doubled to reach a level of USD 13.2 billion in 
2003. Although imports have also more than doubled, their level remained comparatively low, 
yielding a surplus in travel services of USD 11 billion in 2003. The net contribution to GDP was 
positive: more than 5%. Travel services are the only category with a significant positive impact on 
the balance of services. Construction has also yielded a modest positive contribution, despite a 
decline in the nominal export value since 1995. Transport services have increased steadily over 
time. Traditionally, this category has contributed positively to the balance of services. Preliminary 
figures for 2003, however, show a deficit in this category for the first time in the past two decades. 
According to data for the first three quarters, a deficit is also to be expected in 2004.  
 
The currently visible structural trend in the Turkish balance of payments is thus similar to the 
structural developments in goods trade: a heavy dependence on a limited number of categories 
(textiles and clothing in goods trade and tourism in service trade) with only little sign of structural 
upgrading. The relatively strong increases in imports of business-related services may yield positive 
spillovers for the economy in the longer term. In the short run, however, the decline in export volume 
has resulted in an erosion of the previously high surplus (USD 4 billion in 2000); this led in 2002 to a 
first-ever minor deficit in this category. The potential for greater expansion of business-related 
services is still limited. For instance, in insurance, specific restrictions still constrain the freedom of 
services. For the provision of non-financial services, foreign residents invariably require permits and 
the provision of certain services is restricted to Turkish nationals only.  
                                                           
53   The surplus in services covered 75% of the deficit in the goods trade in 2003 compared to merely 53% in 2004.  63 
Following the financial crises prior to 2001 and before all the crisis in February 2001, a programme 
entitled ‘Restructuring the banking sector’ was launched in May 2001. It aimed at accelerating the 
privatization of state-owned banks. Although specific restrictions on the freedom of services remain, 
trade in this category is increasing. Exports of financial services are expanding more than imports 
and the deficit in this category is gradually diminishing. That notwithstanding, this category’s 
significance is still very low: 1.5% of exports.  
 
In summary, Turkish trade in services is heavily dominated by travel services. Major potential for 
future increases would seem to exist (Lejour et al., 2004). Travel service imports have also 
increased in value (from USD 911 million to 2.1 billion); however, in relation to exports, they have 
fallen to 16%.  
 
 
Foreign direct investment  
Inward FDI is relatively small in comparison to the size of Turkey’s economy and its stage of 
development. Given the macroeconomic developments outlined above, Turkey should offer 
considerable direct investment potential. Despite increases in the volume of FDI, the ratio of inward 
stocks to GDP has not tended to increase. This reflects: (a) slow (if any) progress in Turkey’s moves 
towards privatization: and (b) the country's economic structure. The latter is characterized by a large 
share of small and medium-sized enterprises on the one hand and powerful domestic holdings on 
the other. The major domestic players are reluctant to let large privatization projects materialize 
unless they are actively involved in their execution. Some of them have entered into various forms of 
cooperation with transnational companies, both at home and abroad. FDI figures fail to capture this 
aspect adequately and thus do not reflect the true extent of internationalization in Turkey. Part of the 
holdings' networking surfaces in the guise of relatively high Turkish outward investment. 
 
Up to very recently, Turkey created the impression of being reluctant to sell the legacy from its 
Kemalist past. Some large state companies (SEEs) now cooperate with foreign counterparts, but the 
state still retains its majority holding. For instance, the tobacco industry and the telecommunications 
sector have still not been privatized; large segments of the refining and banking industries are in 
public ownership. Furthermore, the cumbersome and bumbling bureaucracy discourages foreign 
investors. Much of the corporate sector that is not in the hands of the state is the domain of small 
and medium-sized enterprises. Thus, the low level of inward FDI is simply for want of acquisition 
objects unencumbered by the state and the highly fragmented economic structure. Other 
impediments also reduce the attraction of investing in Turkey. In the past, high inflation rates, 
compounded by major fluctuations in output, interest rates and exchange rates, might have had a 
negative impact. Since the most recent financial crisis in 2001, however, inflation has been reduced 
sharply and is no longer a matter for concern. Interest rates and exchange rates have also 
stabilized. Currently, the risks stemming from institutional factors and bad governance pose the 
greater problem. Uncertainty rules with respect to licenses and all kind of administrative 
requirements, market access and contract enforcement.  
 
Experts view these obstacles in the non-economic sphere (i.e. rule of law, regulatory quality, 
corruption) as imposing a further limitation on the potential for inward FDI. In this respect it is 
interesting to note that recent governance indicators used by the World Bank show Turkey to have 
deteriorated in terms of five out of six indicators (voice and accountability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) over the period 1996-2002, whereas an 64 
amelioration was visible with regard to the indicator ‘political stability and absence of violence’. In 
comparison to Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey ranks lower on all six World Bank governance 
indicators, especially with respect to political stability, voice and accountability and control of 
corruption. It is often emphasized that corruption distorts the investment climate, constrains 
competition, inhibits growth and forces entrepreneurs into the informal economy, especially in the 
case of small and medium-sized enterprises (World Bank, 2002). For Turkey it has been recognized 
that corruption is rooted in the structure of the public sector, its interactions with the private sector 
and the broader behavioural environment. Reforms have been started in the public sector, as well as 
more generally in the financial sector and the legal and regulatory framework. The impact of these 
reforms has yet to be seen. 
 
As mentioned, the level of FDI inward stocks in Turkey is extremely low: USD 18 billion in 2003. 
According to UNCTAD, inward FDI stock in the same year in Poland (a country of comparable 
economic size in terms of GDP at current exchange rates) amounted to USD 52  billion, while 
Hungary reported a stock of USD 42 billion. It seems appropriate to compare the Turkish figure to 
FDI stocks in other emerging markets at a similar stage of development. For the purposes of 
comparison, Mexico may thus serve as the upper limit, given its openness to foreign capital, and 
India as the lower limit, given its relatively closed economy. With an inward FDI stock of 7.6% in 
relation to GDP, Turkey ranges between the two (26.5% in Mexico and 5.4% in India). FDI, however, 
is far less important to Turkey than to the two most prominent recipients of FDI in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Hungary and Poland. In 2003, inward stock amounted to 25% of GDP in Poland 
and 52% in Hungary. 
 
In terms of UNCTAD yardsticks (FDI inward index and FDI potential index), Turkey falls short of 
exploiting its potential in attracting inward FDI. According to the inward FDI performance index, 
which calculates a country’s share in global FDI flows in relation to its economic size, Turkey ranks 
110 worldwide, behind Hungary (rank 33), Mexico (rank 61), Poland (rank 68), and Austria (rank 78), 
but ahead of India (rank 114). A value of 0.4 on this index indicates that Turkey has attracted far less 
FDI than it could have given the size of its economy (UNCTAD, 2004).  
 
Apart from the (sluggish) implementation of its privatization programme, the government has tried to 
introduce additional measures in order to attract more FDI into the country. Since 1962, Turkey has 
concluded 67 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 35 of which are currently in force. The first of these 
agreements was concluded with Germany and came into effect in December 1965. Future 
prospects are good given the institutional steps taken recently. A new FDI law was enacted in June 
2003 (replacing the law dating from 1954); it has been designed to enhance substantially foreign 
investors’ market access and improve their legal and economic status (i.e. by granting full 
convertibility in their transfers of capital and earnings). Furthermore, in March 2004 the Investment 
Advisory Council was established and more efficient investment promotion is being planned
54. The 
government has enacted a number of additional measures (inflation accounting, simplification of the 
commercial code, work permits for expatriates); attempts have also been made to speed up the 
privatization programme (for example the privatization of Türk Telekom is expected in 2005). 
                                                           
54   The entity in charge of FDI in the country is the General Directorate of Foreign Investments (GDFI), within the Treasury 
Under Secretariat, based in Ankara. GDFI acts as a one-stop shop for major projects and may consider tax exemptions 
or other incentives. Its main tasks include preparing relevant legislation, allocating government support, promoting 
inward FDI and monitoring inward FDI development statistically. 65 
Privatization is likely to exert the greatest impact on FDI, given the precedent set by the new 
member states where over the past decade, FDI was almost entirely linked to the privatization of 
former state-owned enterprises. Moreover, FDI especially in the banking sector has yielded a 
considerable positive developmental effect in both the short and medium term, establishing as it has 
a sound basis for (foreign as well as domestic) investment in other sectors of the economy.  
 
Since domestic investment opportunities are often lacking, Turkish investors have started to look for 
suitable investment openings outside Turkey. As a consequence, Turkish outward FDI has increased 
substantially in the recent past, reflecting the emergence of firm-specific advantages by Turkish 
enterprises taking advantage of a more stable business climate in foreign markets (especially in new 
and old EU member countries and the CIS countries). An overview of the most important Turkish 
multinationals has been given in Chapter C. 
 
In 2003, outward flows (USD 499 million) almost matched inward flows (USD 575 million). Compared 
to outflows from Hungary worth USD 1,581 million, this may not seem a lot; it is, however, far more 
than Polish firms invested abroad (USD 386 million). For reference purposes, Mexico’s outward FDI 
flows amounted to USD 1,390 million in 2003 and those of India to USD 913 million. Turkey’s FDI 
outward stocks amounted to USD 5.5 billion in 2003; in terms of GDP, this was 2.3%, more than in 
Mexico (2.2%) and India (0.9%) or Poland (0.9%). In Hungary, outward stocks took on greater 
importance, accounting for 4.7% of the country’s GDP. 
 
Table 18 
FDI overview for Turkey in comparison to Greece and EU-15 
FDI flows  1985-1995 2000  2003    1985-1995 2000  2003 
    (annual average)    (annual average) 
   USD  millions    as % of gross fixed capital formation 
Turkey           
  inward  529 982 575    1.7  2.2  1.6 
  outward  24 870  499    0.1 2.0 1.3 
Greece           
 inward  869  1,089  47    5.9  4.2  0.1 
 outward  7  2,102  586    0.1  8.2  1.3 
EU-15           
 inward  65,629  671,417  295,154    5.0  5.0  14.7 
 outward 96,135  806,151  336,994    7.5  7.5  16.8 
FDI stocks  1990 2000 2003    1990 2000 2003 
    USD millions    as percentage of GDP 
Turkey           
  inward  11,194 19,209 18,196    7.4  9.4  7.6 
  outward  1,157 3,668 5,546    0.8  1.8  2.3 
Greece           
 inward  5,667  12,499  17,000    6.7  11.0  9.8 
 outward  2,948  5,861  10,000    3.5  5.1  5.7 
EU-15           
 inward  748,298  2,257,701  3,335,454    10.9  28.5  32.8 
 outward  797,102  2,970,938  4,035,610    11.6  37.5  39.6 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004. 66 
Table 18 shows FDI flows and stocks for Turkey in comparison to Greece and the EU-15. The table 
reflects the increased amount of FDI outflows from Turkey in recent years. In terms of inward stocks, 
as well as in relation to GDP, Turkey is comparable to Greece. Outward FDI stocks are still at a 
much lower level in absolute and relative terms. At present FDI counts for far less in the Turkish 
economy than it does in the EU-15.  
 
The sectoral composition of inward FDI is given in Table A14 in the Appendix.
55 Traditionally, the 
manufacturing sector has attracted by far the largest share of FDI; however, services are markedly 
increasing their share. The table also illustrates the rapid growth of foreign capital companies. In 
1980, the year the hitherto highly protective Turkish economy opened up, their number stood at 100 
compared to more than 6500 in 2003. Since the formation of the customs union alone, the number 
of foreign firms has more than doubled.  
 
 
Impact of the customs union 
As a result of the customs union, net protection rates have fallen in Turkey with respect to nearly all 
trading partners. In contrast to a free trade area, a customs union requires both partners to keep a 
common external tariff against all trading partners. Togan (2000) estimated this reduction in average 
economy wide net protection rates to be substantial, as can be seen in Table 19. WTO figures from 
1998 estimate that the combined effect of the customs union and the adoption of the Common 
Customs Tariff (CCT) vis-à-vis third countries together with the implementation of Uruguay Round 
commitments resulted in a trade weighted average tariff on industrial goods of 3.5% by 2001. 
Consequently, the impact on the Turkish economy has been very pronounced; not only have imports 
risen sharply, but prices have also dropped significantly. All other things being equal, this should 
lead to a positive influence on total welfare. On the other hand, increased imports might also bear 
negative consequences for employment, thus offsetting those welfare gains (see also part C for 
current developments in the Turkish labour market). Without conducting a full general equilibrium 
analysis, Togan (2000) expects the customs union have an improving effect overall on welfare, since 
most of the prerequisites have been met: pre-existing trade levels with the EU were high in Turkey, 
the cut in trade barriers has been substantial and demand elasticities are high for those goods where 
trade barriers were reduced.  
 
Table 19 
Economy-wide net protection rates for Turkey (NPRs) 
NPR in trade with:  EU  EU-FTAs  US, CAN JPN, etc.  GSP beneficiaries 
1994 10.22  22.14  22.14  22.14 
2001 1.34  1.34  6.92  2.71 
Source: Togan (2000). 
 
                                                           
55   It is interesting to note that the figures for FDI outflows in Table A14, which have been provided by the Turkish Central 
Bank, differ greatly from those obtained from UNCTAD. The high FDI outflows reported by UNCTAD do not appear in 
the Central Bank statistics. The reason for this discrepancy cannot be located, since UNCTAD also refers to national 
official sources as the source of its data on Turkey. 67 
As recent figures show, Turkey’s weighted average rates of protection through customs duties on 
industrial imports from EU and EFTA countries dropped from more than 10% to zero in 2004. The 
protection rates for products from third countries declined from approximately 16% to 4.2% (Turkish 
Foreign Trade Ministry, 2004). 
 
Akkoyunlu-Wigley and Mihci (2004) report that the customs union has had a pro-competitive impact 
on the Turkish economy. The increase in imports from the EU led to a decline in concentration in 
Turkey’s manufacturing industry. Furthermore, price-cost mark-ups fell in general, especially so in 
the following industries: petroleum (-68%), paper (-20%), metals (-15%), rubber and chemicals (-
14%), machinery (-12%) and minerals (-11%). In most other industries (including textiles), the 
reduction was roughly 10%. The wood industry exhibited an increase in price-cost margins of 18%. 
All effects were statistically significant and related to rising imports.  
 
In terms of trade specialization or competitiveness, the customs union seems to have reinforced 
existing trade patterns with its specialization in labour-intensive, low-skill activities. Clothing, food and 
textiles remained the most important Turkish exports to both the EU and non-EU countries (Togan, 
2000). However, growth in exports to the EU has been highest in power-generating machinery, other 
transport equipment and other non-electrical machinery. Growth in exports to non-EU partners has 
been strongest in power-generating machinery, automotive products, and other consumer goods. 
Taking this and other considerations into account – such as the progress achieved in eliminating 
technical barriers to trade, harmonizing customs procedures and commercial legislation and 
recognizing intellectual property rights – the customs union can be said to be progressing 
satisfactorily. There is also every expectation that non-tariff barriers to trade may be lifted in the near 
future. 
 
In her very detailed analysis of Turkey’s foreign trade structure, Lohrmann (2000a) concludes that 
Turkey did not sell the ‘right’ products to the ‘right’ markets. It persisted in specializing in textiles at a 
time when electronics was experiencing a global boom. Thus, Turkey failed to benefit from the 
enormous growth in world demand for electronic products. Moreover, Turkey increased its focus on 
the EU-15 as the market for its products, even though economic growth in that region has been 
depressed of late. Once again, Turkey ailed to switch swiftly to growing markets in East Asia. 
Lohrmann also posits that the increases in Turkish export market shares in the EU resulted from 
increased price competitiveness; they do not reflect modernization or structural adjustment of the 
Turkish economy. This finding is also borne out by the description of Turkey’s trade patterns in 
section 2 above. Despite some measure of catching-up, very little structural change was to be 
observed. On the contrary, it is clear that the shifts in the lira-euro exchange accelerated growth in 
exports and increased import prices. 
 
In a later paper (Lohrmann, 2002) it is shown that the bulk of Turkey’s trade with the EU is vertical or 
inter-industry trade. Despite a certain trend towards upgrading, especially in apparel and some glass 
and steel products, specialization in low-quality goods persists. Turkey is thus likely to face severe 
adjustment costs in the longer run. Furthermore, the recent enlargement of the EU has placed 
Turkey in a weak position; it now has to compete more with goods from Central and Eastern Europe 
which, in general, are better quality.  
 
Under the customs union between the EU and Turkey, both partners are required to consult each 
other prior to concluding preferential trade agreements with third parties, since future preferential 68 
trading agreements entered into by one partner with third parties have repercussions for the other 
partner. Ideally, the other partner would agree to similar trade preferences with respect to the third 
party. In practice, however, the EU forged ahead and concluded free-trade agreements with third 
countries, ignoring the provisions of the customs union and failing to consult Turkey beforehand. 
This often bore negative implications or Turkey; goods from the third-party markets were now able to 
enter Turkey without any restrictions via the EU market, while Turkish goods were denied direct 
access to the same markets. The third-party countries in question were often unwilling to sign 
agreements with Turkey similar to those they had concluded with the EU. This has led the EU to 
introduce a ‘Turkish clause’ in its bilateral trade agreements. Thus, apart from the asymmetries 
relating to the different timing of tariff and quota restrictions between the EU and Turkey, the 
customs union features yet another major asymmetry in terms of establishing and maintaining a 
common commercial policy. Clearly, the major differences in size and global economic impact lie at 
the heart of these asymmetries. Over the period1971-2002, the EU signed free-trade agreements 
with ten countries (Malta, Cyprus, Tunisia, South Africa, Morocco, Israel, Mexico, Macedonia, 
Croatia and Jordan), of which only three also had a free trade agreement with Turkey (Cyprus, Israel 
and Macedonia). Ülgen and Zahariadis (2004) estimate that at the end of 2002 these discrepancies 
had resulted in a one-sided preferential trade volume of EUR 86 billion between the EU and third 
countries. EUR 36 billion worth of goods were granted preferential access to the EU, while the EU 
exported EUR 50 billion worth of goods on a preferential basis to the same third countries.  
 
As a baseline, it is generally agreed that the customs union has resulted in considerable trade 
creation. The customs union itself features numerous asymmetries; owing to the early abolition of 
most industrial tariffs in the EU (in the 1970s), the impact on Turkey was much stronger in terms of 
imports than exports. Despite the resultant growing trade deficit, the economy has gained from such 
factors as lower import prices, increased competition and an improved business climate. The 
expectation is that welfare will have improved as well. The structural impact on Turkey, however, has 
not been satisfactory in view of Turkey’s long-term growth potential. The specialization in the 
manufacture of labour-intensive, low-skill goods appears to persist and the amount of structural 
upgrading observed to date has been negligible. On the other hand, given the high recent growth 
rates and substantial efforts to improve legislation and the business climate, Turkey offers an 
increasingly interesting market opportunity for consumer and investment goods.  
 
 
General equilibrium effects of EU membership on trade 
The Dutch Central Planning Bureau has conducted a study on the long-term impact of full 
membership on Turkey’s trade flows, using a computable general equilibrium model (Lejour et al., 
2004). Although the analysis ignores the dynamic gains of accession to the EU, the static effects can 
be seen to have already yielded major welfare gains for Turkey and a negligible, yet positive welfare 
effect for the EU. The modelling exercise focuses on the long-term economic implications of three 
main components: Turkey’s accession to the internal market, internal reforms in Turkey, and free 
movement of people between Turkey and the EU. The analysis ignored Turkey’s potential 
membership in the EMU or the implications of transfers from the EU budget, since no realistic 
assumptions on these issues can be made at present. Not surprisingly, the impact on the internal 
market is small, since many aspects of the internal market have already been realized given the 
specific nature of the customs union. In that context, Francois (2003) also finds no noteworthy 
difference between the current customs union and a full membership scenario. He assumes no 
change with respect to the other two components mentioned above. Like Lejour et al. (2004), he 69 
also arrives at positive welfare gains for Turkey in the long term, accompanied by trade increases 
and a positive impact on capital accumulation.  
 
The greater positive impact clearly stems from improvements in national institutions in Turkey. Were 
Turkey to move in the so-called Transparency International Corruption Perception Index to a position 
comparable to that of Portugal and France (i.e. from rank 64 worldwide to rank 25), it could yield a 
welfare gain of EUR 22.5 billion and expand GDP by 5.6%. Aggregate trade would increase by more 
than 50%. Thus, the macroeconomic effects accruing from improved institutions and less corruption 
are substantially larger than the impact of accession to the internal market. If EU membership serves 
as a catalyst for institutional reform, the associated benefits will go far beyond mere improvements in 
market access. Furthermore, the impact of better institutions and less corruption affects all sectors 
alike, while those of the internal market differ across sectors. In the latter case, textiles and wearing 
apparel would register the greatest scale of expansion and account for one quarter of total trade, yet 
generate only 3.6% of value-added. Trade in services and construction would record modest 
increases. Chemicals and metals and transport equipment would experience output losses. Here 
again, Francois (2003) reports similar findings. He suggests that motor vehicles would experience a 
drop in output; however, owing to increasing imports the volume of exports would expand as well. 
This mirrors Mexico’s experience in the NAFTA context. The motor vehicle sector in Turkey will have 
not choice but to restructure and enter into deeper integration with the European industry. 
 
In this simulation study, the free movement of people would lead to an expansion of potential GDP in 
the EU-15 and a contraction in Turkey.
56 In per capita terms, the developments would be reversed, 
leading to increases in per-capita income in Turkey and a decline in GDP per capita in the EU-15, 
especially in Germany. The results hinge on the skill structure of Turkish immigrants. If migrants are 
primarily unskilled, wage inequality in the EU-15 is likely to rise.  
 
In summary, it is to be expected that the welfare effects of full membership will be positive and 
noticeable in Turkey, yet only marginal in the EU. The impact on the volume of trade will also be 
positive and larger than that on incomes or welfare. Accession to the internal market would boost 
mainly the textiles and clothing sector in Turkey. The largest and most widespread gains are to be 
expected from improvements in Turkish institutions as a result of full membership. Migration will 
have the expected effects on both sides, with some increases in per capita GDP in Turkey and a 
marginal decrease in the EU-15. The effects will not be distributed equally; they will be most 
apparent in Germany. Overall, accession will bring economic benefits to Turkey, yet exert only a 
marginal, yet positive effect on the current EU (including the new member states); the greatest 
impact will stem more from institutional reforms in Turkey than from improved market access.  
 
 
Short-term prospects for Turkey’s foreign trade  
Turkey only started to open up its economy to international competition in the early 1980s. 
Especially after the country’s entry into the customs union with the EU in 1996, trade has increased 
substantially. None the less, Turkey is a relatively closed economy; its ratio of exports over GDP is 
quite low (19% in 2002). This puts it well below the average openness ratio in the EU-15, which 
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concern here. In consequence, no need arises in such models for restrictions similar to those introduced in respect of 
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starts at roughly 35% (using an non-weighted average and including intra-EU trade). With 43% on 
average, the new member countries are substantially more integrated in the world economy; 
Bulgaria and Romania also show higher trade integration, with the ratio of exports over GDP 
standing at about 33%. Compared with other, even larger emerging economies, it also transpires 
that Turkey is a relatively closed economy. For instance, the export to GDP ratio in Mexico is 25%, in 
China 26% and in Russia more than 30%.  
 
On the other hand, the potential for further trade expansion is considered to be large. The economy 
is experiencing rapid income and population growth. Output growth in the industrial sector is strongly 
linked to high exports; the latter are based on increased competitiveness stemming from vast 
improvements in productivity levels in the export sector and low unit labour costs. On the other hand, 
exports in the industrial sector in particular depend heavily on imported inputs. This makes Turkey 
an increasingly interesting trading partner, primarily a factor of importance to the machinery and 
transport equipment industry. Thus, trade is most likely to increase further in the industrial sector, 
while services also display a pronounced potential for growth. 
 
Clearly, the share of agricultural products in trade has declined. Nevertheless, Turkey runs a 
sizeable surplus with the EU in this sector, despite the sector’s structural weakness within the 
Turkish economy (with its inefficient and costly domestic support system and low productivity)
 57. The 
reason is that Turkey specializes in products to which the EU is relatively open, such as nuts, fruits 
and vegetables favoured by Turkey’s climate. These segments of the Turkish agricultural sector 
have been able to adapt to the requirements of the EU market. Another reason, of course, is the 
massive trade protection afforded to agriculture – on the Turkish side as well. Given the number of 
people working in agriculture, trade liberalization in this area is a highly sensitive issue and politically 
most burdensome. Implementation of the commitments under the Doha Round would have a severe 
impact, not only on the Turkish trade surplus in agriculture with the EU, but also – and much more so 
– on the Turkish economy and its labour market.  
 
In the industrial sector, two industries are expected to face the greatest changes in the short term: 
textiles for institutional reasons (phasing out the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing ATC); and 
machinery and transport equipment owing to increased Turkish competitiveness.  
 
The actual effects of the integration of the textile and clothing sector into the GATT, which is 
foreseen for 1 January 2005, are hard to assess at the moment. In principle, moving from a distorted 
system, where some countries are confronted with quotas while others are not, to a liberalized trade 
regime in line with WTO rules should bring about a great deal of restructuring with respect to the 
source countries of textiles and clothes on the EU market. Of the largest exporters to the EU in 
2003, China, India, Hong Kong, Pakistan and the Republic of Korea faced quotas, while Turkey, 
together with countries such as Bangladesh, Romania and Tunisia did not. Phasing out these 
quotas should therefore re-distribute import shares in favour of the formerly restricted countries. 
However, it seems unlikely that the quotas will be fully eliminated without being replaced by trade 
barriers in another form
58. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), introduced in 1995 
                                                           
57   Turkey is actually the only candidate to have a trade surplus with the EU in agricultural trade. 
58   For instance, in the first stage of liberalization from 1995 to 2000, recourse was often made to safeguard measures. 
The use of this practise has declined and since 2000 has been practically zero. More recently, however, recourse to 
such measures has intensified again. To keep control over textile and clothing imports from China, Turkey introduced 
such measures in January 2005. However, for Turkey there is no way to avoid tougher competition on exports markets. 71 
together with the establishment of the WTO, was intended to permit the sector’s smooth transition 
from an import quota system to full integration in the multilateral trading system. The quota system 
dated back to the Long Term Agreement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) of 
1962 which was then replaced in 1974 by the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA), However, the ten-year 
transition period has not brought much progress in terms of liberalizing trade in textiles and clothing 
in the most restrictive countries (Canada, the EU, Norway, and the US). On the contrary, the burden 
of protectionism has yet to be done away with. Thus far, liberalization has been kept to a minimum, 
more often than not being restricted to lifting restrictions that were not binding anyway.  
 
Owing to its pronounced focus on textiles, Turkey may experience a loss in EU market shares in the 
near future, once the ATC is phased out. Since the start of the customs union, Turkey’s share in EU 
textile imports has increased from 10% to 16%. A recent study (Nordas, 2004) shows that the 
elimination of existing quotas may relegate Turkey to second place as a major supplier of textiles to 
the EU, the first place going to China. Furthermore, the import elasticity of textiles with respect to the 
current quotas is estimated to be rather small. Thus, an absolute decline in textile exports to the EU 
is in the realm of probability as well. While textile imports demanded by the EU are not expected to 
increase substantially, China’s market share is expected to rise to the detriment of Turkey.  
 
The situation is different for articles of clothing. Here, time to market is the important factor; in short, 
distance matters, especially so in the fashion clothing sector. Therefore, countries closer to the EU 
are expected to lose less of their market share to China and India, both of which are expected to 
benefit most from the elimination of existing quotas. Turkey’s share in EU imports in this industry has 
remained constant at 10% since 1995; it has moved up from third place behind China and Hong 
Kong to become second most important exporter to the EU. Its position is being challenged again 
under the post-ATC regime. Very much like China, Turkey has not developed competitive 
advantages in the design and fashion segments of the market. Thus, while it faces a real threat of 
losing market shares in the more footloose textile industry, Turkey only stands relatively little chance 
of benefiting from its proximity to the EU-market and zero tariffs in the customs union in the often 
highly fragmented clothing sector with its much higher value added.  
 
To sum up, it is difficult to assess the outlook for the Turkish textile sector. On the one hand, 
prospects are not too bright unless it shifts its focus from the more footloose textile segment of the 
market to the more fashion-oriented and vertically integrated clothing sector, where time-to-market 
considerations rank high. On the other hand, the immediate effects of the end of the ATC may not 
be very large quantitatively, since it is feasible that the EU, after having abolished the quota system 
by the end of 2004, at some point of time will adopt some compensatory measures.  
 
The recent increases in export shares in the machinery and transport equipment sector are quite 
promising for Turkey. A large proportion of these exports are the outcome of vertical integration in 
major European production networks, especially in the manufacture of rolling stock and motor 
vehicles. The white goods appliance sector has also taken on increasing importance for Turkey’s 
foreign trade; Turkey has rapidly built up a competitive position in the European market in this sector. 
These developments are likely to be accompanied by stronger trade integration in business 
services, the signs of which, even if modest at the moment, are already apparent in the Turkish 
balance of payments. The machinery industry also features a higher share of intra-industry trade 
than, for instance, the textile and clothing sector. In the case of Turkey, it is the only sector with a 
notable degree of intra-industry trade. Thus, Turkey’s trade potential in this sector is of great 72 
importance to its trading partners, not least to Austria, which exhibits a clear comparative advantage 
in machinery (industrial plants) and accompanying services.  
 
Finally, with further liberalization steps looming large in the area of services, substantial increases in 
trade volume in this sector can be expected. The importance of the travel sector is undisputed; it will 
remain pre-eminent in the long run. Thanks to its extended and still largely undiscovered 
Mediterranean coastline, Turkey still possesses a large potential for further expansion in the tourism 
sector. Over the period 2001-2003, the number of international visitors to Turkey increased from 
2.4 million to 14 million, while the average length of stay remained relatively constant at four nights. 
As a result, revenues have also increased substantially (from about USD 5 billion to more than USD 
13 billion). Growth in this sector is expected to continue. However, business related services are also 
likely to gain in importance in the wake of further liberalization and privatization steps, not forgetting 
the ongoing changes in the global institutional framework after the Doha Round. Especially those 
services associated with the import and export of machinery and transport equipment, as well as 
financial services will record the greatest growth in the near future.  
 
 
The Turkish Straits – a chokehold on energy in transit 
Given its relatively small economy, Turkey is not a major consumer of energy. Nor is it a major 
producer of energy as the country is not particularly rich in hydrocarbon deposits. However, its 
location between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean makes it an important route for both Russian 
and Caspian oil in transit to the rich and energy-hungry markets of Western Europe. 
 
The bulk of oil currently transported via Turkey is shipped in tankers via the Turkish Straits; the latter 
comprise the Bosporus, the Marmara Sea and the Dardanelles.
59 Each day an estimated 3 million 
barrels – equivalent to around one fifth of the oil consumed in a day in the EU – pass through the 
Straits which are less than a kilometre wide at their narrowest point. More than half of this amount – 
some 1.7 million barrels per day (bpd) – is oil from the Russian terminal in Novorossiysk. It is linked 
via pipelines to several important oil-producing areas, including Western Siberia, the Volga basin 
and the Caspian area deposits of Kazakhstan and Azerbaidzhan (the latter constitutes the ‘northern 
route’ for Caspian oil). Apart from Novorossiysk, other important oil terminals on the Black Sea 
include the Russian port of Tuapse (100,000 bpd), the Georgian ports of Supsa (220,000 bpd) and 
Batumi (140,000 bpd), both of which part of the ‘western route’ for Caspian oil, as well as the 
Ukrainian port of Odessa (190,000 bpd) which is also linked to the Russian oil pipeline grid. 
Shipments from Odessa are expected to increase over the short term owing to more Russian oil 
being pumped down the Odessa-Brody pipeline. Completed in 2001, the pipeline was originally 
designed to pump Caspian oil from Odessa to Poland and on further to Western Europe; however, it 
has not been in operation for want of adequate oil supplies. Thus, in summer 2004 the Ukrainian 
government at the time accepted the Russian offer to use the pipeline in the reverse mode over a 
three-year period. Shipping oil from the Odessa-Brody pipeline across the Black Sea started in 
September 2004. The initial throughput was 97,000 bpd, but this will increase to some 180,000 bpd, 
provided the new (western-inclined) Ukrainian government does not decide to withdraw from the 
contract already signed with Russia. 
                                                           
59   Turkey also used to serve as a transit country for Iraqi oil, which was pumped via a 1.5 million bpd-capacity pipeline 
from Kirkuk to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. However, as a result of the US-led invasion in Iraq, the 
Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline has virtually ceased to operate. 73 
The importance of Russia to the energy transiting Turkey derives from the fact that Russia is one of 
the world’s two largest oil producers (on a par with Saudi Arabia) and is the second largest oil 
exporter (after Saudi Arabia). At the same time, the importance to Russia of the Black Sea and the 
Turkish Straits derives from the fact that they represent one of the three major routes for oil exports 
(the other two being the on-shore Druzhba export pipeline across Belarus, Ukraine and Central 
Europe and the Baltic Pipeline System in the north). Apart from Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan 
are the two other former Soviet states whose oil production has risen rapidly over the past few years. 
Both countries are landlocked and have been seeking openings for delivering their oil (and gas) to 
the European and Asian markets. Transit via pipelines through either Russia or Georgia followed by 
shipment in tankers across the Black Sea represents a natural (and for the time being the sole) 
export route for those countries, although it also poses an even greater challenge to the throughput 
capacity of the narrow Turkish Straits. In particular, oil shipments from Novorossiysk surged in late 
2001, following its linkage via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline to the vast Tengiz oil 
deposit in Kazakhstan close to the Caspian Sea. Currently, the capacity of CPC stands at 560,000 
bpd; however, it is due to be upgraded to 1.34 million bpd by 2015. 
 
Pursuant to the Montreux Convention of 1936, the Turkish Straits enjoy the status of an international 
waterway, through which commercial shipping has the right of free passage. However in recent 
years, given the intense tanker traffic in the Straits, the Turkish authorities have been growing 
increasingly concerned over the related safety and environmental hazards. Those concerns will in all 
likelihood gain even greater importance as Turkey’s EU membership negotiations proceed. With 
some 50,000 vessels (5,000 are tankers loaded with oil and/or liquefied natural gas) passing through 
the Straits each year, the waterway is reported to be operating on the verge of its physical capacity. 
Following a collision between the Greek-Cypriot tanker ‘Nassia’ and another ship in March 1994, 
some 20,000 tons of oil were reported to have been spilled into the Bosporus – just a few kilometres 
away from Istanbul, Turkey’s biggest city. In response, the Turkish authorities imposed a new 
regulation requiring that ships carrying hazardous materials report to the Turkish ministry for 
environmental protection. However, implementation to date has been poor, not least on account of 
the pressure being brought to bear by the neighbouring Black Sea countries. Another major accident 
occurred in December 1999, when the Russian tanker ‘Volgoneft-248’ ran aground, spilling some 
800 tons of fuel oil into the Marmara Sea. 
 
In order to cope with the growing tanker traffic in the Straits, Turkey has built a radar-controlled 
Vessel Traffic and Management System akin to an air-traffic control system. Furthermore, in October 
2002, Turkey imposed new restrictions on oil tankers in transit through the Bosporus, including a ban 
on nighttime traffic for ships longer than 200 metres. In effect, the latter restriction applies to all 
tankers carrying crude oil and the larger petroleum product tankers; it incurs delays of up to 20-30 
days, reportedly costing the supertankers’ owners some USD 30,000 per day. Finally, the Straits are 
not suited to large tankers, which offer the only profitable means of shipping oil over long 
distances.
60 In particular, the bottleneck caused by the Turkish Straits was perceived as an obstacle 
to the shipment of Russian oil to the United States via the Black Sea – an option that was 
extensively discussed in the wake of 11 September 2001 when the US sought to reduce its 
dependence for oil on Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East. 
 
                                                           
60    The largest tankers that can pass through the Turkish Straits are the Suezmax class tankers (120,000-200,000 
deadweight tons). 74 
Table 20 
Projected oil pipelines by-passing the Turkish Straits 
Name Location  Capacity  Status 
Burgas-
Alexandroupolis 
From Burgas (Black Sea coast of 
Bulgaria) to Alexandroupolis (Aegean 
coast of Greece) 
 –  Plan approved in January 1997; 
however, suspended for a number 
of technical and economic reasons; 
new feasibility study commissioned 
in November 2003; Memorandum of 
Understanding expected to be 
signed in March 2005 
Albania-Macedonia-
Bulgaria Oil Pipeline 
(AMBO) 
From Burgas (Black Sea coast of 
Bulgaria) to Vlore (Albanian port on the 
Adriatic Sea) 
750,000 bpd Feasibility study completed in 
September 2002; Memorandum of 
Understanding signed in December 
2004; construction is to begin in 
2005; completion date 2008 
Constanta-Pancevo-
Omisalj-Trieste 
(CPOT), also called 
Southeast European 
Line (SEEL) 
From Constanta (Black Sea port of 
Romania) via Pancevo (near Belgrade, 
Serbia), where it would join the 
existing Adria pipeline stretching to 
Omisalj (Adriatic port in Croatia), with 
a possible extension to Trieste, Italy 
480,000 bpd 
by 2007  








From the Black Sea north of Istanbul 
to the Aegean Sea near the Greek 
border (thus crossing the European 




Samsun-Ceyhan  From Samsun (Black Sea port in  
north-eastern Turkey) to Ceyhan 





Source: US Energy Information Administration. 
 
Given the current intense tanker traffic in the Straits and the potential for further increases in line with 
growing oil export volumes, particularly from the Caspian-basin countries, a number of pipelines 
circumventing the area are under consideration (see Table 1). Nevertheless, at present the only 
project already being implemented is the construction of the 1 million bpd-capacity Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline,
61 stretching from the oil deposits of Azerbaijan via Georgia and Eastern Turkey to 
the Mediterranean Turkish port of Ceyhan. This pipeline is seen to offer a dual benefit. Not only 
would it permit large-scale exports of oil from the Caspian basin without adding to the already very 
intense traffic in the Turkish Straits, but it also takes on an important geopolitical dimension closly 
aligned to US strategic interests. By avoiding the territories of the major powers in the region (and 
leading world oil producers), Russia and Iran, the pipeline would deprive both countries of: (a) transit 
fee revenues; and (b) any means of tools of influencing the energy supply to the small neighbouring 
countries in the Transcaucasus. It is also felt that the pipeline would lend an additional impetus to 
                                                           
61   The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Company is a consortium of 11 partners, including British Petroleum (UK); SOCAR 
(the state oil company of Azerbaijan); TPAO (Turkish State Petroleum Company); Statoil (Norway); Unocal (USA); 
Itochu (Japan); Amerada Hess (USA); ENI (Italy); TotalFinaElf (France); INPEX (Japan); and ConocoPhillips (USA). 75 
growth in the generally underdeveloped eastern areas of Turkey. Initially, serious doubts were 
voiced as to the commercial viability of the project. It was not until the upward re-assessment of the 
Azeri, Chirag and Gunashli oil fields in the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea that pipeline construction 
actually started (construction of the Turkish section began in June 2002). However, certain doubts 
about the future profitability of the pipeline still remain, recently compounded by growing 
environmental and safety concerns. In particular, the 1,700 km long pipeline is believed to be an 
ideal target for international terrorism. Nevertheless, pipeline construction is reportedly nearing 
completion and the first oil is scheduled to arrive in Ceyhan by the second half of the current year. 
Parallel to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, the natural gas pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (or South Caucasus 
Gas Pipeline) is also under construction; as of 2006 it will deliver up to 7 billion cubic metres of 
natural gas per year from the Azeri Shah Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea. 
 
To date, the implications that the circumventing pipelines discussed above might bear for the 
intensity of tanker traffic in the Turkish Straits are still unclear. In the short term, the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline might well reduce the load on the Straits by diverting some Azerbaijani oil from the 
Black Sea ports Novorossiysk and Supsa. Needless to say, this projection is based on the 
assumption that no major wars or terrorist attacks upset the region that is already highly unstable in 
political terms (in all three countries involved, ethnic conflicts or territorial disputes have abounded in 
the recent past). However, in the longer term, the impact is likely to be more ambiguous; the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline will be increasingly filled with oil from the new Caspian deposits, while 
additional Kazakhi oil pumped via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium to Novorossiysk will come 
onstream at the same time. Proven oil reserves in the entire Caspian Sea region are estimated at 
some 17-33 billion barrels – comparable to those of the North Sea. Long-term projections put total oil 
production in this area at around 4 million bpd. It remains to be seen whether the combined capacity 




E Labour market 
Over the past decade, the characteristic features of the Turkish labour market have been continuous 
rural-urban migration (Saracoğlu and Roe, 2004), changing sectoral employment patterns and 
declining employment and activity rates, particularly those of women. Turkey still has a strong 
agricultural sector, indicating that the country is still in transition as it moves towards an industry and 
service economy. Unemployment has been on the increase over the past few years; it is high by 
European standards, especially in urban regions and for educated young people.  
 
The present analysis of the Turkish labour market is based on labour force survey data published by 
the Turkish State Institute of Statistics (SIS). These data include results obtained from the labour 
force surveys conducted biannually over the period 1989-1999 and those conducted each quarter 
from 2000 onwards. As the two surveys also differ in terms of methodology and sample frame, the 
breaks in the two data sets become evident (e.g. the share of agricultural employment is shown to 
fall from 41.5% in 1999 to 36% in 2000). Bearing this in mind, the results obtained should be treated 
with some caution. Comparisons with the EU are based on Eurostat data. 
 
 
Population and internal migration 
In contrast to the EU, which is characterized by an ageing population, the Turkish population has 
been growing continuously. According to the 2000 census, the population of Turkey reached 67.8 
million, about two thirds of which lived in urban areas with 20,000 inhabitants or more. Over the 
period 1990-2000, the population grew at an annual rate of 1.8%; the growth rate was higher in 
urban areas (2.7%) than in rural areas (0.4%). Overall, both population growth and the birth rate 
(number of births per 1000 population) in Turkey have been slowing down over more than a decade 
(Figure 23).  
 
The growth gap between the urban and rural areas is mainly due to the steady migration from rural 
to urban regions, a process which is still underway (in 1950, the urban population accounted for only 
18% of the total). Most people migrate from the eastern to the western parts of Turkey and have 
virtually no schooling. Their job opportunities are limited to manual work on account of their previous 
work experience as farmhands or some other low-skill activity. The massive regional income 
disparities are the prime cause of the large-scale migration from the poor to the rich regions of the 
country. In the 1990s the Marmara region – industrial heartland and one of the wealthiest areas – 
together with the Mediterranean region (tourist area) were the main target regions for internal 
migration from the agricultural regions in Anatolia. Both areas (Marmara and Mediterranean regions) 
registered a population growth of 20-25% over the period 1990-2000.  
 
A large part of the east-west migration is related to the Kurdish minority, who traditionally live in 
Southeast and East Anatolia. As a consequence of the Kurdish conflict that started in the 1980s and 
went on until the late 1990s, many Kurds have fled to urban areas in the western part of Turkey or 
left the country for good.
62 Only a small fraction have returned to their villages in the south-east 
                                                           
62   For more on that see Schweızer Flüchtlingshilfe (2003),; Human Rights Watch (2005) dealing with internally displaced 
Kurds; and Gunduz and Sezgin (2004) analysing the economic consequences of the armed conflict in southeastern 
Turkey - the number of violent incidents peaked in the mid-nineties. 77 
(Paranzino, 2004). Other reasons for the rural exodus are the standard push-and-pull factors (de 
Santis, 2003). The most important push factors are: (1) the large proportion of the population living in 
villages; (2) the relatively limited amount of arable land; (3) low agricultural productivity (the value-
added per worker in agriculture was one fifth of that generated in manufacturing in 1995); and 
(4) poor quality of life and little expectation of future improvement (viz. the high infant mortality rate: 
7-8% in the eastern regions as against 5% in the western regions). Among the most important pull 
factors are: (1) the high demand for labour in manufacturing, particularly in Istanbul and Izmir (about 
1.3 million jobs were created by manufacturing and services over the period 1988-1994, and a 
further 1 million jobs over the period 1995-2000); (2) higher wages in manufacturing than in 
agriculture; (3) job security offering a continuous source of income and social security together with 
hopes of permanent, formally regulated employment; (4) the better quality of life in urban areas and 
better access to subsidized public services (schools, health care). Yet another motivation for 
migrating to urban areas might be the further cuts in farming subsidies, given the need to keep 
public finances under control after the economic crisis in 2001. 
 
Figure 23 
Turkey: population growth and birth rate  
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Source: State Institute of Statistics. 
 
The demographic structure of Turkey differs substantially from that of the European Union. While the 
share of the productive age group (15-64 years) resembles the EU pattern, major differences obtain 
in the pre-productive age group (up to 14 years) and the post-productive age group (65 years and 
over). The latter accounts for only 6% in Turkey, while the respective value for the EU is almost 17%; 
this discrepancy arises from the low life expectancy in Turkey compared to that in the EU.
63 However, 
life expectancy varies significantly across countries and between the old and new member states as 
                                                           
63   In 2002 the life expectancy at birth for males was 69.2 years in Turkey versus 74.8 years in the EU-25, the respective 
figures for females were 71.5 years and 81.1 years. 78 
well. By way of contrast, the share of the pre-productive age group is almost 28% in Turkey as 




Employment fell only slightly in the crisis year 2001; however, it has not yet recovered despite the 
remarkable GDP growth from 2002 onwards. High economic growth was accompanied by high 
productivity growth rather than employment growth and an increase in working hours to more than 
50 hours a week in urban areas (European Commission, 2004). Similar patterns were also to be 
observed in most of the new EU member states. Thus, creating additional employment calls for 
constant economic growth much higher, for example, than the rate in the EU which stands at about 
2%. wiiw estimates the figure for Poland to be 6%; this might serve as a rough indicator for Turkey.  
 
On closer scrutiny, for example, it transpires that the job losses in 2003 were due to employment 
being cut back in rural areas, while it had increased in urban areas. With the exception of 2001 
(when economic hardship led to reverse migration to rural areas) agricultural employment started to 
dip uninterruptedly from the late 1990s onwards, while employment in industry fluctuated wildly. The 
number of jobs in construction dropped quite substantially in 2001 and 2002, remaining stagnant in 
2003. The decrease in construction is the more worrying as it is an important source of employment 
for urban workers, primarily young unskilled males. Employment in the services sector picked up 
again after a substantial decline in 2001 (Table 21). 
 
In 2003 only slightly more than half of all those employed were wage and salary earners; 
self-employed and employers accounted for 30% and unpaid family workers for 20% of total 
employment. From a gender perspective, 56% of the males earned a salary or wages, 36% were self-
employed and 8% were unpaid family workers. Even more alarming are the corresponding figures for 
women, 38% of whom are wage-earners, 13% self-employed and almost half of them unpaid family 
workers. In terms of self-employment Turkey is quite different from the EU-15 where about 15% of 
those in employment are self-employed and 85% of the workforce has a standard dependable job. 
From a European perspective, the situation in Turkey is similar to that in Poland. 
 
 
Informal sector employment 
Turkey employs a large share of workers in the informal sector. However, data on size vary 
considerably. From 2000 onwards the SIS has been including an independent informal sector 
survey in its labour force survey. Thus, the informal sector is defined as ‘all non-agricultural 
economic units which are unincorporated (establishments whose legal status is individual ownership 
or simple partnership), paying lump-sum tax or no tax at all, and working with 1-9 persons engaged.’ 
The most recent data obtained from the labour force survey indicate that in the second quarter of 
2004 in the non-agricultural sector, the share of those employed in the informal sector accounted for 
14% of the total workforce or 2.2 million persons. If informal employment in agriculture were to be 
included, the figure would stand at some 24% of total employment. The OECD (2004c) reports that 
overall the informal sector is estimated to account for some 52% of total employment (including 
agriculture) and 37% in private sector employment (excluding agriculture). This calculation 
apparently takes into account all those workers who are not registered in any social security 
institution: one third of whom work in urban and two thirds in rural areas. Sector-based observations 79 
may raise doubts whether official estimates grasp the full extent of informal activities. For example, 
unofficial approximations come to the conclusion that the textiles and clothing industries alone may 
employ as much as 2 to 2.5 million undeclared domestic workers, apart from an additional 1 to 1.5 
million undeclared foreign workers. 
 
 
Decline in employment and activity rates 
In contrast to the EU, where employment rates have been on the increase over recent years, the 
Turkish labour market has displayed by a sharp decline in both employment and activity rates
64 over 
the past decade and a half. Over the period 1988-2003, the employment rate fell by almost 10 
percentage points to 45.5% in 2003; it is well below that of comparative countries. Compared to the 
EU-25 (63% in 2003), Turkey would find itself at the lower end of the scale, even behind Poland with 
its 51% (Figure 24). This outcome also stands in stark contrast to the Lisbon target of an overall 
employment rate of 70% (more than 60% for women) that the European Council agreed the EU 




                                                           
64   Employment rate: employed in % of working-age population. Activity rate: labour force (employed and unemployed) in 
% of working-age population. Working-age population: in Turkish national statistics the population aged 15 years and 
over, in EU (OECD) comparisons the age group between 15 and 64 years. 80 
Table 21 
Employment development, by sector 
in 1000 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
AGRICULTURE 8,249 8,639 8,691 9,212 8,718 7,862 8,813  9,080 9,259 8,837 9,039 8,856 7,769 8,089 7,458 7,265 
INDUSTRY-Total   3,818 3,789 3,738 3,909 4,205 4,180 4,503  4,533 4,785 5,035 5,048 5,149 5,174 4,884 4,912 4,812 
  Mining  229 184 194 176 159 135 180  154 164 159 148 134 81 98 120 83 
  Manufacturing  2,550 2,635 2,625 2,736 2,949 2,706 3,013  3,027 3,237 3,445 3,463 3,555 3,638 3,581 3,731 3,664 
  Energy  27 28 26 22 48 101 102  114 86 111 112 95 91 95 103 100 
  Construction  1,012 942 893 975 1,049 1,238 1,208 1,238 1,298 1,320 1,325 1,365 1,364 1,110 958 965 
 SERVICES  5,687 5,793 6,112 6,168 6,538 6,459 6,693  6,974 7,153 7,333 7,693 8,045 8,637 8,551 8,984 9,170 
 Transportation  778 829 816 821 875 933 894  878 907 907 968 952 1,067 1,034 1,004 1,022 
 Trade  2,029 2,041 2,154 2,190 2,377 2,412 2,538  2,717 2,737 2,896 2,995 3,204 3,817 3,737 3,980 4,052 
  Financial Inst.  428 439 416 432 474 429 479  482 508 527 544 580 709 697 697 737 
  Other Services  2,452 2,484 2,726 2,725 2,812 2,685 2,782  2,897 3,001 3,003 3,186 3,309 3,044 3,083 3,303 3,359 
TOTAL 17,754 18,222 18,539 19,289 19,461 18,501 20,009  20,587 21,197 21,205 21,780 21,324 21,580 21,524 21,354 21,450 
in % of total employment 
AGRICULTURE 46.5 47.4 46.9 47.8 44.8 42.5 44.0  44.1 43.7 41.7 41.5 41.5 36.0 37.6 34.9 33.9 
INDUSTRY-Total   21.5 20.8 20.2 20.3 21.6 22.6 22.5  22.0 22.6 23.7 23.2 24.1 24.0 22.7 23.0 22.4 
  Mining  1.3 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.9  0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 
  Manufacturing  14.4 14.5 14.2 14.2 15.2 14.6 15.1  14.7 15.3 16.2 15.9 16.7 16.9 16.6 17.5 17.1 
  Energy  0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5  0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 
  Construction  5.7 5.2 4.8 5.1 5.4 6.7 6.0  6.0 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.4 6.3 5.2 4.5 4.5 
 SERVICES  32.0 31.8 33.0 32.0 33.6 34.9 33.4  33.9 33.7 34.6 35.3 37.7 40.0 39.7 42.1 42.8 
 Transportation  4.4 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.5 5.0 4.5  4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.8 
  Trade  11.4 11.2 11.6 11.4 12.2 13.0 12.7  13.2 12.9 13.7 13.8 15.0 17.7 17.4 18.6 18.9 
  Financial Inst.  2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.4  2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.7 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 
  Other Services  13.8 13.6 14.7 14.1 14.4 14.5 13.9  14.1 14.2 14.2 14.6 15.5 14.1 14.3 15.5 15.7 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: State Institute of Statistics. 81 
Informal sector employment 
One of the reasons for the low employment rate is the extremely low female employment rate in 
Turkey. While the male rate is higher than in most of the new EU member states, the female 
employment rate is less than half the EU-25 average. In 2003 it amounted to 25.5% in Turkey and 
55% in the EU-25. With 33%, only Malta comes close to the Turkish figure, while the Scandinavian 
countries, for example, report female employment rates exceeding the 70% mark (Table 22).  
 
Figure 24 
Employment rates in selected EU countries and Turkey, 1996 and 2003 









HU PL 1) BG RO 1) GR  TR AT EU-15 EU-25 1)
1996 2003
 
Notes: 1) Data 1997 
Source: Eurostat; Progress Report Turkey 2003; wiiw, based on national LFS. 
 
As regards employment rates of the 25-64 year-olds broken down in terms of schooling/education, 
for people with less than upper secondary education (close to 50%) the Turkish rate is similar to that 
of Italy and Germany, while being higher than that of Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic and 
lower than that of the EU-15. Employment rates for males and females broken down by educational 
attainment differ substantially. Whereas the rate for males with less than upper secondary education 
stood at about 75%, it was only 23% for females. The latter figure was less than half the EU-15 
average, and only Slovakia came near it. The employment rate for Turkish males with upper 
secondary education was close to the EU average, whereas the female rate (27%) was once again 
far below the EU-15 figure (67%). In the case of tertiary education, no EU member state reports a 
lower employment rate for both men and women than Turkey.  
 
Activity rates dropped from 53% in 1992 to only 45% in 2003. Male rates are very similar in urban 
and rural areas, while female rates are much lower in urban (19%) than in rural areas (39%). Activity 
rates based on the population aged 15 years and above show that: (a) rural activity rates are higher 82 
than urban rates; (b) males rates are higher than female rates; and (c) the gender gap is much 
higher in urban than in rural areas (see also ETF, 2004).  
 
Table 22 
Employment rates in selected EU countries/candidate countries, by gender 
employed in % of working age population 15-64 
Male       
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Czech  Republic  78.1 77.4 76.0 74.0 73.2 73.2 73.9 73.1
Hungary  59.5 59.7 60.5 62.4 63.1 62.9 62.9 63.5
Poland  65.2 66.8 66.5 64.2 61.2 59.2 56.9 56.5
Slovakia    69.2 67.7 67.8 64.3 62.2 62.0 62.4 63.3
Slovenia    66.0 67.0 67.2 66.5 67.2 68.6 68.2 67.4
Bulgaria  57.7 58.0 57.5 55.1 54.7 52.7 53.7 56.0
Romania  72.6 71.9 70.4 69.0 68.6 67.8 63.6 63.8
Greece  72.7 72.1 71.6 70.8 71.1 70.8 71.1 72.5
Turkey   .  74.1 72.8 71.2 69.3 66.9  65.9
EU-15  70.4 70.7 71.2 72.0 72.8 73.1 72.8 72.5
EU-25 .  70.2  70.6 70.9 71.3 71.3 71.0  70.8
Female      
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Czech  Republic  60.6 59.9 58.7 57.4 56.9 57.0 56.3 56.3
Hungary  45.2 45.4 47.2 49.0 49.7 49.8 49.8 50.9
Poland  51.8 51.3 51.7 51.2 48.9 47.7 46.2 46.0
Slovakia    54.6 54.0 53.5 52.1 51.5 51.8 51.4 52.2
Slovenia    57.1 58.0 58.6 57.7 58.4 58.8 58.6 57.6
Bulgaria  50.4 50.3 49.9 47.5 46.3 46.8 47.5 49.0
Romania  58.4 59.1 58.2 57.5 57.5 57.1 51.8 51.5
Greece  38.7 39.3 40.2 40.6 41.2 40.9 42.5 43.9
Turkey .  .  27.9 29.1 25.1 26.3 26.6  25.2
EU-15  50.2 50.8 51.6 52.9 54.1 55.0 55.6 56.0
EU-25 .  51.1  51.8 52.9 53.6 54.3 54.7  55.0
Source: EUROSTAT; wiiw incorporating national LFS  
 
OECD data available for 2002 show that activity rates in the 25-64 age bracket were lowest for those 
with less than upper secondary education (54.6%); this is similar to the rates in the Czech Republic 
and in Italy, but far below the EU-15 average (61%). Activity rates for people with upper secondary 
education stood at 67.4%; they show no similarity whatsoever to any EU country or the aggregate 
EU level of almost 80%. As far as people with tertiary education are concerned, Turkey’s activity rate 
amounted to 82% and was close to that of Hungary, yet once again below the EU average of 88%. 
The activity rate for men with less than upper secondary education even exceeded the EU-15 level, 
while the female rate in this category was far below the EU aggregate.  83 
The falling activity rates in Turkey can be explained in several different ways (see Auer and Popova, 
2003; Tansel, 2001): First, young people are staying at school longer (increasing the school 
enrolment rate) pursuant to law introduced in 1997 extending compulsory schooling from five to 
eight years. (In the long run, this measure may well have positive effects on the increase in overall 
activity rates, in particular for women). Secondly, the composition of the labour force is changing, 
shifting from agriculture to non-agricultural activities (in general both female and male activity rates 
are higher in rural than in urban areas). When women from rural areas – previously economically 
active as unpaid family worker in agriculture – migrate to industrial centres, they often leave the 
labour market and stay at home, as most of them lack the skills needed to find a new job. Thirdly, up 
until 2001 an early retirement scheme dating from the early 1980s was still in effect, whereby women 
were eligible for retirement after 20 years of service or at the age of 50, whereas men could retire 
after 25 years of service or at the age of 55.  
 
 
Low share of part-time work  
Similar to the situation in the new EU member states, part-time work is less common in Turkey than 
in the EU-15. In 2003 part-time work accounted for 6% of total employment as against roughly 19% 
in the EU-15. Turkey has a higher proportion of part-time employed than the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria, but only half of that in Romania. Overall, Turkey resembles 
the EU-South more closely, where part-time employment also plays a subordinate role. The reasons 
for this trend are: (a) the low proportion of women in the labour force; and (b) the underdeveloped 
services sector in Turkey. For instance, in the EU-15 part-time employment is found primarily in 
health care, education and other services sectors (tourism and retailing). Within the EU-15 those 
countries with the largest services sector have the highest proportion of part-time work.  
 
 
Employment structure well below European standards 
According to data in the labour force surveys, in 1990 agriculture accounted for 46% of all those 
employed, industry for 15%, construction for 5% and services for 35%.
65 Despite shifts over time, 
employment patterns in Turkey are still far from those of a developed economy. Agriculture still plays 
an important function as an employer, absorbing about 34% of total employment or 7.2 million 
persons in 2003 (Figure 25). The EU-15 employs an agricultural workforce of a similar magnitude, 
whereas in the new EU member states about 6.7 million people are active in agriculture. From a 
gender perspective, agriculture accounted for 58.5% of total female employment, while only for 
24.4% of male employment. Men were primarily engaged in services sector activities, whereas only 
a smaller proportion (28%) of women worked in the services sector. Industry absorbed about 20% of 
male and 13% of female employment. Given that agriculture accounts for 34% of all those employed 
and contributes about 14% to the country’s GDP, productivity in agriculture can be seen to be very 
low. About half of those employed in agriculture are unpaid family workers, of whom three quarters 
are women. As in other countries with a high proportion of their population employed in the primary 
sector, agriculture functions as a buffer against unemployment, absorbing laid-off workers from 
industry and construction. Similar to Poland and Romania, agriculture still masks unemployment.  
                                                           
65   The Census data for 1990 reveal a quite different picture; this might be attributable to the different definitions used in 
the labour force survey and the Census: agriculture is thus reported as employing about 54% of the total labour force, 
industry 19% and services 28% (ETF, 2004). 84 
Industrial employment (excluding construction) accounted for about 23% of the workforce in 2003; a 
proportion that had increased slightly over time (in 1990 it had been close to 19%). Job losses in 
construction over the past few years have translated into an ever-declining share in total 
employment from 6.5% in 2000 to only 4% in 2003. The proportion of those employed in 
construction in Turkey is only half that of both the EU-15 and the new member states. In the EU-
South, at least 11% of all those employed were engaged in construction in 2003.  
 
Figure 25 
Employment patterns in selected EU countries and Turkey 
% of total 
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Sources: wiiw Database incorporating national statistics; wiiw calculations using AMECO; State Institute of Statistics. 
 85 
With its 43% share in total employment, Turkey’s services sector employment comes close to that of 
Bulgaria and is well above Romania’s; however, it is still far below EU levels.
66 In 2003 trade and 
tourism accounted for over 19% of total employment; this is higher than in the EU-15, yet somewhat 
below the EU-South.
67 Employment in financial institutions [banking, insurance, real estate and 
business activities] is relatively underdeveloped, accounting for a meagre 3.5% of total employment; 
the corresponding value for the EU-South is some 9%. Turkey ranges somewhere between Bulgaria 
(4.8%) and Romania (2.6%). Employment in transport absorbs 4.5% of total jobs: once again below 
the level of the EU-South and similar to Romania. As for community services, Turkey reports an 
employment share similar in size to Romania, yet far below the EU average. A more detailed 
breakdown by individual sub-segments such as public administration, health and education is not 
available.  
 
Overall employment in the services sector is – as in other less developed countries – mainly 
concentrated in the low-skill/low value-added segments such as trade, tourism and transport, while 




Overall unemployment stood at an average rate of 8% in the 1990s, falling to 6.6% in 2000 and 
increasing steadily thereafter, reaching 10,5% in 2004. There is no significant difference in the 
incidence of unemployment between men and women at the national level. Over the past few years, 
female unemployment has been slightly lower than the male rate. However, when analysing 
unemployment account also has to be taken of the high proportion employed in the agricultural 
sector, thus masking a huge number of workers who would ‘normally’ be counted as unemployed. 
Urban unemployment is therefore considered to provide a better measure of the actual scale of 
unemployment. In 2003, the urban unemployment rate was 14.8%, much higher than the national 
average, while the rural rate was 6.5%. 
 
In 2003 unemployment in Turkey was higher than both in the EU-15 and EU-25, yet Turkey reported 
a significantly lower unemployment rate than did Poland and Bulgaria (Figure 26).  
 
In contrast to most of the new EU member states where long-term unemployment is persistently 
high and/or even increasing, the share of long-term unemployment in Turkey has been on the 
decline from 1996 onwards. It increased somewhat in 2002 only to drop again a year later to 24% of 
total unemployed. Women are affected more by long-term unemployment than are men. In 2003, 
the share of long-term unemployment was 31% for women as against only 22% for men. Overall, 
the incidence of long-term unemployment for males and females alike has dropped over time.  
 
                                                           
66    In 2003 services sector employment in the EU-15 accounted for 67%, in the EU-South for 59%, and in the new 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe (excluding Poland) 57%. Romania’s share was 33%. 
67   EU-South: Greece, Portugal and Spain.  86 
Figure 26 
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1) unemployment rates in selected EU countries/candidate countries 
in % 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Czech Republic  .  .  12.8 17.7 17.8 17.3 16.9  18.6
Hungary  18.5 17.0 15.0 12.7 12.1 10.9 11.8 13.1
Poland  . 23.2 22.5 30.1 36.3 39.8 41.8 41.1
Slovakia    . . . 34.2 37.1 39.0 37.6  32.9
Slovenia    17.5 17.2 17.8 17.9 16.8 16.0 15.3 15.9
Bulgaria  . . . . 33.7 38.0 35.0  26.8
Romania  . 16.3 15.8 17.2 17.2 17.6 21.0 18.7
Greece    31.0 30.8 30.1 31.9 29.4 28.0 26.4  .
Turkey     14.2 15.3 13.2 16.6 19.2  20.5
EU-15  20.8 20.0 18.5 16.9 15.4 14.6 15.1 15.6
EU-25 .  .  18.6 18.3 17.6 17.5 17.8  18.2
Note: 1) 15 to 24 years. 
Source: Employment in Europe 2003; Progress Report on Turkey 2003; LFS Turkey. 
 
Young people are hit hardest by unemployment, suffering from unemployment rates double the 
national average. However, compared to the EU where the same phenomenon is to be observed, 87 
the youth unemployment rate is only slightly higher than the EU average, and substantially lower 
than, for example, in Poland or Slovakia. Once again some similarities are to be found with 
Romania, which also has a large agricultural sector (Table 23). The rate is especially high among 
Turkey’s young educated people; in 2003 it stood at 28%. The problem is more serious in urban 
areas where the unemployment level of the educated youth stood at 30% (25.6% for males and 
31.6% for females). Overall, the unemployment is higher among young educated women than men 
in urban and rural areas alike. It seems that skill mismatches are one of the main reasons for the 
high jobless rate among young educated people as high schools and universities invariably fail to 
equip them with the skills required on the labour market. A future reversal of this trend might come 
about following the extension of compulsory schooling and improvements in women’s education.  
 
Unemployment varies significantly in terms of schooling received. In 2002, the incidence of 
unemployment was lowest for those with tertiary education, particularly for men, followed by those 
with upper secondary education and finally the people with less than upper secondary education. 
Overall, unemployment rates for the less educated were lower in Turkey than in the European 
Union, whereas those for the higher educated exceeded the EU levels. However, the most striking 
feature is the high unemployment rate among women with secondary upper education (more than 
double the rate for men) and those with tertiary education. The latter exceeds the EU average by 4 




As in other developing countries, child labour is very common in Turkey. In 1991 Turkey joined the 
International Programme of the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) initiated by the ILO. In 1998 
Turkey signed the ILO Convention 138 which, in effect, raised the minimum age of employment to 
15 years. In 2001 Turkey ratified the ILO convention 182 which calls for the elimination of the worst 
forms of child labour.  
 
After joining the child labour elimination programme, the number of 6-14 year-olds in the workforce 
dropped substantially: from almost 1 million in 1994 to 500,000 in 1999 (latest available data). This 
might also be the result of having extended compulsory education.  
 
A breakdown by economic activities shows that child labour is most common in agriculture (close to 
60% of the 6-17 year-olds), with over 20% working in industry, 10% in trade and 10% in other 
services.
68 The drop in child labour over the 1990s was mainly attributable to the decline in 
agriculture. Children who make contributions to the household budget are from households with the 
lowest income levels; they account for a substantial share of the household income (ETF, 2004).  
 
Research into the incidence of child labour in Turkey revealed that poverty, low productivity, rapid 
population growth, inadequate education, tradition and culture are significant causal factors that give 
rise to child labour (Bulutay, 1995). Other important factors influencing the extent of child labour are 
the child’s age and gender, parental education and the region where they live (Tunali, 1996).  
 
                                                           
68   A study quoted in ETF (2004) shows that male children are employed in furniture manufacturing, construction, car 
repair, restaurants, bars and coffeehouses. Employment in textiles, wearing apparel and leather products are sectors 
where female children are represented to a significant degree. 88 
Migration 
Large-scale labour migration from Turkey to Western Europe started in 1961, following an 
agreement concluded between Turkey and Western Germany. In the subsequent years, Turkey 
signed similar agreements with other West European countries such as Austria, Belgium, 
Netherlands, France and Sweden. Labour recruitment from Turkey ended with the oil crisis in 1973, 
but Turkish emigration to Europe continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s via family reunifications 
and people, particularly the Kurdish minority, seeking political asylum. According to Turkish 
estimates, the flow of emigrants due to family reunification has steadily decreased from 90,000 in 
1996 to about 60,000 in 2001. Other emigrants from Turkey include those asylum seekers (mostly 
from Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq) who pass through Turkey en route to the European Union (OECD, 
2004c).  
 
Today emigration from Turkey is almost negligible. According to ISKUR (Turkish Labour 
Organization) less than 10,000 workers went abroad in 2001 and about 15,000 halfway through 
2002. In 2002 Turkish migrants went mostly to Saudi Arabia, the Russian Federation and Germany 
(ETF, 2004). In general, information on external migration is extremely limited for want of systematic 
data collection. 
 
Today about 3.2 million Turkish nationals live in the European Union, the bulk of whom (two thirds) 
are concentrated in Germany. Other important host-countries are the Benelux countries, France and 
Austria. Most of the immigrants are of rural origin. However, over the past few years migration has 
taken on a new aspect – an increase in the number of Turkish emigrants with professional 
qualifications and university degrees to Europe and the CIS countries (Kirişçi, 2003 and 2004). The 
OECD estimates that some 1,000 highly skilled and skilled workers as well as university graduates 
(mostly in the fields of information technology, finance and management) emigrate from Turkey each 
year.  
 
Since the early 1990s Turkey has witnessed a wave of irregular immigration comprising nationals 
from neighbouring countries and transitory migrants. People from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, 
Moldova, the Ukraine, Russia and the Central Asian republics are permitted to enter the country 
quite freely. A large number of them are engaged in small-small-scale trade; others work illegally 
(having overstayed their visa or failed to get their visa renewed) as household helps or workers in 
the construction and tourism sectors. The number of illegal workers is estimated at 150,000 up to 1 
million persons (Kirişçi, 2003). The OECD established that illegal migrants from Moldova, Romania, 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation are mainly employed in agriculture, construction or ‘domestic 
services’ (mostly Moldavian women).  
 
From the early 1960s remittances sent by Turkish migrants from abroad have represented an 
important source of foreign exchange earnings for the Turkish economy. Remittances to Turkey 
stood at USD 3.2 billion in 1990, peaking at USD 5.4 billion in 1998, only to drop again to USD 1.9 
billion in 2002.  89 
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Variables  1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  prel.
  2005* 2006* 
Population, th pers., mid-year  56212 62841 63989 65145 66304 67469  68618 69757 70885 72003 73112 74209 
  annual population growth, in %  1.84 1.83 1.81 1.78 1.76  1.70 1.66 1.62 1.58 1.54 1.50 
Gross domestic product, YTL mn, nom.   393 14,772 28,836 52,224 77,415 124,583 178,412 277,574 359,763 430,511
  429,729 542,500 
  annual change in % (real)   9.3 7.0 7.5 3.1 -4.7 7.4  -7.5 7.9 5.8 8.9
  6.0 6.0 
GDP/capita (EUR at exchange rate)   2028 2235 2561 2660 2577 3171  2348 2776 3004 6751
   
GDP/capita (EUR at PPP)   3996 5.213 5.651 5.820 5.573 6.260 5.570 5.949 6.254 .
   
Gross industrial production, Index 1990=100   100 133.4 147.2 150.2 142.6 151.3 139.9 153.1 165.0
   
  annual change in % (real)   8.6 7.1 10.4 2.0 -5.0 6.0  -7.5 9.4 7.8 9.8
  88  
Gross agricultural production   100 107.8 105.3 114.1 108.4 112.6 105.3 112.5 109.7
   
  annual change in % (real)   6.8 4.4 -2.3 8.4 -5.0 3.9  -6.5 6.9 -2.5
   
Consumption of households,YTL mn, nom.  270 9938 19619 36123 55928 89098  128513 184420 239586
   
 annual change in % (real)  13.1 8.5 8.4 0.6 -2.6 6.2  -9 2.1 6.6 10.1
   
Gross fixed capital form., YTL mn, nom.   90 3,706 7,618 12,839 16,931 27,848 32,409 46,043 55,618
   
  annual change in % (real)   15.9 14.1 14.8 -3.9 -15.7 16.9  -31.5 -1.1 10.0 32.4
   
Construction industry    
   
  annual change in % (real)   1.7 5.2 6.6 2.5 -9.4 0.2 -10.6 -6.1 -10.3
   
Dwellings completed, units   n.a. 219753 226930 200072 174758 204740  196884 128206 131556
   
  annual change in %   n.a. 7.3 3.3 -11.8 -12.7 17.2 -3.8 -34.9 2.6
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Table A1 (contd.) 
Variables  1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  prel.
  2005* 2006* 
Employed persons total - LFS, th, avg  19947 20387 20362 20872 21413 20557  20492 21463 21291 21291
 
 
Employed pers. in agriculture - LFS, th, avg  9355 8735 8299 8461 8872 7176  8105 7623 7390 6412
 
 
Employed pers. in industry - LFS, th, avg  3235 3400 3625 3638 3580 3731  3767 3913 3821 3844
 
 
Employed pers. in services - LFS, th, avg  7356 8252 8438 8772 8962 9650  9647 9926 10080 9647
 
 
LFS - unemployed persons, avg (1)  1615 1416 1462 1527 1774 1449  1905 2473 2497 .
 
 
LFS - unemployment rate in %, avg (1) 7.5 6.5 6.7 6.8 7.6 6.6  8.5 10.4 10.5 10.5
 
 
Regist. unemployment rate in %, avg (1) 4.2 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 3.3  3.2 1.9 2.5 2.9
 
 
Average nom. wages (YTL/Hour)  0.0042 0.1465 0.28 0.52 0.95 1.48 1.95 2.68 3.30 .
   
 annual change in % (real)  22.6 0.0 2.7 0.5 11.0 0.8 -14.6 -5.4 -1.8 n.a.
    
GDP Deflator, % p.a.   58.3 77.8 81.5 75.7 55.6 49.9 54.8 44.1 22.5 .
 
 
Consumer prices, % p.a.   60.3 80.4 85.7 84.6 64.9 54.9  54.4 45.0 25.3 10.6
 
75  
Wholesale prices in manufacturing, % p.a. 46,9 70.4 80.6 66.7 57.2 56.1 66.7 48.3 23.8 11.1
 
 
FXD / M2, in %  n.a. 83.7 88.5 76.9 81.1 78.1  125.6 116.0 82.6 .
 
 
Discount rate, % p.a., end of period   45.0 50.0 67.0 67.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 55.0 43.0 38.0
   
* wiiw projections. 
Notes: (1) as of civilian labour force. 
Source: Central Bank of RT, Electronic Data Distribution System, State Institute of Statistics,  State Planning Organization, Undersecretariat of the Treasury. 100 
Table A2 
Southeast Europe: an overview of economic fundamentals, 2003 
Albania    Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
 Bulgaria  Croatia Macedonia    Romania Serbia  and 
Montenegro
 NMS-8
1) EU-15  EU-25
2) Turkey  
GDP in EUR at exchange rates, EUR bn  5.42 6.22 17.59 25.11 4.14   50.35 17.22 425.36 9294.93 9735.75 212.27  
GDP in EUR at PPP, EUR bn  11.76 23.29 53.41 43.94 12.99   146.25 35.32 864.55 9294.93 10179.15 443.30  
GDP in EUR at PPP, EU-25=100  0.1 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.1   1.4 0.3 8.5 91.3 100.0 4.4  
GDP in EUR at PPP, per capita  3740 6030 6830 9890 6340    6730 4260 11835 24302 22292 6256   
GDP in EUR at PPP per capita, EU-25=100  17 27 31 44 28    30 19 53 109 100 28   
GDP at constant prices, 1990=100  134.8 390.1
3)  92.3 98.1 90.6 
  98.0 53.8 129.7 128.1 128.2 149.9  
GDP at constant prices, 2000=100  119.4 114.1 114.0 114.5 99.3 
  116.4 111.7 109.0 103.7 103.9 105.5  
Industrial production real, 1990=100  41.3 . 62.1 74.7 50.9   72.6 43.5 140.2 117.8 118.8 165.0  
Industrial production real, 2000=100  112.0 113.4 117.2 116.3 96.3   118.5 99.0 113.3 99.5 100.1 109.1  
Employed persons - LFS, thousands, average  920.0
4)5)  634.0
6)  2834.8 1537.0 545.1 
  9222.5 3220.8
5)  28372.6 170962.0 199772.0 21290.5  
Public sector expenditures, nat. def., in % of GDP 28.4
5)  46.3 40.9 50.2 22.3 
7)  32.3 . 48.4 48.4 48.3 38.9  
Public sector revenues, nat. def., in % of GDP  22.2
5)  46.7 40.9 40.9 21.3 
7)  30.0 49.4 42.8 45.8 45.6 27.9  
Price level, EU-15=100 (PPP/exch. rate)  46 27 33 57 32    34 49 49 100 96 47.9   
Average gross monthly wages, EUR  158
8)5)  395 145 743 326 










12)   21.3  




12)   27.1  




12)   7.9  




12)   3.5  




12)   0.9  




12)   3.2  
Current account in % of GDP   -6.7 -29.6 -8.5 -7.2 -6.0   -5.8 -10.7
11) -4.3
12) 0.6 . -2.8  
FDI stock per capita in EUR  336 294 551 2044 520    465 327 2031 . . 275 
5) 
PPP: Purchasing power parity - wiiw estimates for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. 
NMS-8: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. EU-15: EU up to 30 April 2004. EU-25: EU as of from 1 May 2004. 
Notes: 1) wiiw estimates. - 2) wiiw estimates, except: employed persons, budget and compensation per employee. - 3) 1995=100. - 4) Employment total. - 5) Year 2002. - 6) Employees, end of period. - 7) Central government budget. - 8) 
Monthly wages in public sector. - 9) Average net monthly wages, Serbia only and including various allowances. - 10) Gross wages plus indirect labour costs, whole economy, national account concept. - 11) Serbia only. - 12) NMS-8, EU-
15 and EU-25 data include flows within the region. - 13) 1st half 2003, average wages in industry. 
Source:  wiiw, AMECO, Eurostat. 101 
Table A3 
Gross domestic product at current prices: shares of economic sectors, 1980 to 2003 
Sectors  1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Agriculture  26.1 24.2 22.4 20.9 21.2 19.7 19.5 17.8 17.3 16.6 17.5 15.2 15.0 15.4 15.5 15.7 16.9 14.5 17.5 15.3 14.1 12.1 11.6 11.7 
Industry  19.3 21.9 22.8 21.9 21.1 21.7 25.5 25.8 27.0 27.1 25.5 25.9 25.6 24.5 26.4 26.3 25.2 25.3 22.9 23.2 23.3 25.7 25.2 24.7 
  Mining & Quarrying  1.4  1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 
  Manufacturing  17.1  19.4 20.0 19.1 18.1 18.3 22.2 21.8 23.0 23.1 22.0 22.2 21.6 20.8 22.1 22.6 21.1 21.6 19.4 19.2 19.2 20.6 20.1 20.0 
  Energy  0.8  0.8 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.8 1.6 2.0 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.9 3.0 3.9 4.1 3.6 
Construction  5.7 5.2 4.6 5.5 5.4 5.8 6.9 7.3 7.7 7.0 6.3 7.0 6.8 7.4 6.8 5.5 5.8 6.0 6.0 5.6 5.2 5.2 4.1 3.5 
Trade  16.0 17.0 17.9 18.4 19.2 19.1 18.3 19.9 19.9 18.8 19.1 18.6 18.5 18.6 19.7 20.5 20.5 20.8 19.9 19.1 20.0 21.0 20.2 19.8 
Transport & Communication  11.1 12.1 12.9 13.4 13.5 12.7 11.7 11.6 11.8 11.6 11.8 11.8 12.2 12.0 13.3 12.6 13.1 13.9 13.6 14.0 14.2 15.8 15.1 15.0 
Financial Institutions  2.0 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.5 3.1 3.3 2.9 3.2 4.1 4.0 4.3 3.0 4.2 5.0 5.1 6.3 5.5 3.8 3.7 4.7 5.0 
Ownership Of Dwellings  8.2 7.5 7.5 7.7 7.1 7.2 6.7 5.9 4.5 3.7 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.4 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.2 4.1 
Business & Personnel Services  2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.5 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.5 
(-) Imputed Bank Serv. Charges  1.6 1.6 1.0 1.1 0.1 -0.9 1.4 2.7 2.6 1.1 2.5 3.7 3.8 3.8 4.2 3.5 4.8 4.8 5.8 5.5 3.3 6.5 2.9 2.2 
Sectoral Total  89.4 91.3 92.1 91.6 92.2 91.7 92.0 91.0 91.4 89.8 87.9 86.4 85.7 85.3 87.3 88.2 88.3 87.5 87.4 85.3 85.4 85.4 85.6 85.0 
Government Services  8.9 6.9 6.0 5.9 5.1 5.1 4.7 5.1 4.9 6.8 8.3 9.7 10.2 10.3 8.9 8.0 8.4 8.9 9.4 11.3 10.1 10.4 10.0 10.2 
Private Non-Profit Institutions  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.0 
Import Duties  1.4 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.3 2.8 2.9 3.5 3.3 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.7 4.1 3.5 3.7 3.1 3.4 3.0 3.0 4.1 3.7 3.8 3.8 
G.D.P. (at market prices)  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Net Factor Income From Abroad  1.4 1.5 1.1 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.4  (0.0) 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.9 2.5 1.1 0.8  (1.1) (0.9)  (0.9) 
G.N.P. (at market prices)  101.4 101.5 101.1 100.2 100.8 100.7 100.2 100.4 100.0 101.3 101.0 100.7 100.9 100.8 100.5 101.2 101.4 101.9 102.5 101.1 100.8  98.9 99.1 99.1 




Balance of payments, in % of GDP, 1990 to 2003 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
A. CURRENT  ACCOUNT  -1.7 0.2 -0.6 -3.6 2.0 -1.4 -1.3 -1.4 1.0 -0.7 -4.9 2.3 -0.8 -2.8 
1.         Exports f.o.b.  8.6 9.0 9.3 8.6 14.0 12.8 17.7 17.0 15.4 15.7 15.4 23.7 21.8 21.3 
2.         Imports f.o.b.  -15.0 -13.9 -14.4 -16.5 -17.2 -20.6 -23.6 -25.1 -22.5 -21.4 -26.7 -26.8 -26.4 -27.1 
Balance on Goods  -6.4 -4.9 -5.2 -7.9 -3.3 -7.8 -5.9 -8.1 -7.1 -5.7 -11.2 -3.1 -4.5 -5.8 
3.         Services: Credit  5.4 5.6 6.0 6.1 8.5 8.8 7.4 10.4 11.9 9.1 10.2 11.0 8.0 7.9 
4.         Services: Debit  -2.1 -2.2 -2.4 -2.3 -3.1 -3.1 -3.7 -4.7 -5.1 -5.1 -4.5 -4.8 -3.8 -3.5 
Balance on Goods and Services  -3.1 -1.4 -1.5 -4.2 2.2 -2.1 -2.2 -2.4 -0.4 -1.6 -5.5 3.2 -0.2 -1.5 
5.         Income: Credit  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.4 0.9 
6.         Income: Debit  -2.3 -2.4 -2.3 -2.2 -3.2 -2.8 -2.5 -2.6 -2.7 -3.2 -3.4 -5.3 -3.8 -3.2 
Balance on Goods, Services and Income -4.7 -3.2 -3.2 -5.7 -0.4 -4.0 -3.8 -4.0 -1.9 -3.5 -7.5 -0.3 -2.7 -3.7 
7.         Current Transfers  3.0 3.4 2.6 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 0.9 
B. CAPITAL  ACCOUNT   
C. FINANCIAL  ACCOUNT  2.7 -1.6 2.3 5.0 -3.3 2.7 3.0 3.7 -0.4 2.6 4.8 -10.1 0.6 2.5 
8.         Direct Investment Abroad  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 
9.         Direct Investment in Turkey  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 2.2 0.6 0.2 
10.         Portfolio Investment- Assets  -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.8 -0.4 -0.8 -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 -1.1 -0.6 
11.         Portfolio Investment- Liabilities  0.5 0.5 2.0 2.5 0.9 0.4 1.1 1.2 -2.5 2.3 0.8 -2.6 0.8 1.6 
11.1.              Equity Securities  0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.4 
11.2.              Debt Securities  0.4 0.4 1.8 2.2 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.2 -2.3 2.0 0.6 -2.5 0.8 1.2 
12.         Other Investment- Assets  -0.3 -1.7 -1.5 -1.8 1.9 -0.2 0.2 -0.9 -0.7 -1.3 -1.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
12.1.              Monetary Authorities  0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
12.2.              General Government  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
12.3.              Banks  -0.5 -1.7 -1.6 -1.8 1.9 -0.2 0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -1.0 -0.8 0.2 0.3 0.1 
12.4.              Other sectors  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -0.5 
13.         Other Investment- Liabilities  2.1 -0.8 1.8 4.3 -6.5 2.3 2.2 3.5 3.4 1.9 5.2 -8.5 0.9 1.8 
13.1.              Monetary Authorities  -0.4 -0.6 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.2 
13.2.              General Government  -0.3 -0.1 -1.0 -1.2 -2.3 -1.3 -1.2 -0.8 -0.8 -1.1 0.1 -1.4 -0.4 -0.9 
13.3.              Banks  1.5 0.3 1.3 2.5 -5.4 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.9 -6.6 -1.1 1.2 
13.4.              Other sectors  1.2 -0.3 1.4 2.4 0.2 1.5 1.0 2.5 2.3 1.7 3.0 -1.0 1.6 1.3 
Current, Capital and Financial Account  0.9 -1.4 1.7 1.4 -1.3 1.3 1.7 2.3 0.6 1.9 -0.1 -7.7 -0.2 -0.4 
D.  NET ERRORS AND OMMISSIONS  -0.3 0.6 -0.7 -1.2 1.4 1.4 0.8 -0.5 -0.3 0.9 -1.4 -1.2 0.1 2.1 
GLOBAL BALANCE  0.6 -0.8 0.9 0.2 0.2 2.8 2.5 1.8 0.2 2.8 -1.5 -8.9 -0.1 1.7 
E. RESERVE  ASSETS  -0.6 0.8 -0.9 -0.2 -0.2 -2.8 -2.5 -1.8 -0.2 -2.8 1.5 8.9 0.1 -1.7 
14.         Official Reserves  -0.6 0.8 -0.9 -0.2 -0.4 -3.0 -2.5 -1.8 -0.1 -3.1 -0.2 1.9 -3.3 -1.7 
15.         Use of Fund Credits and Loans  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.3 1.7 7.0 3.5 0.0 
16.         Exceptional Financing   
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, Ankara, update form 5 August 2004. 103 
Table A5 
Economic and financial relations with the outside world, 1990 to 2004 (2006) 
Variables  1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 
Current account, EUR mn   -2035 -1930 -2328 1751 -1267  -10670 3798 -1603 -7120 -12530 -14000  -17000 
Current account in % of GDP (1)   -1.7 -1.3 -1.4 1.0 -0.7 -4.9 2.3 -0.0 -3.3 -5.2   
Central Bank's gross foreign exchange reserves, EUR mn 4631 12885 16254 17404 21849  24095 21050 28233 29781 .  
Total outstanding external debt,USD mn (2) (3)  49035 79356 84215 96417 103027  118806 113901 131058 147035 .  
Short term to total outstanding external debt, % (3)  19.4 21.5 21.0 21.5 22.2 23.8 14.4 12.5 15.7 .  
Public sector's share (incl. SEEs)  
on total outstanding external debt, % (3)  62.0 50.6 46.2 41.4 41.2  41.2 40.8 48.8 47.8 47.3
 
Gross external debt, EUR mn (3)  38021 62834 74319 85090 97121  129107 127620 138031 130263 .  
FDI inflow, EUR mn   530 724 752 841 766  1855 3684 621 367 .  
FDI outflow, EUR mn   0 152 41 11 28  788 25 5 7 .  
Exports total, fob, EUR mn  10048 25391 28337 27060 27189  33385 38484 42203 45365 53630 61700 
  annual change in %   n.a. 53.0 11.6 -4.5 0.5 22.8 15.3 9.7 7.5 18.2  
Imports total, fob, EUR mn  16286 32471 40282 38094 36040  55673 42495 49557 57777 72860 84000 
  annual change in %   n.a. 26.1 24.1 -5.4 -5.4 54.5 -23.7 16.6 12.0 26.1  
Average exchange rate YTL/USD   0.002609 0.081591 0.152438 0.2616 0.4211 0.6252 1.2284 1.5095 1.4967 1.4253  
Average exchange rate YTL/EUR (ECU)   0.003365 0.103044 0.172736 0.2964 0.4468 0.5753 1.0963 1.4332 1.6894 1.7714  
Purchasing power parity YTL/EUR, wiiw  0.00175 0.045090 0.079740 0.1378 0.2095 0.2950 0.4668 0.6689 0.8116 0.8857  
Purchasing power parity YTL/USD, wiiw  0.00155 0.039815 0.071529 0.1241 0.1917 0.2744 0.4301 0.6183 0.7451 0.7126  
Notes: (1) Figures for 2005 and 2006 are wiiw estimates. - (2) Public and private. (3) 1996-2004: new series. 
Source: Central Bank of RT, Electronic Data Distribution System (data update from 5 May 2004), State Institute of Statistics, OECD, Eurostat-ameco, own calculations. 
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Table A6 
Turkey’s foreign trade volume, 1989 to 2003 
World Trade    
year exports imports  net  exports  imports exports imports  trade  volume 
  in Bio USD  % change to previous year Index, 1989==100 
1989 11.6 15.8  -4.2  
1990 13.0 22.3  -9.3 12.1 41.1 112.1 141.1  128.8
1991 13.6 21.0  -7.4 4.6 -5.8 117.2 132.9  126.3
1992 14.7 22.9  -8.2 8.1 9.0 126.7 144.9  137.2
1993 15.3 29.4  -14.1 4.1 28.4 131.9 186.1  163.1
1994 18.1 23.3  -5.2 18.3 -20.7 156.0 147.5  151.1
1995 21.6 35.7  -14.1 19.3 53.2 186.2 225.9  209.1
1996 23.0 42.7  -19.7 6.5 19.6 198.3 270.3  239.8
1997 26.2 48.6  -22.4 13.9 13.8 225.9 307.6  273.0
1998 26.9 45.9  -19.0 2.7 -5.6 231.9 290.5  265.7
1999 26.6 40.7  -14.1 -1.1 -11.3 229.3 257.6  245.6
2000 27.5 54.1  -26.6 3.4 32.9 237.1 342.4  297.8
2001 31.3 40.4  -9.1 13.8 -25.3 269.8 255.7  261.7
2002 35.7 49.9  -14.2 14.1 23.5 307.8 315.8  312.4
2003 47.2 66.7  -19.5 32.2 33.7 406.9 422.2  415.7
Trade with EU-15   
year exports imports  net  exports  imports exports imports  trade  volume 
  in billion USD  % change to previous year Index, 1989==100 
1989 5.7 6.5  -0.8  
1990 7.2 9.9  -2.7 26.8 53.1 126.8 153.1  140.8
1991 7.3 9.9  -2.5 2.4 0.0 129.8 153.1  142.2
1992 7.9  10.7  -2.8 8.0 8.1 140.2 165.5  153.7
1993 7.6  13.9  -6.3 -4.2 29.9 134.3 215.0  177.4
1994 8.6  10.9  -2.3 13.6 -21.6 152.6 168.6  161.1
1995 11.1 16.9  -5.8 28.5 55.0 196.1 261.5  230.9
1996 11.5 22.7  -11.2 3.6 34.3 203.2 351.2  282.1
1997 12.2 24.9  -12.7 6.1 9.7 215.5 385.2  306.0
1998 13.4 24.1  -10.7 9.8 -3.2 236.7 372.8  309.3
1999 14.4 21.4  -7.0 7.5 -11.2 254.4 331.1  295.3
2000 14.4 26.5  -12.1 0.0 23.8 254.4 410.0  337.3
2001 16.1 18.1  -2.0 11.8 -31.7 284.4 280.0  282.1
2002 18.3 23.1  -4.8 13.7 27.6 323.3 357.4  341.5
2003 24.5 31.1  -6.6 33.9 34.6 432.8 481.1  458.6
Source: UN COMTRADE, own calculations. 
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Table A7 
Turkey’s trade structure, by product group 
    Export shares in % of total 
SITC groups    1989 1995  2003
2-22-27-28  Agricultural Raw Materials   3.3 1.5  0.8
0+1+22+4 Food    22.9 19.6  10.0
26+65+84 Textiles    37.4 40.8  32.7
3 Fuels    2.2 1.3  2.1
5 Chemicals    8.3 4.1  3.5
27+28+68  Ores & Metals   5.7 3.3  2.0
7  Machinery & Transport Equipment   5.0 11.0  26.2
6+8-68 Other  manufactures    52.5 59.2  54.1
9  Miscellaneous Goods   0.0 0.1  1.4
 manufactures  65.8 74.4  83.7
  Group  Import shares in % of total 
SITC   1989 1995  2003
2-22-27-28  Agricultural Raw Materials   4.5 5.6  3.7
0+1+22+4 Food    8.0 7.0  4.2
26+65+84 Textiles    4.0 7.5  7.7
3 Fuels    20.5 13.0  13.0
5 Chemicals    14.7 14.7  15.1
27+28+68  Ores & Metals   8.1 5.9  5.5
7  Machinery & Transport Equipment   25.9 32.2  32.1
6+8-68 Other  manufactures    18.3 21.4  21.2
9  Miscellaneous Goods   0.0 0.2  5.3
 manufactures  58.9 68.3  68.4
Source: UN COMTRADE, own calculations. 
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Table A8 
Revealed comparative advantages in manufacturing, 1995 
Export component  Import component  RCA 
Industry EU AUT TUR   EU AUT TUR EU AUT TUR 
Food products and beverages  1.18 0.47 1.52   1.23 0.65 0.93 -0.05 -0.18 0.59 
Tobacco products  0.93 0.25 1.78   1.05 0.25 0.30 -0.12 0.00 1.49 
Textiles 0.93 1.09 5.36   0.96 1.05 1.41 -0.03 0.04 3.95 
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur  0.73 0.68 8.42   1.06 1.28 0.07 -0.33 -0.60 8.35 
Tanning and dressing of leather; related articles  0.98 1.17 0.62   0.85 1.01 0.47 0.12 0.16 0.15 
Wood and products of wood & cork, excl. furniture  0.76 3.00 0.26   0.98 1.24 0.24 -0.22 1.76 0.03 
Pulp, paper and paper products  1.19 2.40 0.23   1.24 1.10 1.13 -0.05 1.30 -0.90 
Publishing, printing & reproduction of recorded media  1.31 1.63 0.15   1.17 2.15 0.45 0.14 -0.52 -0.30 
Coke, refined petroleum products nuclear fuel 0.59 0.02 0.08   0.81 0.29 1.41 -0.21 -0.27 -1.32 
Chemicals and chemical products  1.16 0.55 0.54  1.14 0.96 1.75 0.02 -0.41 -1.21 
Rubber and plastic products  1.18 1.39 0.91   1.20 1.46 0.72 -0.02 -0.08 0.19 
Other non-metallic mineral products  1.31 1.95 2.18   1.14 1.53 0.78 0.17 0.42 1.40 
Basic metals  0.98 1.44 1.92   1.02 0.91 1.44 -0.04 0.53 0.49 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery & equip.  1.15 2.07 0.75   1.11 1.86 0.76 0.04 0.22 -0.01 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  1.16 1.44 0.32   0.88 1.19 1.63 0.28 0.25 -1.32 
Office machinery and computers  0.73 0.23 0.01   1.00 0.58 0.40 -0.27 -0.35 -0.39 
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  0.96 1.11 0.65   0.92 1.02 0.73 0.04 0.09 -0.08 
Radio, TV and communication equipment & apparatus  0.54 0.37 0.15   0.62 0.44 0.39 -0.08 -0.06 -0.24 
Medical, precision, optical instruments, watches & clocks  0.89 0.78 0.05   0.92 0.91 0.81 -0.03 -0.13 -0.76 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  1.12 1.11 0.39  1.10 1.29 0.59 0.02 -0.18 -0.21 
Other transport equipment  0.95 0.45 0.18   1.00 0.75 2.74 -0.05 -0.30 -2.56 
Furniture; manufacture n.e.c.  0.94 1.16 0.28   0.88 1.25 0.30 0.06 -0.09 -0.01 
Note: An index greater than 1 indicates above-average shares of exports (imports, respectively), below-average export shares result in an index between 0 and 1. The RCA index is 
symmetric around 0, a positive index reveals specialization in the respective industry. 
Source: Own calculations based on UN COMTRADE data. 
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Table A9 
Revealed comparative advantages in manufacturing, 2003 
Export component  Import component  RCA 
Industry EU AUT TUR   EU AUT TUR EU AUT TUR 
Food products and beverages  1.08 1.01 0.93   1.23 0.98 0.53 -0.15 0.03 0.39 
Tobacco products  1.08 2.05 1.15   1.52 0.56 0.45 -0.45 1.49 0.70 
Textiles 0.87 0.74 6.07   0.90 0.89 1.64 -0.03 -0.15 4.42 
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur  0.68 0.47 5.27   1.01 0.99 0.25 -0.33 -0.52 5.02 
Tanning and dressing of leather; related articles  1.07 1.14 0.49   0.96 0.94 0.45 0.11 0.20 0.04 
Wood and products of wood & cork, excl. furniture  0.85 3.02 0.25   0.93 1.12 0.36 -0.08 1.90 -0.11 
Pulp, paper and paper products  1.30 2.08 0.35   1.30 1.34 1.16 0.01 0.73 -0.81 
Publishing, printing & reproduction of recorded media  1.20 2.93 0.19   1.18 2.05 0.54 0.02 0.88 -0.35 
Coke, refined petroleum products nuclear fuel 0.76 0.20 0.80   0.86 0.98 1.62 -0.09 -0.78 -0.82 
Chemicals and chemical products  1.22 0.65 0.30  1.23 0.91 1.57 -0.01 -0.26 -1.27 
Rubber and plastic products  1.14 1.25 1.10   1.14 1.45 0.91 0.00 -0.20 0.19 
Other non-metallic mineral products  1.19 1.50 2.71   1.08 1.38 0.66 0.12 0.12 2.05 
Basic metals  0.88 1.25 1.60   1.10 1.03 2.50 -0.22 0.21 -0.89 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery & equip.  1.16 1.83 1.23   1.09 1.74 0.74 0.07 0.09 0.50 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  1.24 1.34 0.62   0.98 1.27 1.58 0.25 0.06 -0.96 
Office machinery and computers  0.44 0.40 0.02   0.78 0.59 0.36 -0.34 -0.19 -0.34 
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  0.99 1.29 0.61   0.92 1.14 0.77 0.06 0.15 -0.15 
Radio, TV and communication equipment & apparatus  0.55 0.50 0.49   0.57 0.50 0.52 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
Medical, precision, optical instruments, watches & clocks  0.86 0.66 0.08   0.84 0.82 0.65 0.02 -0.16 -0.58 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  1.21 1.09 0.95  1.16 1.25 0.98 0.05 -0.16 -0.03 
Other transport equipment  0.96 0.57 0.56   1.21 0.58 0.31 -0.25 -0.01 0.25 
Furniture; manufacture n.e.c.  0.91 1.22 0.89   0.78 0.95 0.31 0.13 0.27 0.59 
Note: An index greater than 1 indicates above average export shares (imports, resp.), below average export shares result in an index between 0 and 1. The RCA index is symmetric around 0, a 
positive index reveals specialization in the respective industry. 




Regional structure of Turkey’s manufacturing exports, 1995 
Industry World OECD EU-15 CEEC-9  AUT  DEU
Food products and beverages  10.8 7.2 7.2 3.1  9.2  5.1
Tobacco products  0.7 0.9 0.4 1.2  0.1  0.1
Textiles 22.0 26.8 26.8 39.1  25.2  28.4
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur  23.4 32.3 31.8 37.7  38.4  42.7
Tanning and dressing of leather; related articles  1.0 0.8 0.6 4.5  1.1  0.5
Wood and products of wood & cork, excl. furniture  0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0  0.0  0.1
Pulp, paper and paper products  0.7 0.2 0.2 0.6  0.1  0.1
Publishing, printing & reproduction of recorded media  0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1  0.1  0.2
Coke, refined petroleum products nuclear fuel  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0  .  0.0
Chemicals and chemical products  6.2 4.2 4.7 4.0  1.9  0.7
Rubber and plastic products  2.7 2.1 2.2 1.4  2.1  1.4
Other non-metallic mineral products  3.7 3.5 3.7 0.6  2.2  3.1
Basic metals  12.1 6.5 5.2 0.2  1.9  1.9
Fabricated metal products, except machinery & equip.  2.1 1.6 1.7 0.8  1.8  1.7
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  3.6 3.1 3.2 1.8  2.5  2.2
Office machinery and computers  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1  0.0  0.0
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  3.0 2.8 3.3 1.7  3.0  4.8
Radio, TV and communication equipment & apparatus  1.3 1.7 2.0 0.6  2.0  1.5
Medical, precision, optical instruments, watches & clocks 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1  0.1  0.2
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  4.4 4.3 4.9 1.9  6.0  3.2
Other transport equipment  0.6 0.5 0.5 0.0  0.1  0.7
Furniture; manufacture n.e.c.  0.9 0.9 0.8 0.4  2.4  1.1
Source: Own calculations based on UN COMTRADE data. 
Table A11 
Regional structure of Turkey’s manufacturing imports, 1995 
Industry World OECD EU-15 CEEC-9  AUT  DEU
Food products and beverages  6.3 5.1 4.2 2.3  3.6  2.1
Tobacco products  0.1 0.1 0.1     0.0
Textiles  5.7 2.9 3.1 4.3 3.5 2.9
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur  0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0  0.3  0.1
Tanning and dressing of leather; related articles  0.9 0.8 0.9 0.1  0.1  0.2
Wood and products of wood & cork, excl. furniture  0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2  0.3  0.2
Pulp, paper and paper products  3.3 2.9 2.7 7.7  11.2  2.3
Publishing, printing & reproduction of recorded media  0.4 0.6 0.5 0.0  0.6  0.6
Coke, refined petroleum products nuclear  fuel  1.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Chemicals and chemical products  21.1 20.7 22.3 23.7 23.0 20.6
Rubber and plastic products  2.0 2.4 3.0 0.6  3.0  3.6
Other non-metallic mineral products  1.2 1.4 1.8 1.6  8.1  1.5
Basic  metals  10.2 5.9 7.6 18.8 7.7 6.4
Fabricated metal products, except machinery & equip.  1.9 2.3 2.8 0.7  2.9  2.4
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  17.7 22.1 23.2 12.8  22.2  28.7
Office machinery and computers  2.4 2.7 1.8 0.0  0.6  1.5
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  3.4 4.0 4.5 3.4  5.2  5.8
Radio, TV and communication equipment & apparatus  3.6 4.0 4.3 12.0  1.8  4.7
Medical, precision, optical instruments, watches & clocks 2.8 3.4 3.0 1.1  1.3  3.8
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  6.3 8.1 8.7 9.1  2.0  10.7
Other  transport  equipment  7.3 8.7 3.7 0.8 0.8 1.1
Furniture; manufacture n.e.c.  1.0 1.1 1.2 0.6  1.9  0.7
Source: Own calculations based on UN COMTRADE data.  
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Table A12 
Regional structure of Turkey’s manufacturing exports, 2003 
Industry World OECD EU-15 CEEC-9  AUT  DEU
Food products and beverages  5.31 3.95 3.87 3.20  5.79  4.04
Tobacco products  0.21 0.08 0.10 0.68  .  0.00
Textiles 20.47 23.67 23.93 19.51  19.06  29.11
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur  14.02 18.65 18.28 5.52  14.40  24.30
Tanning and dressing of leather; related articles  0.66 0.47 0.48 1.55  0.54  0.36
Wood and products of wood & cork, excl. furniture  0.34 0.14 0.16 0.09  0.05  0.13
Pulp, paper and paper products  0.84 0.29 0.31 0.31  0.05  0.11
Publishing, printing & reproduction of recorded media  0.15 0.11 0.11 0.06  0.32  0.17
Coke, refined petroleum products nuclear fuel  2.19 1.20 0.93 0.49  0.01  0.00
Chemicals and chemical products 3.71 2.36 2.24 4.33  1.14  1.46
Rubber and plastic products  3.37 2.71 2.89 3.83  4.42  2.50
Other non-metallic mineral products  4.14 4.00 3.41 2.97  1.37  1.97
Basic metals  8.93 5.75 5.30 2.36  4.06  1.65
Fabricated metal products, except machinery & equip.  3.26 2.40 2.47 4.50  5.89  2.26
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  6.94 6.20 6.35 8.91  8.49  4.99
Office machinery and computers  0.09 0.07 0.07 0.04  0.01  0.05
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  2.81 2.05 2.40 1.84  1.26  2.55
Radio, TV and communication equipment & apparatus  4.48 5.98 6.98 6.86  10.43  5.84
Medical, precision, optical instruments, watches & clocks 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.18  0.05  0.20
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 12.51 14.13 15.74 28.33  18.94  14.11
Other transport equipment  2.39 2.84 1.99 0.19  0.14  2.04
Furniture; manufacture n.e.c.  2.90 2.69 1.75 4.25  3.59  2.14
Source: Own calculations based on UN COMTRADE data. 
Table A13 
Regional structure of Turkey’s manufacturing imports, 2003 
Industry World OECD EU-15 CEEC-9  AUT  DEU
Food products and beverages  2.9 2.5 2.3 0.9  0.7  0.9
Tobacco products  0.1 0.1 0.1     0.0
Textiles  5.7 3.6 3.9 3.8 4.0 2.6
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur  0.8 0.6 0.8 0.3  0.1  0.2
Tanning and dressing of leather; related articles  0.8 0.5 0.6 0.5  0.8  0.1
Wood and products of wood & cork, excl. furniture  0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7  1.0  0.4
Pulp, paper and paper products  2.4 2.6 2.9 2.3  11.1  2.5
Publishing, printing & reproduction of recorded media  0.5 0.6 0.6 0.0  0.1  0.4
Coke, refined petroleum products nuclear  fuel  5.1 1.7 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.2
Chemicals and chemical products  20.0 21.0 22.3 12.3 19.2 19.9
Rubber and plastic products  2.6 2.9 3.4 2.9  2.0  3.7
Other non-metallic mineral products  0.9 0.9 1.1 0.8  2.2  1.2
Basic  metals  13.2 11.2 7.8 9.7 4.2 5.7
Fabricated metal products, except machinery & equip.  1.8 2.1 2.4 2.8  3.6  3.2
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  14.9 18.1 18.3 8.5  21.6  24.0
Office machinery and computers  2.2 1.6 1.2 3.8  0.2  0.6
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  3.7 4.1 4.0 5.7  7.1  5.0
Radio, TV and communication equipment & apparatus  5.5 5.0 4.3 33.9  0.8  4.0
Medical, precision, optical instruments, watches & clocks 2.6 3.1 2.4 0.8  1.2  3.1
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 11.6 15.3 18.1 9.5  6.9  20.7
Other transport equipment  0.9 1.0 1.0 0.0  12.4  0.9
Furniture; manufacture n.e.c.  1.2 1.0 1.1 0.6  0.6  0.9
Source: Own calculations based on UN COMTRADE data.  
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Table A14 
Foreign Direct Investment figures for Turkey, 1980 to 2004 
  FDI Permits, USD million  Sectoral Breakdown of Authorized FDI, in %   Realized FDI Flows, USD million 
Years Cumulative  Annual  Manufacturing  Agriculture  Mining  Services 
No. of Foreign 
Capital 
Companies 
Total Capital of 
Foreign Capital 
Companies (YTL mn)
Inflows Outflows  Net 
1980  97 97 91.5  0.0  0.0  8.5  78  28.39   
1981  435 338  73.0  0.3 0.3  26.4 109  47.40  141 46 95 
1982  602 167  59.0  0.6 1.2  39.2 147  100.20  103 48 55 
1983  704 103  86.6  0.0 0.0  13.4 166  147.11  87 41 46 
1984  976 271  68.5  2.2 0.1  29.2 235  254.78  113  0  113 
1985  1210 234  60.9  2.7 1.8  34.5 408  464.98  99  0 99 
1986  1574 364  53.2  4.6 0.2  42.0 619  707.16  125  0  125 
1987  2229 655  44.9  2.0 0.2  53.0 836  960.04  115  0  115 
1988  3050 821  59.8  3.3 0.7  36.2  1172  1597.10  354  0  354 
1989  4562 1512  62.8  0.6  0.8 35.8 1525  4847.83  663  0 663 
1990  6423 1861  65.2  3.5  2.5 28.7 1856  7943.78  684  0 684 
1991  8390 1967  55.7  1.1  2.0 41.2 2123  13,101.04  907  97 810 
1992  10210 1820  70.0  1.9  1.0 27.1 2330  23,441.21  911  67 844 
1993  12274 2063  76.0  1.0  0.6 22.4 2554  36,737.05  746 110 636 
1994  13751 1478  74.9  1.9  0.4 22.7 2830  62,449.96  636  28 608 
1995  16690 2938  68.0  1.1  2.1 28.9 3161  113,013.79  934  49 885 
1996  20525 3836  16.7  1.7  0.2 81.4 3582  235,971.18  914 192 722 
1997  22204 1678  52.0  0.7  1.6 45.7 4068  458,968.46  852  47 805 
1998  23850 1646  61.8  0.4  0.8 37.0 4533  823,560.55  953  13 940 
1999  25550 1700  66.1  1.0  0.4 32.6 4950  1,446.50  813  30 783 
2000  29027 3477  31.8  1.7  0.1 66.4 5328  3,063.46  1707 725 982 
2001  31752 2725  45.7  4.9  1.1 48.3 5841  6,184.41  3288  22  3266 
2002  33995 2243  39.8  1.5  0.8 58.0 6280  10,092.74  590  5 585 
2003 
1)  35203 1208  58.8  0.6  10.3 30.3 6511  12,605.29  414  8 406 
2004 
2)               455  3  452 
Total/Avg.    35203  60.1  1.6  1.2  37.0      16604  1531  15073 
Notes: 1) The value in the second column is only for January-June. - 2) January-May. 
Source: Central Bank of RT, St. Planning Organization, Under-secretariat of the Treasury.  
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Table A15 
Total outstanding external debt profile (USD million) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Q1 
TOTAL  OUTSTANDING EXTERNAL DEBT ( OED ) 79,356 84,215 96,417 103,027 118,806 113,901 131,058 147,035 146,510 
MEDIUM - LONG TERM  OED  62,284 66,524 75,643 80,106 90,505 97,498 114,634 124,022 122,630 
PUBLIC SECTOR  51,551 49,713 51,963 52,739 61,352 70,010 84,325 91,742 89,289 
PRIVATE SECTOR (1)  10,733 16,812 23,680 27,367 29,153 27,488 30,309 32,280 33,341 
SHORT TERM  OED  17,072 17,691 20,774 22,921 28,301 16,403 16,424 23,013 23,880 
PERCENTAGE  SHARE OF OED  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
MEDIUM - LONG TERM  OED  78.49 78.99 78.45 77.75 76.18 85.60 87.47 84.35 83.70 
SHORT TERM   OED  21.51 21.01 21.55 22.25 23.82 14.40 12.53 15.65 16.30 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN TOTAL  OED  6.12 14.49 6.85 15.32 -4.13 15.06 12.19 -0.36 
MEDIUM - LONG TERM  6.81 13.71 5.90 12.98 7.73 17.58 8.19 -1.12 
SHORT TERM  3.63 17.43 10.34 23.47 -42.04 0.13 40.12 3.77 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES (GROSS)  16,273 18,419 19,721 23,177 22,172 18,787 26,807 33,616 32,922 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES (NET)  17,614 19,513 20,726 24,183 23,153 19,799 28,071 35,162 34,491 
CREDIT DISBURSEMENT (3)  6,048 9,905 11,505 11,842 20,898 23,931 27,636 16,045 17,989 
EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE (3)  11,418 12,418 16,513 18,316 21,937 24,623 28,852 27,772 29,864 
PRINCIPAL 7,218 7,830 11,690 12,866 15,638 17,489 22,450 20,784 22,779 
INTEREST 4,200 4,588 4,823 5,450 6,299 7,134 6,402 6,988 7,085 
GNP   
GNP (USD million) (4)  184,037 193,286 205,071 186,332 201,371 144,020 182,644 238,891 260,081 
GNP (TRL billion) (5)  14,978,067 29,393,262 53,518,332 78,282,967 125,596,129 176,483,953 275,032,366 356,680,888 368,536,755 
AVERAGE USD EXCHANGE RATE (BUY RATE) (6)  81,386 152,071 260,974 420,126 623,704 1,225,412 1,505,840 1,493,068 1,417,006 
EXTERNAL DEBT RATIOS (%)   
T.EXTERNAL DEBT / GNP  43.12 43.57 47.02 55.29 59.00 79.09 71.76 61.55 56.33 
PUBLIC SECTOR / GNP  28.01 25.72 25.34 28.30 30.47 48.61 46.17 38.40 34.33 
PRIVATE SECTOR / GNP  5.83 8.70 11.55 14.69 14.48 19.09 16.59 13.51 12.82 
T.EXTERNAL DEBT / EXPORTS (FOB)  341.68 320.69 357.46 387.51 427.75 363.51 363.45 311.17 292.05 
EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE / GNP  6.20 6.42 8.05 9.83 10.89 17.10 15.80 11.63 11.48 
EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE / EXPORTS (FOB)  49.16 47.29 61.22 68.89 78.98 78.58 80.01 58.77 59.53 
INTEREST / GNP  2.28 2.37 2.35 2.92 3.13 4.95 3.51 2.93 2.72 
INTEREST / EXPORTS (FOB)  18.08 17.47 17.88 20.50 22.68 22.77 17.75 14.79 14.12 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES (NET) / T. EXTERNAL DEBT 22.20 23.17 21.50 23.47 19.49 17.38 21.42 23.91 23.54 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES (NET) / SHORT TERM DEBT   103.17 110.30 99.77 105.50 81.81 120.71 170.91 152.79 144.43 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES (GROSS) / T. EXTERNAL DEBT 20.51 21.87 20.45 22.50 18.66 16.49 20.45 22.86 22.47 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES (GROSS) /  SHORT TERM DEBT   95.32 104.11 94.93 101.12 78.34 114.53 163.22 146.07 137.86 
TCMB RESERVES (GROSS) / IMPORTS (CIF)  37.30 37.93 42.94 56.99 40.68 45.38 52.00 48.48 43.52 
TCMB RESERVES (NET) /  IMPORTS (CIF)  40.37 40.18 45.13 59.46 42.48 47.83 54.45 50.71 45.59 
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE  / TCMB RESERVES (GROSS)  -14.98 -14.32 10.06 -5.80 -44.29 18.04 -5.68 -20.38 -28.23 
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE /  TCMB RESERVES (NET)  -13.84 -13.52 9.57 -5.56 -42.41 17.12 -5.42 -19.48 -26.94 
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE / GNP  -1.32 -1.36 0.97 -0.72 -4.88 2.35 -0.83 -2.87 -3.57 
Notes: 1) Since 1 Oct 2001, CBRT is responsible for monitoring private sector debt. - 2) Excluding Shuttle Trade and Other Goods. - 3) 12-months' total. - 4) GNP (TRL) / Average USD Exchange Rate. - 5) 4-quarter 
total. - 6) Annual average. 
Source: UT, CBRT, SIS.  
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Table A16 
Currency composition of total outstanding external debt
1) 
in % of total 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
  SHORT MEDIUM TOTAL SHORT MEDIUM TOTAL SHORT MEDIUM TOTAL SHORT MEDIUM TOTAL SHORT MEDIUM TOTAL 
USD  58.4 32.0 37.7 61.6 42.3 46.3 59.7 45.3 48.4 66.7 48.8 52.7 68.3 50.0 54.4 
DEM  31.7 33.0 32.8 28.7 35.5 34.1 30.7 36.4 35.2 20.3 28.6 26.8 13.8 21.3 19.5 
EUR/ECU  0.0 2.5 2.0 0.0 2.0 1.6 0.0 2.0 1.5 6.0 7.2 7.0 12.9 12.3 12.5 
SDR  0.0 1.1 0.8 0.0 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 1.1 0.9 0.0 4.6 3.5 
CHF  1.4 1.9 1.8 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.2 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.7 
GBP  1.3 1.0 1.1 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.7 
JPY  1.5 17.6 14.2 1.9 13.0 10.7 2.5 9.9 8.3 2.4 9.3 7.8 1.3 7.8 6.3 
FRF  1.5 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.9 
NLG  1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.4 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 
OTHER (USD)   3.0 8.0 6.9 2.8 1.5 1.8 2.4 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.9 1.2 1.1 
TOTAL 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
TOTAL mn USD  17,072  62,283 79,355 17,691 66,524 84,215 20,774 75,643 96,417 22,921 80,106 103,027 28,301 90,505 118,806 
(1) Provisional.       
 
  2001 2002 2003  2004  Q1   
  SHORT MEDIUM TOTAL SHORT MEDIUM TOTAL SHORT MEDIUM TOTAL SHORT MEDIUM TOTAL  
USD  63.5 48.3 50.5 60.6 45.1 47.1 58.1 43.6  45.9 60.1 45.9 48.2  
DEM  2.5 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
EUR/ECU  30.2 30.0 30.0 35.4 29.8 30.5 38.7 32.2  33.3 37.1 31.0 32.0  
SDR  0.0 14.5 12.4 0.0 19.2 16.8 0.0 19.4 16.3 0.0 18.6 15.5  
CHF  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6  
GBP  1.2 0.5 0.6 1.3 0.5 0.6 1.4 0.3 0.4 1.4 0.3 0.5  
JPY  1.4 5.1 4.5 1.7 4.4 4.1 0.8 3.5 3.1 0.5 3.3 2.8  
FRF  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
NLG  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
OTHER (USD)   0.2 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.4  
TOTAL 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
TOTAL mn USD  16,403  97,497 113,900 16,424 114,634 131,058 23,013 124,022 147,035 23,880 122,630 146,510  
Note: 1) Provisional. 
Source: Under-secretariat of the Treasury & CBRT.   
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Table A17 
Total outstanding external debt by borrower, USD million, 1996 to 2004
1) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  Q1 
TOTAL OUTSTANDING DEBT  79,356 84,215 96,417 103,027  118,806 113,901 131,058 147,035 146,510 
SHORT TERM 
(2)  17,072 17,691 20,774 22,921 28,301 16,403 16,424 23,013 23,880 
MEDIUM-LONG TERM  62,284 66,524 75,643 80,106  90,505 97,498 114,634 124,022 122,630 
SHORT TERM 
(2)  17,072 17,691 20,774 22,921 28,301 16,403 16,424 23,013 23,880 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT  0 54 0 0  1,000 0 0 0 0 
CBRT 984 889 905 686  653 752 1,655 2,860 2,883 
CBRT LOANS  42 30 7 6  26 20 15 11 11 
DRESDNER BANK SCHEME  942 859 898 680  627 732 1,640 2,849 2,872 
DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS  8,419 8,503 11,159 13,172  16,900 7,997 6,344 9,692 10,017 
OTHER SECTORS  7,669 8,245 8,710 9,063  9,748 7,654 8,425 10,461 10,980 
MEDIUM-LONG TERM  62,284 66,524 75,643 80,106  90,505 97,498 114,634 124,022 122,630 
 PUBLIC SECTOR  40,162 38,845 39,890 42,427  47,924 46,419 63,985 70,238 69,283 
 GENERAL  GOVERNMENT  36,282 34,738 35,687 37,686  42,503 41,277 59,179 65,562 64,595 
 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT  32,305 31,406 32,333 34,582  39,524 38,763 56,833 63,457 62,566 
 LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS  2,749 2,399 2,567 2,451  2,378 1,934 1,673 1,528 1,471 
 EXTRA BUDGETARY FUNDS  1,211 921 774 646  594 557 646 549 530 
 UNIVERSITIES  16 11 14 8  6 23 26 28 28 
 STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES  2,803 3,171 3,517 3,865  4,216 4,013 3,762 3,475 3,513 
 Financial SOEs  157 445 651 743  706 575 196 209 204 
 Non-financial SOEs  2,646 2,726 2,865 3,123  3,510 3,438 3,566 3,266 3,308 
 OTHER PUBLIC SECTOR 
(3)  1,077 936 686 875 1,205 1,129 1,045 1,200 1,176 
 CBRT  11,389 10,868 12,073 10,312  13,429 23,591 20,340 21,504 20,006 
 CBRT Loans  669 601 392 396  3,705 13,643 8,068 7,272 6,145 
 Dresdner Bank Scheme  10,720 10,267 11,681 9,916  9,724 9,948 12,272 14,232 13,861 
 PRIVATE SECTOR 
(4)  10,733 16,812 23,680 27,367 29,153 27,488 30,309 32,280 33,341 
 FINANCIAL  3,354 5,535 6,879 7,482  7,581 4,789 4,671 5,070 5,253 
 Banks  2,270 3,757 4,274 4,768  4,550 3,211 3,032 3,090 3,165 
 Non-Bank Financial Enterprises  1,084 1,778 2,605 2,713  3,032 1,578 1,639 1,980 2,088 
 NON-FINANCIAL  7,379 11,277 16,801 19,885  21,571 22,699 25,638 27,210 28,088 
Notes: 1) Provisional. - 2) Source: CBRT. - 3) T. Development Bank,  T. Eximbank. - 4) Since 1 Oct 2001, CBRT is responsible for monitoring private sector debt. 
Source: Under-secretariat of the Treasury & CBRT.  
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Table A18 
Public sector borrowing requirement and consolidated government budget 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR), 1000 YTL, at current prices
 (1)    
Total PSBR  29429 64469 116681 239792 306938 392866  1294435 2258729 5016903 12149118 14796079 28926635 34886803 31118619 
   Consolidated budget (2)  11955 33516 47434 133857 152180 316716  1238128 2241376 3895127 9284629 13725888 30790402 40746196 40759003 
   SEEs  15117 19943 36313 48925 54870 -15251  -82502 -115288 697436 1814755 2060070 11420 -3001940 -1794525 
   Local authorities  160 1731 8676 14355 15867 16070  42351 83099 206187 309497 452626 462564 154732 393852 
   Revolving funds  -68 76 78 86 261 2101  -1875 -4956 -14371 -49807 -139833 -171223 -520765 -613757 
   Social security institution including unemployment  
  insurance  -1086 875 2603 11536 22569 33762  4575 25769 204709 194484 -379313 -1981146 -2669380 -3844360 
   Extra-budgetary funds  2424 5945 13876 16984 35049 49782  21290 5847 26204 526860 -1478956 -822184 -55654 -2297300 
   SEEs under privatization  927 2383 7701 14049 26142 -10314  72468 22882 1611 68700 555597 636802 233614 -1484294 
  PSBR / GDP  7.5 10.2 10.7 12.1 7.9 5.1 8.8 7.8 9.6 15.7 11.9 16.2 12.6 8.6 
  Total PSBR excluding interest payments  9246 25861 49046 75404 -113071 -350861  -433535 -360430 -1746468 181385 -7108154 -14279131 -19238099 -30302117 
Consolidated government budget, 1000 YTL (3)     
  Revenues  55239 96747 174224 351392 745116 1394023  2702034 5750096 11887552 18973292 33756437 51812542 76400450 100238122 
  Non-Interest expenditures  54561 106190 181360 368779 599011 1134530  2442761 5712831 9408781 17296951 26162764 39314395 63614975 81444818 
Primary balance  678 -9443 -7136 -17387 146105 259493 259273 37265 2478771 1676341 7593673 12498147 12785475 18793304 
Interest expenditures  13966 24073 40297 116470 298285 576115  1497401 2277917 6176595 10720840 20439862 41064609 51870658 58609163 
 Total expenditures (interest and non-interest)  68527 130263 221657 485249 897296 1710645  3940162 7990748 15585376 28017791 46602626 80379004 115485633 140053981 
Consolidated budget balance (2)  -13288 -33516 -47433 -133857 -152180 -316622 -1238128 -2240652 -3697824 -9044499 -12846189 -28566462 -39085183 -39815859 
  Deferred payments  1161 3555 -778 10905 20092 52072  16325 139740 204064 406672 496835 1490237 1764785 -262332 
  Advances  -1561 -3465 -11227 -3151 -19837 -29945  -45931 -119518 -315730 -458905 -402217 -5040629 2932795 -1824059 
Cash balance  -13688 -33426 -59439 -126103 -151926 -294495 -1267734 -2220430 -3809490 -9096733 -12751571 -32116854 -34387603 -41902250 
  Financing  13688 33426 59439 126103 151926 294495  1267734 2220430 3809490 9096733 12751571 32116854 34387603 41902250 
     Foreign borrowing (net)  41 1921 4038 21062 -67174 -79560  -134411 -447085 -1035566 459693 2676734 -4448179 16570479 2684308 
     Domestic borrowing (net)  9874 15069 39386 52377 173878 282875  1066229 2505517 4590178 9740450 9350855 23542321 17474459 42884258 
     Central bank advances (net)  331 10719 17394 53010 51857 94723  228954000 0 0 0 0  
     Others  3442 5718 -1380 -345 -6635 -3544  106962 161998 254879 -1103410 723983 13022712 342664 -3666315 
Primary balance as % of GDP (4)   0.2 -1.5 -0.7 -0.9 3.8 3.3 1.8 0.1 4.7 2.2 6.1 7.0 4.6 5.2 
Consolidated budget balance as % of GDP (4)   -3.4 -5.3 -4.3 -6.8 -3.9 -4.1 -8.4 -7.8 -7.1 -11.7 -10.3 -16.0 -14.1 -11.1 
Interest expenditures as % of GDP  3.6 3.8 3.7 5.9 7.7 7.4 10.1 7.9 11.8 13.8 16.4 23.0 18.7 16.3 
Notes: (1) negative sign indicates surplus; data source: State Planning Organization, Central Bank of R.T. Electronic Data Distribution System. - (2) There are discrepancies between two lines related to consolidated 
budget balance, as the sources of the two data sets are not the identical. - (3) A positive sign indicates a surplus; source: Under-secretariat of the Treasury, Central Bank of R.T. Electronic Data Distribution System. - 
(4) Data for 2004 and 2005 are government targets for the primary balance and IMF estimates for the consolidated budget. Source: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=17577.0 






Military expenditures of Turkey compared to Greece, Poland and USA 
in USD million at year 2000 prices and exchange rates, and in % of GDP 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Turkey     
USD million  4,559 5,274 6,373 6,551 6,891 7,618 7,462  7,652 8,567 8,926 9,352 10,326 9,994 9,161 9,748 9,888 
In % of GDP  2.9 3.1 3.5 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1  3.9 4.1 4.1 4.4 5.4 5.0 5.0 4.9 n.a. 
Poland     
USD million  4,200 3,541 3,757 2,603 2,568 2,846 2,746  2,763 2,907 3,061 3,179 3,103 3,046 3,061 3,123 3,235 
In % of GDP  2.5 1.8 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.3  2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 n.a. 
Greece     
USD million  4,233 3,969 4,013 3,806 3,955 3,861 3,927  4,011 4,251 4,530 4,937 5,169 5,455 5,336 5,236 5,241 
In % of GDP  5.1 4.6 4.7 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.4  4.3 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.6 4.3 n.a. 
USA     
USD million (year 2000 prices)  426,798 422,133 403,701 354,284 374,386 354,778 334,539 315,107 298,058 296,530 289,658 290,480 301,697 304,130 341,489 417,363 
In % of GDP  5.7 5.5 5.3 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.1  3.8 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.4 n.a. 
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